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CHAPTER 1  
Introduction:  
How Patents Matter to Business, 
Economics and Society 
 
“If patent law had been applied to novels in the 
1880s, great books would not have been written.” 
  The Guardian (23.06.2005) 
 
“Some of the most innovative industries of the last 
forty years – software, computers, and semi-
conductors – have historically had weak patent 
protection and have experienced rapid imitation of 
their products.” 
Bessen and Maskin (2009) 
 
“On the patent front, more time and energy seems 
to be spent on nuisance and defensive patenting of 
the obvious or well-known than is spent on actually 
innovating new ideas.” 
Boldrin and Levine (2002) 
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The year is 2012. On an August morning, in front of Apple Computer’s 
headquarters in California arrive 30 large trucks, each fully loaded with 
five-cent coins, and totaling a billion dollars. Apple’s chief executive Tim 
Cook is called by Samsung and told this is the way Samsung wants to pay 
the fine to Apple after losing the latest patent infringement trial on 
smartphones and tablet computers. The story of the trucks, which was very 
popular on the Internet, with news articles, pictures and videos dedicated to 
making it more credible, is of course false (although the billion-dollar fine 
was real). One would need more than 2,700 trucks to carry a billion dollars 
in nickels; the coins would weigh 100,000 tons and would necessitate the 
entire amount of nickels in circulation in the US (The Guardian, 
29.08.2012). Even though the story was a hoax, it marked a peak of the so-
called “smartphone patent wars”, which continually made news headlines 
during those years.  
 
The smartphone patent wars, which have been ongoing for years, were 
largely fought on a growing market and involved countless patent litigation 
trials between giants of the Internet, computer and mobile phone industries, 
with Sony, Google, Apple, Samsung, Microsoft, Nokia, Motorola and HTC 
as the most prominent examples. These wars were so complex that even 
Eric Schmidt, Google’s chairman, said he didn’t “understand all the details” 
of the smartphone patent fights (The Guardian, 22.10.2012). One of the 
reasons for the confusion is that smartphones “combine technologies from 
different industries, most of them patented. Given such complexity, sorting 
out who owns what requires time and a phalanx of lawyers” (The 
Economist, 21.10.2010). I discuss this peculiar phenomenon in my 
dissertation; it has even won itself a name: “patent thickets”. To make 
matters worse, the smartphone wars became all the more complicated when 
“patent trolls” got involved. These are firms “that buy patents not in order to 
make products, but to sue others for allegedly infringing them” (idem). 
“Patent trolls” are generally seen as a perverse result of the patent system, 
and it is unfortunate that they have also gained a name. Patents, which were 
originally intended to spur innovation, seem meanwhile to have drifted from 
their purpose in many ways. A large portion of this dissertation is dedicated 
to the analysis of such distortions.  
 
Among the smartphone wars, the battle between Apple and Samsung 
particularly stood out because, while fighting over patents, “the two 
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companies are close business partners, with Apple as one of the biggest 
buyers of chips, screens and other components that Samsung manufactures” 
(The Wall Street Journal, 22.04.2011). This makes the situation somewhat 
absurd; after all, the two firms could have agreed on a business solution and 
would have spared themselves the enormous costs of going to court. Indeed, 
the literature has signaled many concerns that patent battles redirect 
significant resources away from innovative activity into wasteful legal suits.  
 
Even more absurd, the one-billion-dollar battle from August 2012 was won 
on “design patents”, not on regular patents. That is, it was won on form, not 
function. Apple had registered designs for elements including the rounded 
corners of its iPhone and iPad, and argued these corners were “visually 
distinctive features” of their products that Samsung infringed upon (The 
Guardian, 22.10.2012). As we will see throughout the dissertation, such 
patents which lack real novelty (often under the name of “trivial patents”) 
may severely jeopardize the chances of subsequent innovation and therefore 
harm society and the economy. In the Apple-Samsung patent war, Samsung 
was even banned from selling its tablet in the US, at the detriment of 
consumers who wanted to buy the product. After receiving the billion-dollar 
fine, Samsung declared that the “verdict should not be viewed as a win for 
Apple, but as a loss for the American consumer. It will lead to fewer 
choices, less innovation, and potentially higher prices. It is unfortunate that 
patent law can be manipulated to give one company a monopoly over 
rectangles with rounded corners, or technology that is being improved every 
day by Samsung and other companies” (The Guardian, 25.08.2012).  
 
Ironically, the entire battle resulted in some unintended consequences for 
Apple. Initially, “many people had no idea that Samsung had a tablet 
offering until they began hearing news reports about Apple seeking to ban 
it” (idem), and people started buying Samsung afterwards. Eventually, 
Apple hurt its own reputation through the patent war, and turned Samsung 
into the second largest seller of smartphones worldwide.  
 
The example of the smartphone wars was meant to point out some patent-
related issues that we will encounter again throughout this dissertation.        
I believe that patents have generally recognized virtues and essential 
features for firms, investors, the economy and society at large. Among 
others, patents are meant to protect the efforts of innovators against easy 
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imitation by competitors; therefore, patents’ role is indispensable. On the 
other hand, patents can bring a myriad of unwanted and unforeseeable 
consequences to the involved institutions. Thus, it is a very difficult 
endeavor for researchers, policy makers and regulators to design an 
“optimal” level of patent protection. Finding a balance between too strong 
and too weak patent protection will often depend on many factors: the 
industry structure, product characteristics, the type of innovation as well as 
other forces. In my dissertation, I bring a theoretical and experimental 
research contribution by studying the status quo on patents and patent races, 
shedding light on critical issues and discussing potential improvements of 
the patent incentive structure.  
 
1.1. Business and Economics Aspects of Patents 
1.1.1. A Brief Patent Definition 
In this subchapter, I give a definition of patent protection according to 
German patent law (PatG) and I mention further features of patents. 
Protection is achieved by the fact that, after the granting of a patent, third 
parties are no longer allowed to offer, sell, use or produce an invention, 
except if the patent holder allows them that through licenses (§§ 9, 15, 23 
PatG). This exclusive protection right can only be awarded for a maximum 
of 20 years, but still not any invention can be patented. The following 
conditions must be fulfilled in order for exclusive protection to be granted: 
the invention must be new, based on an inventive activity and commercially 
usable (§ 1 Abs. 1 PatG). To be considered new, the invention may not 
belong to the state of the art (§ 3 Abs. 1 PatG). To the state of the art 
belongs all knowledge, written or spoken, which was available to the public 
before the day of the patent application. The product or process is 
considered an inventive activity if the description of the inventive step is not 
obvious to an expert professional (§ 4 Abs. 1 PatG). The last condition for 
patenting is that the invention must be produced or be usable in an industrial 
field of application (§ 5 Abs. 1 PatG). There are also many products and 
ideas that are not patentable, for instance discoveries, mathematic theories 
and scientific methods; aesthetic conceptions; plans, rules and procedures 
for intellectual activities; computer programs which do not contain technical 
instructions and the reproduction of information (§ 1 Abs. 3 PatG). 
1. Introduction 
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A patent document typically contains: “bibliographic data (providing 
information on the applicant, inventor, technological classes, references to 
the existing prior art, etc.), a specification or description of the invention, a 
set of claims (what the patentee is claiming exclusive rights on, a.k.a. the 
patent’s scope of protection), and finally – but optionally – some 
illustrations supporting the specification and claims in the form of drawings, 
listings, gene sequences, etc.” (van Zeebroeck et al., 2009). First and 
foremost, the purpose of a patent is to protect a product or a method against 
imitators. But patents are used for a whole range of different tasks. They 
may be used to block competitors, to win technological reputation, to 
produce internal incentives or as a means of exchange (cross-licensing, co-
operations, access to the capital market, revenues from licensing) (Blind et 
al., 2003). Many of these aspects are discussed in the following.  
 
1.1.2. Arguments For and Against Patents  
The traditional economic argument for intellectual property protection 
appears in the pioneering works by Arrow (1962) and Nordhaus (1969): 
innovative activity leads to the production of knowledge, but, unlike other 
goods, knowledge has an inherently non-rival character. This means that 
once an invention is known, everyone can use it without incurring additional 
R&D costs, which induces market failure and destroys initial incentives to 
innovate. Patents are supposed to reverse that effect and provide incentives 
for innovation. Fershtman and Markovich (2010) write that “the 
conventional wisdom is that by protecting innovators from imitation we 
encourage R&D investment and promote innovation”. However, these 
authors continue by saying that “recently this rationale has been challenged” 
(they are referring to empirical evidence from the software and computer 
industries, which experienced the most rapid innovation during periods of 
weak patent protection; I discuss some of these findings in Chapter 1.1.4).  
 
Among many researchers, Boldrin and Levine (2002) challenge the 
conventional view on patents. They show that intellectual property has two 
components: the right to own and sell ideas, which they view as essential, 
and the right to control the use of those ideas, which they regard as 
economically dangerous, because it results in an “intellectual monopoly” 
with very high social cost. Boldrin and Levine (2002) do admit that              
“if strong property rights provide good incentives for the production of 
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potatoes, they must also provide good incentives for the production of 
ideas”, but they point out to the very different ways the ownership of 
products versus ideas is treated in practice: “When you buy a potato you can 
eat it, throw it away, plant it or make it into a sculpture. Current law allows 
producers of CDs and books to take this freedom away from you. When you 
buy a potato you can use the “idea” of a potato embodied in it to make 
better potatoes or to invent French fries. Current law allows producers of 
computer software or medical drugs to take this freedom away from you.     
It is against this distorted extension of intellectual property rights that we 
argue”.  
 
In their article, Encaoua et al. (2006) summarize the most important virtues 
and drawbacks of the patent system. In this paragraph, I discuss the four 
virtues provided by Encaoua et al.; I closely follow the reasoning of these 
authors but I also add my own interpretation of their statements:  
• the first virtue is that the government gives some temporary 
exclusive property rights to inventors but in exchange delegates the 
R&D investment decision and therefore the responsibility as well as 
risk of the R&D cost fall into the hands of private inventors. This is 
a wise decision, because individual agents have much better 
information on the benefits and costs of R&D than the government 
does. Another positive consequence of delegating is that the 
potential problem of moral hazard on the side of researchers is 
alleviated (Encaoua et al., 2006). If, instead of delegating, the 
government chose to subsidize R&D investment, inventors could use 
the subsidy for private purposes and pretend to be unsuccessful in 
their R&D endeavour (which would be a plausible statement, due to 
the highly uncertain nature of R&D); 
• the second virtue of patents is that the assignment of costs falls on 
the users of the products, and not on taxpayers (idem). That is, the 
R&D cost (per unit) is included in the price of the product and 
affects buyers of the product specifically and not the general public 
who might have no interest or connection to a certain patented 
product; 
• the third is that the government may instill a patent system without 
requiring “sensible economic information that is only privately 
known, such as R&D cost and private value of the invention, thus 
avoiding adverse selection problems” (idem). In this context, 
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adverse selection would mean that, without patents and in the 
absence of information, the government might choose to finance a 
firm that is either cost or revenue inefficient, or both. Instead, 
through the patent system, the  effective selection of R&D projects is 
done by the market: innovative firms weigh the private values of 
their inventions against the costs of patenting and decide whether to 
invest or not; 
• the fourth virtue is that patents require the disclosure of information, 
which helps the further diffusion of knowledge (idem) and therefore 
subsequent innovation. 
Supporting these virtues, a prestigious publication by Kultti et al. (2007) 
also suggests that the patent system is able to simultaneously stimulate 
information disclosure, innovation and welfare.  
 
On the other hand, Encaoua et al. (2006) also find five drawbacks of patents 
and note that there might be more. Indeed, throughout this dissertation I 
found many other weaknesses of patents and discussed them in detail.  
• The first weakness identified by Encaoua et al. is that patents induce 
“the classical deadweight loss that results from inefficient monopoly 
pricing: not all consumers valuing goods above their marginal cost 
can buy them”.  
• Second, the prize obtained from a patented good (profits, market 
share) is not directly linked to the R&D effort necessary to develop 
it (idem). In fact, Chapter 3.1.2 shows that in recent years firms 
almost completely decoupled their patenting and their R&D 
activities; besides, Chapter 2.2.2 finds no relationship between 
patent protection and innovative activity.  
• The third drawback signaled by the above authors is that firms racing 
for a patent may be subject to a wasteful duplication of R&D costs. 
This thought worried many patent researchers and is very present in 
the patent literature. However, an empirical study by Cockburn and 
Henderson (1994) shows that such a wasteful behavior does not 
occur even in the most patent-intensive industries; I discuss the topic 
in Chapter 4.4.  
• The fourth drawback is derived from theoretical work by Eswaran 
and Gallini (1996): patents are much more likely to create substitute 
products instead of complementary goods and this results in 
coordination problems on the market. To my mind, this happens 
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because, if more substitutes are being produced, competition 
between existing industry players intensifies and the market does not 
settle to accommodate firms who harmonize their activities by 
producing complementary products. 
• The fifth weakness is related to opportunity costs: patenting requires 
a significant “amount of financial resources that are diverted from 
the innovation process itself” (Encaoua et al., 2006).  
 
There are countless arguments for and against patents, and I discuss most of 
them throughout the dissertation. Still, after scanning the literature, I can 
assert that most papers do have one element in common: they all agree that 
too weak intellectual protection rights might lead to an under-provision of 
R&D, while too strong protection rights might lead to an excessive 
monopoly distortion in the form of a deadweight loss that has to be incurred 
by society, and potentially to a slow-down in the speed of innovation. 
Therefore, any measure to strengthen or weaken patent protection involves a 
series of difficult tradeoffs. In the words of Encaoua et al. (2006): “patents 
appear to be a second best solution. The first best, characterized by a 
socially desirable level of innovation without market power and with global 
diffusion, appears to be unreachable”.  
 
1.1.3. The Importance of Patents For Firms 
According to a survey from 1999 performed by the Fraunhofer Technology 
Development Group (Fraunhofer TEG 1999), German companies  use about 
38% of their patents for products that they sell, while 43% of patents are not 
used at all. Although at first glance the proportion of unused patents seems 
rather large, it may be a natural consequence of the fact that firms make ex 
ante decisions to patent. That is, firms decide to patent before they know the 
real market benefits of the patented product. From a Bayesian information 
point of view, a firm decides to patent with incomplete information, based 
on prior beliefs about the future market rewards from patenting. After 
patenting, the firm receives market feedback and updates its prior beliefs ex 
post. In a sense, patenting activities are a necessary cost, similar to 
advertising activities; I reiterate this point at the end of Chapter 1.2.1. 
Fraunhofer TEG (1999) also reports that the remaining 19% of the held 
patents are so-called “strategic patents”, which are either sold to other 
companies or used to delay the market entry of other products, because 
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competitors are forced to research around the strategic patent in order to 
avoid infringement. Patents serve further purposes, different from the 
exclusion of competitors from the market: firms use patents to obtain 
negotiation power “for cross-licensing agreements, as a signalling 
mechanism for shareholders, banks, venture capitalists, competitors or 
customers” (Encaoua et al., 2006). In this subchapter I limit my analysis to 
the importance of patents as protection mechanism for firms’ innovations.  
 
Harhoff (1997) reports on the analysis of a dataset entitled Mannheim 
Innovation Panel, which was collected by the German government with the 
purpose of providing a comprehensive description of German firms’ 
innovative activities. Harhoff (1997) used a cross-sectional portion of the 
dataset, from the year 1993, and researched a number of 1,413 West-
German companies on the estimated effectiveness of different protection 
mechanisms, through which they appropriate the returns from their 
innovative activities. Tables 1.1 and 1.2 provide results of the investigation 
for product and process innovations. For both types of innovations firms 
rely largely on alternative protection mechanisms such as personnel binding, 
first mover advantages, complexity and secrecy, while intellectual property 
comes last with patents, copyright and registered trademarks. 42 % of 
companies consider patents effective as protection mechanism for product 
innovations, while for process innovations the figure is lower: 25.2 %. 
Similar general estimates for the importance of patents as protection 
mechanism were obtained by Levin et al. (1987), who performed a survey 
of high-level R&D executives in the USA. They also found that “lead-time 
advantage” and “moving down the learning curve quickly” were rated as a 
more effective protection mechanism than patents. Finally, patents have an 
important drawback for firms, because they require the publication of the 
knowledge embedded in the patent. Horstmann et al. (1985) emphasize that 
this may lead to a danger of knowledge drain for the patenting firms. 
 
1.1.4. Sequential Innovation 
The conventional view on patent protection (as described in Chapter 1.1.2) 
is turned upside down in the ground-breaking paper by Bessen and Maskin 
(2009). They point out to empirical evidence showing that some of the most 
innovative industries towards the end of the 20th century – software, 
computers and semiconductors – had historically been under weak patent 
1. Introduction 
10 
 
Table 1.1. The importance of protection mechanisms for product 
innovations 
 
Protection mechanism Percent of firms which 
consider this 
mechanism important 
or very important 
Long-term binding of qualified personnel 83.7 % 
Lead-time advantage  82.6 % 
Product complexity 55.3 % 
Secrecy 53.4 % 
Patents 42.0 % 
Copyright and registered trademarks 25.3 % 
No. of firms 1,413 
 
Source: Harhoff (1997), based on cross-sectional data from the 1993 
Mannheim Innovation Panel. 
 
 
Table 1.2. The importance of protection mechanisms for process 
innovations 
 
Protection mechanism Percent of firms which 
consider this 
mechanism important 
or very important 
Long-term binding of qualified personnel 79.6 % 
Lead-time advantage  79.6 % 
Process complexity 52.2 % 
Secrecy 49.8 % 
Patents 25.2 % 
Copyright and registered trademarks 14.8 % 
No. of firms 1,413 
 
Source: Harhoff (1997), based on cross-sectional data from the 1993 
Mannheim Innovation Panel. 
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protection. In the US, patent enforcement for semiconductors and computers 
first came into place through the Federal Circuit Court in 1982 (idem). 
Before this measure, the industry was patent free. Software had been 
excluded from patent protection for decades, until a series of court decisions 
in the mid-1980s and 1990s significantly increased the strength of software 
patents, which Bessen and Maskin (2009) consider “a revealing natural 
experiment”. This experiment showed that, instead of generating a burst of 
innovative activity, the firms which acquired the software patents actually 
reduced their R&D spending as percentage of sales (Bessen and Hunt, 
2004). Bessen and Maskin (2009) state that “there is nothing paradoxical 
about this outcome”. In their view, for industries such as software or 
computers imitation may promote innovation, while strong patents might in 
fact inhibit it, contrary to the conventional view. Bessen and Maskin argue 
that those industries which seem to be doing better without patent protection 
share one common element: the presence of sequential and complementary 
innovations. They define an innovation as sequential if “each successive 
innovation builds on the preceding one”. They illustrate this with the 
example of spreadsheet software, where Microsoft’s Excel built on Lotus, 
and Lotus built on VisiCalc. Furthermore, Bessen and Maskin define an 
innovation as complementary if “each potential innovator takes a different 
research line and thereby enhances the overall probability that a particular 
goal is reached within a given time”. The authors ascertain that the 
complementarity of the different research lines taken to voice-recognition 
software increased the speed of this innovation.  
 
In a world of innovations which are both sequential and complementary, the 
conventional reasoning about patents’ role in the promotion of innovation 
seems to be reversed. Bessen and Maskin give reasons for this counter-
intuitive result: imitation of a discovery is socially desirable in such a world, 
because it helps the imitator develop further inventions, and since the 
imitator may have valuable ideas not accessible to the original inventor, the 
overall speed of innovation may be enhanced. What is more, with sequential 
innovations even the inventor herself could find it advantageous if others 
imitate and compete against her. Even though imitation reduces the 
inventor’s current profit, it increases the probability of follow-on 
innovations, which in turn improves the inventor’s future profits. Bessen 
and Maskin even bring relevant examples of firms which appeared to 
encourage imitation. In 1981, IBM announced its first personal computer; 
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Apple Computer, which was then the industry leader, responded with a full-
page newspaper ad entitled “Welcome, IBM. Seriously”. Cisco, among 
others, regularly contributes patented technology to the industry standard 
and allows any market entrant to produce competing products. IBM and 
other firms donated a number of patents to be used for free by developers of 
open source. Bessen and Maskin do admit that the conclusions from their 
paper would fail to work if the cost of market entry were equal to zero, or if 
imitation were infinitely fast. However, in real-world settings market entry 
requires significant investments in specialized capital, and entry does not 
occur instantly, so that the original innovator typically enjoys a temporary 
first-mover advantage. Thus, Bessen and Maskin’s model cannot be 
overthrown by rejecting its main assumptions.  
 
Chapter 1.1 reviewed the conventional view on patent protection and 
showed some of the ways in which this view has been challenged by more 
recent research. While patents do have their virtues both on the 
macroeconomic and on firm level, they also bring a number of drawbacks to 
the economy as well as society. Moreover, there are very important settings, 
such as sequential and complementary innovations, in which patents seem to 
do more harm than good; other such situations can be found throughout the 
dissertation. In the next chapter I concentrate on two major disadvantages 
brought by the patent system in practice: the explosion in patenting at the 
detriment of patent quality and the emergence of a dangerous phenomenon 
under the name of patent thickets. 
 
1.2. Distortions Induced By Patents  
1.2.1. Quantity Before Quality  
Van Zeebroeck et al. (2009, p. 1011) write that the intellectual property (IP) 
strategy of firms in some industries recently moved from being static to 
more active. That is, companies no longer use patents just for the leveraging 
of exclusion rights. Instead, they started using them for licensing and other 
strategic purposes. More importantly, firms changed their patent strategy 
from a “single patent” view to a “portfolio management” view. Some large 
firms have a strong tendency to patent their inventions. “IBM for instance 
has used the fact that it is the largest patentee in the USA as a marketing 
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tool for several years and Microsoft has recruited an IP officer (from IBM) 
to develop its patenting strategy with a view to outperforming IBM in this 
respect” (idem). Unfortunately, the shift from the single patent strategy to 
the patent portfolio strategy resulted in a deterioration of the quality of 
patents, an explosion of patent applications and a world in which the size 
and strength of the patent portfolio are more important than the original 
purpose of patents, which is to reflect real inventive activity. Many 
researchers have expressed concern about this “more is better” strategy, 
which perverts patenting incentives, places patent offices under pressure and 
compromises the reliability of the patent system by creating patent thickets 
that no one can look through anymore.  
 
Even more paradoxically, the boom of patent applications was not coupled 
with an increase in innovative activities. For instance, an industrial inquiry 
among electronic companies done by Taylor and Silberston (1973) showed 
that firms uniformly agreed that patents have very little or no impact on 
R&D investment decisions and on the industry competition. Patent expert 
and lawyer Jan Tönnies states that to interpret the increase of patent 
applications as innovative progress makes as little sense as interpreting an 
increase in the use of prisons as a success in combating criminality 
(Wissensallmende, 2009). A detailed discussion on the effects of the 
unprecedented surge in patent applications is provided in Chapter 3.  
 
Adding to the discussion on the diminishing quality of patents, Taylor and 
Silberston (1973) point out that a large proportion of patents in electronics 
and electrical engineering is of “very suspect validity”. They report that up 
to 90% of these patents are questionable due to a lack of clear consensus 
about their novelty. Different than with chemical research, where it is clear 
whether a chemical compound is new or not, with electronics many 
innovations represent very small technical improvements or rearrangements 
of existing components and circuits, which are not necessarily patentable 
(idem). Taylor and Silberston (1973) show that even basic patent rights held 
by the American company Western Electric for the transistor could easily be 
attacked by UK firms who refused to pay royalties for the use of transistors. 
Similar findings to Taylor and Silberston are brought by other researchers. 
Bessen und Hunt (2004) are very critical about the results of a strengthening 
of patentability which took place in the US software industry. According to 
their econometric study on the patent-R&D ratio (which I also discuss in 
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Chapter 3.1.2), Bessen and Hunt (2004) prove that stronger patent 
protection for software did not lead to more innovative activity and R&D. 
Instead, it allowed firms to appropriate portions of the revenues obtained by 
successful inventions through the use of “trivial patents” – patents lacking 
real novelty and granted after very limited R&D efforts. Lanjouw and 
Schankerman (2004) corroborate Bessen and Hunt’s findings by looking at 
the patent-R&D relationship within a traditional invention production 
function and taking into account patent quality (they build a quality index 
for patents). Their results confirm that patents of low quality were 
responsible for the increase in the patent-R&D quotient. Overall, the 
increase in patent applications, coupled with a questionable patent quality, 
generates an uncertainty which compromises the reliability of the patent 
system altogether (van Zeebroeck et al., 2008). I discuss this in Chapter 3.3.  
 
Yet, in spite of patents’ allegedly falling quality, since the 1970s the number 
of patents held by a firm has been one of the criteria for rankings at the 
stock exchange: a firm with more patents was considered more innovative 
and more valuable. This incentivized firms to patent more, even though they 
could not bring to market many of their patented developments 
(Wissensallmende, 2009, based on data from the Fraunhofer TEG, 1999). 
According to popular science, firms ended up in an arms’ race with patents: 
if one firm patents, all other firms have to patent as well! (idem). In game-
theoretical terms, firms can be seen as caught in a Prisoner’s Dilemma 
where patenting is the non-cooperative strategy. However, the same point 
could be made for advertising. It is generally recognized that advertising, as 
well as the costs it brings, is an essential activity performed by firms. I 
regard patenting activities from a similar perspective: they are costly and 
their success is uncertain, yet all firms perform such activities, because they 
are necessary for survival.  
 
1.2.2. Patent Thickets 
The rise of patenting in recent decades was coupled with an increase in 
technological complexity and these combined factors gave birth to a 
dangerous phenomenon labeled as “patent thickets”. Bessen (2003) writes 
that the traditional patent race literature assumes a “one-to-one 
correspondence” between a product and a patent. In reality, technologies are 
complex and property rights for a product are shared by several firms 
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through a number of patents. More often than not, a product may be based 
on hundreds of patents, and this generates patent thickets, “a dense web of 
overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack its way 
through in order to actually commercialize new technology” (Shapiro, 
2001). Bessen (2003) as well as Siebert and von Graevenitz (2010) explain 
that patent thickets are a result of firms’ patent portfolio strategies: the more 
patents a firm has related to a certain product, the greater its probability of 
winning in patent infringement suits, and thus the stronger the firm’s 
bargaining power and the larger its “freedom to operate”. But patent thickets 
have a dark side: if an innovator must contact and negotiate with a large 
number of patent holders, her transaction costs may become prohibitively 
high (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). Shapiro (2001) quotes the famous 
statement by Sir Isaac Newton that every scientist “stands on the shoulders 
of giants” and puts it in relation to patent thickets: “today, most basic and 
applied researchers are effectively standing on top of a huge pyramid, not 
just one set of shoulders”. Shapiro points out that the pyramid may reach 
“far greater heights” than any individual alone. However, this will not 
happen if a researcher who wants to place a new block on the top of the 
pyramid must, in Shapiro’s words, “gain the permission of each person who 
previously placed a block in the pyramid”. In patent terminology, such 
persons are the owners of blocking patents, and they might be able to 
prohibit innovators from using the invention. Consequently, patent thickets 
may drastically slow down the commercialization of new discoveries and 
ultimately decrease the speed of innovation, which is exactly the opposite of 
what patents are intended to do (idem).  
 
Shapiro (2001) emphasizes that the patent system is creating patent thickets 
and severe transaction costs in several key industries: semiconductors, 
biotechnology, software and the Internet. In Chapter 1.1.4, I showed that 
such industries (where sequential innovation is of essence) are particularly 
prone to incur strong negative effects of patenting. Shapiro (2001) supports 
this view: “With cumulative innovation and multiple blocking patents, 
stronger patent rights can have the perverse effect of stifling, not 
encouraging, innovation”. Thus, patent thickets are attacking our newest, 
most sensitive and essential industries. The literature (particularly Shapiro, 
2001, Bessen, 2003 and Siebert and von Graevenitz, 2010) does come up 
with some solutions to the thicket problem: cross licenses (where two 
companies grant each other the right to use the other’s patents) and patent 
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pools (where several patent holders agree to jointly license an entire group 
of patents and share the revenues). However, Bessen (2003) expresses 
doubts about the effectiveness of such institutions and points out that the 
deepest problem causing patent thickets is rooted in low patent standards. 
According to Bessen, when patentability standards are high, “portfolio 
building is costly” and firms are more likely to embark in activities that rely 
less on patents. Conversely, low patent standards result in aggressive 
portfolio building, socially wasteful behavior and even reduced R&D 
incentives (idem). Overall, many of the distortions discussed in this chapter 
could be alleviated by reversing the tendency towards lower patent 
standards which could be observed during the last decades and returning to 
a more reliable regime with patents of high quality, based on real novelty 
and significant inventive effort.  
 
1.3. Patents, Society and Ethics 
Apart from patents’ economic use (where we could see that patents have 
their virtues but also create many distortions), there are important societal 
and ethical considerations related to intellectual property, especially in some 
sensitive industries where people’s health and lives are at stake. In her 
excellent book, Naomi Klein (2009) raises the alarm about profit-seeking 
firms attempting to make fortunes out of putting “a patent and a price tag on 
life-forms and natural resources never dreamed of as commodities – seeds, 
genes, carbon in the earth’s atmosphere”. Patents are even more ethically 
questionable in public health issues. Klein (2009) refers to the outbreak of 
polio (a crippling and often fatal children’s disease) in the US during the  
1950s, when “the ethics of disease profiteering were hotly debated”. With 
around 60,000 cases of polio, the “search for a cure was frantic” (idem). 
Finally, a scientist at the University of Pittsburgh, Jonas Salk, found the 
cure, developed the first polio vaccine in 1952 and decided not to patent this 
lifesaving treatment (idem). When asked about his decision, Salk answered 
“There is no patent. Could you patent the sun?” (Oshinsky, 2005). Such 
examples of highly ethical behavior should be more common in our society. 
Unfortunately, in practice one finds some bad apples; for instance, Klein 
(2009) points out that Gilead Sciences, a company which owns patents on 
four AIDS treatments, puts a lot of effort in “trying to block the distribution 
of cheaper generic versions of its lifesaving drugs in the developing world”, 
even though some of Gilead’s “key medicines were developed on grants 
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funded by taxpayers”. From a societal point of view, Gilead makes a double 
mistake. This example raises serious ethical concerns about patent 
protection for medical drugs, where the patent may prevent saving lives. 
Due to the importance of this debate, I provide a detailed analysis of patents 
for pharmaceuticals in Chapter 4. However, there are many other fields 
where society at large is against the use of patents: genetics, 
nanotechnology, stem cell and biomedical research are some of the most 
prominent areas of concern I have identified in the literature. In 2013, the 
US Supreme Court has already decided in the case of Myriad Genetics, a 
company holding patents on two genes linked to breast cancer, that human 
genes are not patentable (The Economist, 13.01.2013), a decision that will 
hopefully also stay valid in the future.  
 
Furthermore, the general public has started to be more and more informed 
and critical about trivial patents, which do not fulfill the usual standards for 
novelty and non-obviousness. Shapiro (2001) writes that “even while a 
consensus has emerged that innovation is the main driver of economic 
growth, we are witnessing somewhat of a backlash against the patent system 
as it is currently operating”. Shapiro refers to especially unpopular patents 
such as Amazon's patent on a one click online shopping system, which was 
asserted against Barnes & Noble and caused a public scandal. The Guardian 
(22.10.2012) criticizes Apple’s “slide to unlock” system for the iPhone as 
another trivial patent where potential competitors had trouble inventing 
around the patent. For instance, “a touch interface with a thin line along 
which you slide a ball to unlock the screen” could have been judged as 
infringing Apple’s patent (idem). Eventually, Google’s Android system 
found a way to circumvent the “slide to unlock” patent by letting users pull 
a lock icon in any direction without using a line to hint in which direction 
the lock should be dragged (idem). While The Guardian (22.10.2012) sees 
most of the patent disputes as “boring” and “depressing”, I regard them as 
dangerous to society, because trivial patents such as the ones described 
above create obstacles for subsequent innovators and therefore may lead to a 
slow-down or even blockage of innovation.  
 
There are several further societal concerns about the use of patents, out of 
which I only mention one more, related to fairness issues. The Telegraph 
(16.12.2010) writes that patents are “practically worthless” for small 
companies, because challenging a patent can only be done through very 
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“lengthy and expensive” court processes, which small companies cannot 
afford. Thus, the patent system allows big firms with “deep pockets” to 
copy innovations of smaller firms (thereby infringing IP rights) and then to 
avoid any legal challenge by assembling expensive legal teams that smaller 
competitors cannot pay for (idem). 
 
In the following chapter, I present the structure of the dissertation and I 
highlight its main research and discussion topics. 
 
1.4. Structure of the Dissertation 
In Chapter 2.1 I provide and attempt to synthesize a series of scientific 
definitions for the three instruments of patent regulation which I have 
identified in the literature: patent breadth, patent height and patent length. 
Through such instruments, patent regulators are able to influence the 
appropriability of market benefits for producers of innovations and therefore 
these tools are of crucial importance to the level of innovativeness on any 
market. However, Chapter 2.2 shows that any attempt by regulators to find 
an optimal level of patent protection faces many difficult tradeoffs and even 
the concept of “optimality” is not easy to define. I discuss “optimality” of 
patent and patent race regulation with respect to three aspects, 
corresponding to the three subchapters included in Chapter 2.2. In Chapter 
2.2.1 I analyze the welfare tradeoffs which the regulation of various patent 
instruments leads to, especially the tradeoffs between patent length and 
breadth; I include some of the important models which were developed in 
the literature. In Chapter 2.2.2 I look at the effects of patent protection on 
innovativeness by discussing changes in patent policy in different countries 
and industries (considered “unusual natural experiments”). Chapter 2.2.3 
presents three papers which deal with optimal rules for patent races. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the dramatic increase in the number and size of patent 
applications around the world, which raises the alarm about patent quality 
standards. The chapter is structured in three parts: Chapter 3.1 describes the 
status quo, Chapter 3.2 identifies reasons for the surge in patent 
voluminosity, while Chapter 3.3 presents the effects of and possible 
solutions to the patent boom. I start Chapter 3.1.1 with scientific definitions 
of patent claims and their relationship to the number of pages pro patent. In 
Chapter 3.1.2 I describe the dynamics of patent growth, which became 
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particularly dramatic after the 1980s; I also relate the development of patent 
voluminosity to R&D activities and try to show a link between them; this 
link is important because it leads us to the question whether firms patent out 
of “patenting greed” or due to structural changes in the economy. Chapter 
3.2 shows that in fact both the “greed” and the structural changes might play 
an important role for the surge in applications. This chapter identifies five 
factors for the patent growth, which are discussed in the five subchapters 
3.2.1 to 3.2.5: administrative fees of patent offices; internationalization of 
applications through the Patent Cooperation Treaty; national practices, 
particularly the differences between the US and Continental Europe; the 
increase in technological complexity, which requires more words to be 
described; the emergence of young and very complex sectors with less 
standardized vocabulary. In Chapter 3.3 I present the effects of the patent 
boom on patent offices, on the quality standards of patents and on the 
reliability of the patent system altogether. Towards the end of this chapter I 
sketch potential solutions from the literature, especially through the fee 
structure.  
 
Chapter 4 analyzes the role of patents in the pharmaceutical industry. 
Chapter 4.1 starts by pointing out to the pharma industry being the most 
profitable of all US industries during the half of the 20th Century and to a 
strengthening of patent protection which seemed to encourage the 
emergence of such profits. I also discuss the role of the enormous 
development costs which are a factor influencing patent protection. In 
Chapter 4.2 I present the hot debate from the literature on the topic of 
innovativeness in the pharma industry; here, I introduce arguments and 
figures for and against stronger patent protection. In Chapter 4.3 I show how 
the competition for “follow on” or “me too” drugs has dramatically 
increased towards the end of the 20th Century and I raise again a question 
from Chapter 4.2 about “true innovators”, which might need stronger patent 
protection against “copycats” (or imitators). In Chapter 4.4 I shed light on 
the topic of patent races for pharmaceuticals: I present firms’ racing 
behavior and empirical evidence for such races. Here, the main research 
question is whether firms engage in cut-throat competition and wasteful 
duplication of R&D costs, or whether they settle to share the market 
amicably. Chapter 4.5 discusses the role of generics and whether they fulfill 
their role of conquering the market and driving down prices after the patent 
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of the original drug expires. In Chapter 4.6 I wrap up my conclusions and 
recommendations about patents in the pharmaceutical industry.  
 
Chapter 5 introduces the theoretical and experimental literature on patent 
races. The chapter is divided into two parts: in Chapter 5.1 I analyze 
theoretical models of patent races, while Chapter 5.2 presents experimental 
evidence and partially relates it to the theoretical literature. Chapter 5.1.1 
reveals the “traditional” patent race literature and points out to the many 
contradictions encountered between the papers and models developed here. 
This chapter includes the literature from the time span between the late 
1960s and the early 1980s. During the ‘80s, a shift towards multistage two-
player patent races can be observed, and this is the topic of the following 
Chapter 5.1.2. In Chapter 5.1.3 I summarize the main results of the excellent 
literature review on patent races, performed by Reinganum (1989). She was 
able to wrap up the literature and synthesize it into 16 assumptions and 40 
propositions, which are of great theoretical value. In Chapter 5.1.4 I present 
further ramifications of the patent race literature, most notably perpetual (or 
endless) races and the optimal design of patent races. Chapter 5.1.5 wraps 
up the findings from the entire Chapter 5.1. The next chapter (5.2) is 
separated into two subchapters. In Chapter 5.2.1 I look at experimental 
studies which took models from the patent race literature as their theoretical 
basis, and I compare results from theory with results from experiments. 
Differently, in Chapter 5.2.2 I describe patent race experiments which did 
not root their theory in the standard patent race literature but instead 
developed their own theory (based on established theoretical constructs) and 
their own experiments.  
 
In Chapter 6 I extensively discuss my experimental study on patent races. 
The chapter consists of four parts, represented by Chapters 6.1 to 6.4, in 
which I analyze the following aspects: building up the game-theoretic patent 
race model; building the experiment; econometric analysis and results; 
conclusions. Chapter 6.1.1 starts with a selection of Nalebuff’s (1988) 
sailing race which later is adapted to become a patent race model; here, I 
also highlight my contribution to the existing literature. Chapter 6.1.2 builds 
up a novel patent race model by adding parameters to Nalebuff’s puzzle, 
parameters which are essential for the modeling of an R&D race under a 
time framework. In this subchapter I construct the generalized decision tree 
based on game-theoretic considerations, I define the model parameters and I 
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generate the payoff matrix of the game. In Chapter 6.1.3 I perform an 
algebraic equilibrium analysis, I discard equilibria which may never exist 
and I formally point out to Nash equilibria which may exist, given certain 
parameters. The next chapter, 6.1.4, employs a multi-dimensional graphical 
solution based on several parameter sets. In Chapter 6.1.5 I select the 
appropriate parameters for an experimental study based on realistic interval 
definitions and interactions between parameters. In Chapter 6.2.1 I briefly 
point out to the importance of experiments as research methods. Chapter 
6.2.2 presents the experimental treatments and the way the experiment was 
implemented. In Chapter 6.2.3 I formulate two propositions derived from 
the framework of perfect rationality and two behavioral hypotheses based 
on the framework of bounded rationality. Chapter 6.3 employs statistical 
methods to show the results of the experiment. In Chapter 6.3.1 I compare 
the normative predictions derived from the equilibrium analysis with the 
actual decisions made by subjects in the experiment. Chapter 6.3.2 provides 
reasons for subjects’ deviations from the normative equilibrium predictions. 
In Chapter 6.3.3 I show results for the propositions and the hypotheses. 
Chapter 6.4 summarizes the findings, highlights my contribution to the 
literature and sketches recommendations for future research.  
 
Finally, Chapter 7 synthesizes the entire dissertation, including research 
questions as well as results and recommendations. The chapter is structured 
in three parts. In Chapter 7.1 I wrap up the conclusions from Chapters 2 to 4 
which mostly dealt with the issue of optimal patent protection. Chapter 7.2 
is concerned with patent races only, corresponding to Chapters 5 and 6. In 
the last subchapter, 7.3, I provide recommendations and point out to 
potential future developments concerning both patents and patent races.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Economic Models of Optimal Patent 
Regulation  
 
“Economic theory makes predictions about the 
effects of policy parameters that are sometimes 
quite sensitive to model assumptions, and it is often 
difficult to connect specific changes in patent rules 
and practices to the theoretical constructs.”   
 Jaffe (2000) 
 
“We have shown that the patent breadth-length 
optimal mix depends in a subtle way (involving 
second derivatives) on the relationship between 
social welfare and post-innovation profits, on the 
one hand, and the breadth of the patent, on the 
other hand. And economic theory places no 
restriction on the concavity of these functions. Thus 
it should not be surprising that different models and 
examples yield seemingly contradictory conclusions. 
But what is the economic intuition underlying these 
diverse results?” 
Denicolò (1996) 
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Patent policymakers must play a delicate game of balancing between two 
extreme conditions. At one end there is too strong patent protection, which 
brings overly high rewards for the innovator through a monopoly position 
but punishes society who has to incur the deadweight loss. At the other end 
there is too low patent protection, which destroys the incentives to innovate 
altogether and therefore benefits no one. In this chapter I first describe 
instruments of patent regulation. Second, I examine the literature on optimal 
patent policy and the effects of this policy on welfare and innovation.  
 
2.1. Instruments of Patent Regulation  
A patent granting authority has many instruments at its disposal, through  
which it is able to regulate the appropriability of profits stemming from 
innovations. According to Judd et al. (2012), national patent systems use a 
set of tools such as “filing requirements, duration and scope of a patent, and 
renewal fees”. The literature on patent regulation speaks of these tools in 
terms of patent breadth, height and length. I describe them in the following 
subchapters. At the end of Chapter 2.1. I provide a table of definitions for 
these concepts, based on the literature.   
 
2.1.1. Patent Breadth 
An important element which determines the value of a patent is the patent's 
breadth, a concept defined quite ambiguously in the literature. In his article 
from 1972, Nordhaus firstly introduces the concept of patent breadth and 
describes it in terms of the appropriability of cost reductions induced by a 
process innovation. Nordhaus assumes that an innovator patents a 
technology which reduces production costs from a high cost CH to a lower 
cost CL. If B, the breadth of the patent, is zero, then competitors can imitate 
the process innovation perfectly easily and also reduce their costs by CH -  
CL. If B = 1, there is perfect patent protection and competitors may not 
reduce their costs at all, being forced to pay the high cost1. Nordhaus's 
definition of patent breadth is therefore related to the proportion of cost 
savings generated by the patented process innovation that is freely available 
to non-innovating competitors.  
                                                 
1 Nordhaus (1972) uses a different notation from the one in this dissertation. 
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A rather different definition can be found in Klemperer (1990), who sees 
patent breadth as the “region of (differentiated) product space covered” (p. 
116), meaning that “breadth measures how different competitors' products 
must be in order not to infringe the patent”. Following Klemperer's 
definition, a broader (or wider2) patent means that a non-infringing 
competing product needs to contain more differentiated characteristics 
compared to the patented product. Interestingly, Klemperer notes that in 
1793 patent breadth was virtually equal to zero, and competing inventors 
could “file almost identical applications” to get patents of their own. Patent 
breadth came into existence through US acts from 1836 and later (idem). 
Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) define breadth very generally as any aspect of 
patent policy that affects the flow of profits to the patent holder. Matutes et 
al. (1996) define patent breadth as “the number of applications of the basic 
innovation which the patent holder is allowed to use in exclusivity”3. Van 
Zeebroeck et al. (2009) regard the number of claims per patent as a measure 
of patent breadth, while Lanjouw and Schankerman (1997) relate breadth to 
the probability that a patent is litigated. Finally, van Dijk (1996) also has his 
own definition of patent breadth (given in the next chapter), but he puts it in 
relation to another regulating instrument: patent height.  
 
2.1.2. Patent Height 
The height of patent protection is defined as “the stringency of novelty 
requirements that patent offices use in judging patentability” (van Dijk 
1996). Patent laws demand that inventions can only be patented if they are 
non-obvious and include an inventive step, but the task of defining the exact 
boundaries of patentability falls into the responsibility of patent offices 
(idem). Van Dijk (1996) writes that it is fairly easy to define novelty 
requirements for fundamental inventions, but the judgment is more difficult 
in case of improvements of existing products, because it is hard to decide 
whether an improvement is obvious or not and what degree of inventiveness 
is required for patenting. However, patent history shows that most patents 
are conferred to product improvements (Baker, 1976) and this makes patent 
height an important, albeit delicate dimension of patent protection.  
 
                                                 
2 Klemperer (1990) uses the terms "patent breadth" and "patent width" interchangeably 
3 Matutes et al. (1996) also use the term "patent scope" 
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Van Dijk (1996) defines the difference between patent breadth and patent 
height, which he considers fundamental. Patent breadth forms restrictions on 
the imitation of patented products, in that it sets a “maximum number of 
product characteristics that are allowed to be imitated” (van Dijk 1996, p. 
152). Patent height sets conditions on product improvements (and not 
imitations) “by requiring a minimum number of new product 
characteristics” (idem). Van Dijk distinguishes between imitations and 
improvements from three points of view: costs, legal aspects and demand 
aspects. In the following, I closely follow van Dijk’s argumentation. From 
the cost side, imitations require some R&D investments in order to obtain 
learning effects which make production worthwhile; however, 
improvements necessitate even higher R&D costs, because, in order to make 
product characteristics more efficient or come up with new characteristics, 
additional knowledge needs to be acquired. From the legal side, “a sufficient 
improvement is in principle patentable, while a sufficient imitation is not” 
(idem). From the demand side point of view, imitations can be regarded as 
horizontal product differentiations: some consumers will prefer the imitation 
to the original if prices are equal; in other words, the market is split between 
originals and imitations. Improvements can be viewed as vertical 
differentiations: at the same price, all consumers should prefer the 
improvement to the original product, as the former brings buyers a higher 
utility. Therefore, from the demand side being an imitator does not secure 
any market advantages, while being an improver promises higher payoffs 
(idem).  
 
Scotchmer and Green (1990) study the effect of novelty requirements (or 
patent height) on research and patenting decisions. They develop a model in 
which firms decide to enter or exit a patent race and examine the effects of a 
high patent, corresponding to strong novelty requirements, vis-à-vis a low 
patent height in the form of weak novelty requirements. Some of the most 
relevant observations made by Scotchmer and Green are the following: 
strong novelty requirements serve the purpose of protecting innovators’ 
profits by deterring competitors from making small product improvements, 
as these would infringe the patent; in this regard, high patents keep alive 
firms’ initial incentives to innovate. By contrast, weak novelty requirements 
support the social goal of information disclosure, which brings significant 
advantages on its own: since more technical knowledge is available to firms 
in an industry, these firms are more likely to innovate and thus the speed of 
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innovation is overall enhanced. However, the authors point out to a 
drawback of disclosure, in that it “confers a positive externality on a firm’s 
competitors, which the firm might want to avoid” (idem). Indeed, under 
weak novelty requirements a strategic player might refuse to patent or 
market small improvements, in order to block other players from using the 
knowledge made available. Due to this strategic component, low patents 
may not fulfill their desired goal of information disclosure. 
 
Van Dijk (1996) develops a standard vertical differentiation model to 
analyze the effects of patent height. Here, two firms compete in product 
improvements and only one firm holds the patent on the basic invention. 
Both firms choose their innovations, but the non patent holder has a limited 
choice due to the novelty requirements implied by the patent height. Van 
Dijk’s analysis is based on a non-cooperative duopoly competition 
consisting of three stages: an entry stage (in which firms decide to enter or 
not), an improvement stage (where firms decide on the level of 
improvement) and a price stage. The author notes that this order of the 
stages reflects increasing decision flexibility for the firms. After 
characterizing the problem mathematically and solving for equilibrium, van 
Dijk comes up with three sets of results. First, low patent protection does 
not influence the market outcome that would have been obtained without a 
patent, so low patent height plays no role in the competition. Second, high 
protection guarantees the patent holder a monopoly position at the detriment 
of the non patent holder. The third and most interesting case can be found 
for an intermediate patent height. Here, the novelty requirements imposed 
by the patent office “serve as a commitment for the non patent holder to 
choose the more profitable improvement” (idem). This leads to a “patent 
trap” for the patent holder, who loses access to the more profitable 
equilibrium. Van Dijk points out that his model is highly stylized, for which 
reason “applications and predictions must be taken with great care”. Still, he 
finds empirical evidence that many firms are deterred from patenting by the 
application costs in the case of low patent height, which, as shown above, 
does not influence competition. He also finds empirical support for the 
“patent trap” in the intermediate case by comparing nations with different 
patent heights. Van Dijk’s most important result here is that different patent 
heights can be used as instruments to encourage basic research versus 
applied research and development. He notes that in Japan, where patent 
protection is rather low because claims can be patented separately, a relative 
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advantage in applied research and product improvements can be observed. 
Differently, in Germany and the US, where patents are high, a comparative 
advantage in basic research exists (idem). To my mind, this implies that 
patent height is more likely to lead to radical innovations by encouraging 
basic research.   
 
2.1.3. Patent Length  
From the three types of tools I am discussing, patent length is the most 
comprehensible, can be described quite straight-forwardly and is also the 
preferred instrument of regulation by social planners due to the easiness to 
define it and modify it. Patent length represents the lifetime of the patent, 
the length of time for which the patent is valid and generates benefits for its 
holder. The formal concept of patent length, also called de jure life 
(Scotchmer and Green 1990) or statutory life of the patent (O'Donoghue et 
al. 1998), must be clearly delimited from the concept of effective life of a 
patent. The latter is defined as "the expected time until a patented product is 
replaced in the market" (idem). There is a very large difference between the 
two concepts. While the de jure patent length is generally 20 years, the 
effective lifetime of a patent is much shorter: Mansfield (1984) brings 
survey evidence showing that, in certain industries, 60 % of patented 
innovations were imitated in no more than four years after their 
introduction. Especially in cumulative innovation settings, where 
technologies are developed quickly and original innovations give way fast 
to subsequent products, imitations may appear even faster. Levin et al. 
(1987) report that almost all patented products are duplicated in less than 
five years.  
 
Nordhaus (1972) builds a model of optimal life for patent protection 
restricted to small process inventions. The model is based on several 
assumptions, from which I selected the most important: i) perfectly inelastic 
supply of inventors; ii) complete patent protection; iii) competitive product 
and factor markets. The only potentially critical assumption here is i). 
However, since the number of existing firms which invest in R&D does not 
change dramatically over time, I can consider this assumption to be quite 
realistic. Using well-chosen estimates for the parameters in his model 
(among others, price elasticity of demand, level of inventive inputs, 
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percentage of cost reduction, private and social discount rate), Nordhaus 
reaches the following conclusions: 
• for a natural or regulated monopoly, patents and the length of patent 
life are irrelevant to the level of welfare, and the inventing firm can 
capture its payoffs irrespective of the existence of a patent; 
• in the case of several large firms and significant entry barriers, the 
general welfare problem cannot be solved through patent regulation; 
• for relatively easy (trivial) inventions, the life of the patent is too 
long and should be shortened, or patents should not be conferred in 
the first place; 
• for small innovations (which lead to cost reductions of less than 5%), 
the monopoly losses induced by the patent system are rather small 
(less than 20% of the gains from innovation);  
• for drastic innovations (which bring significant cost reductions), a 
firm receiving a patent will lower its price by a portion of the cost 
saving for competitive reasons: in order to increase its market share. 
If the firm successfully obtains a larger market share, the resulting 
output will be produced at lower cost, which will then increase the 
average efficiency in the industry (idem). The gain to the economy 
during the lifetime of the patent will exceed the private gain of the 
firm, and some of the benefits will be immediately transferred to 
consumers (idem). Thus, for drastic innovations Nordhaus 
recommends that the optimal patent life should be slightly increased.  
 
The definitions of patent regulating instruments encountered in this chapter 
are summarized in Table 2.1.  
 
2.2. Optimal Patent and Patent Race Regulation  
“Optimality” in the context of patent regulation may refer to a variety of 
concepts. The corresponding literature is highly heterogeneous; it ranges 
from topics such as the effects of patents on welfare to the impact of patent 
systems on innovation, to patent policy in patent races and to further 
ramifications, e.g. the effects of intellectual property on economic growth 
and inequality (Chu and Peng, 2011). In a sense, the literature on optimal 
patent regulation presents similar drawbacks to the patent race literature 
from Chapter 5: it is highly complex and based on different models under 
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Table 2.1. Definitions of regulating instruments This text is a puppet text 
that I have formatted white. It can be deleted. 
Concept Author Year Definition 
Patent 
Breadth 
Nordhaus 1972 Appropriability of cost reduction 
induced by a process innovation 
Klemperer 1990 Region of differentiated product 
space covered 
Gilbert and 
Shapiro 
1990 Any aspect of patent policy that 
affects the flow of profits to the 
patent holder 
Matutes et al. 1996 Number of applications of the 
basic innovation which the patent 
holder is allowed to use in 
exclusivity 
Van Dijk 1996 Restrictions on the imitation of 
patented products 
Lanjouw and 
Schankerman 
1997 Probability of patent litigation 
Van Zeebroeck 
et al.  
2009 Number of claims per patent 
Patent 
Height 
Scotchmer and 
Green 
1990 A high patent means strong 
novelty requirements 
Van Dijk 1996 Restrictions on improvements of 
patented products 
Patent 
Length 
Mansfield 1984 The effective lifetime of a patent 
is much shorter than the statutory 
life of a patent 
Scotchmer and 
Green 
1990 De jure life of the patent, typically 
20 years 
O’Donoghue 
et al. 
1998 Statutory life of the patent 
  
 
miscellaneous, mostly incompatible assumptions. Kamien and Schwartz 
(1974) recognized early in the patent literature that establishing an optimal 
patent structure will depend on the interplay of a large number of 
influencing factors. In this chapter I have identified three main streams of 
the literature, which are discussed below. 
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2.2.1. Welfare Tradeoffs Between Regulating Instruments 
Much of the literature considers patent length in its relation with patent 
breadth. Nordhaus (1972) finds that patent “life and breadth go hand in 
hand”: if the patent breadth should be reduced because it causes undesirably 
strong protection, the patent length can be increased for compensation. In 
other words, there is a tradeoff between patent breadth and length. Similar 
recommendations are given by Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), who state that 
“whenever patent breadth is increasingly costly in terms of deadweight loss” 
(p. 111), infinitely-lived patents are optimal, but with “minimum market 
power necessary to attain the required reward level” (p. 107). What 
Nordhaus as well as Gilbert and Shapiro refer to is that broad patents may 
give an innovator a strong and wide monopoly position. The innovator can 
use this position to block competitors from developing products around the 
broad patent and sell the product at high price, with severe consequences on 
consumer surplus and a large deadweight loss. A regulator seeking to 
maximize social surplus should therefore reduce patent breadth to a 
minimum and largely increase patent length. However, Gilbert and Shapiro 
do recognize an important limitation of their paper: their conclusion only 
works in a stationary environment; in practice, inventions build on one 
another and thus a long patent might delay further innovation.  
 
The study by Klemperer (1990) represents an important extension to the one 
by Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), by taking into account the role of consumers’ 
substitution cost. Klemperer rightfully shows that the optimal decision on 
patent breadth depends on whether demand is more elastic in price than in 
substitution cost. If demand is more elastic in price, then Gilbert and 
Shapiro’s conclusions are correct: to ensure demand can be satisfied, price 
must be kept low and therefore a minimal patent breadth combined with 
maximal patent length should be enforced (so as to avoid any monopoly or 
deadweight loss). If, however, demand is more elastic in substitution cost 
than in price, the converse is true and a broad but very short-lived patent is 
preferred. In other words, Gilbert and Shapiro’s model is correct in the 
context of a homogenous product, while Klemperer’s is accurate for 
differentiated products. Klemperer gives examples of products for each of 
the two situations. A product with high price elasticity of demand could be a 
computer program where different competing versions exist, some of which 
may be more expensive but easier to learn and use than others. If consumers 
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are more sensitive to price than to the effort of learning, the patent for the 
computer program should be long-lived and of small breadth. A product 
with high elasticity of demand in substitution cost could be a drug that cures 
a serious disease but where other versions of the drug produce side effects. 
To my mind, this example is not well chosen, because it implies setting a 
large patent breadth for a product whose competing alternatives might 
produce negative side effects to people. In such a case, the monopolist 
patent holder could set a very high price for the product, forcing many 
consumers to buy alternatives that would damage their health. Instead, I 
would like to give here my own example of an appropriate product: a luxury 
watch with Internet connectivity where consumers have high substitution 
cost due to brand loyalty should be granted a broad and short-lived patent. 
Klemperer himself writes in his concluding chapter that his 
recommendations are based on a simple stylized model and drawing policy 
conclusions should only be done under extreme caution.  
 
Both papers by Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) and by Klemperer (1990) are 
limited by their stationary point of view. In the remainder of this subchapter, 
I discuss the paper by O’Donoghue et al. (1998), which is based on the more 
realistic assumption that innovation is sequential and firms continually 
improve on each other’s products. Indeed, Hopenhayn et al. (2006) write: 
“A central feature of innovative activity is that research is cumulative. […] 
New innovations build on the knowledge embodied in previous 
innovations”. Scotchmer (2004) provides many examples for the importance 
of sequential innovations, may it be for software, which is based on  
previous generations, for hardware, which builds on earlier less developed 
products, or for biotechnology, where each new crop is used as a base for 
subsequent crops.  
 
O’Donoghue et al. (1998) discuss patent policy in such a sequential 
innovation setting and note that “a patent can terminate either because it 
expires or because a non-infringing innovation displaces its product on the 
market”. The time until any of these two happens is called the “effective life 
of a patent” (idem), and its difference to the statutory life was described in 
Chapter 2.1.3. In the paper by O’Donoghue et al., the effective patent life is 
shown to depend on patent breadth, because breadth sets conditions on 
which products may compete with, and ultimately supersede the patented 
product (independent of the statutory life). The authors distinguish between 
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“lagging breadth”, which protects against imitation from products of inferior 
quality to the patented product, and “leading breadth”, which protects 
against new product improvements from superior alternatives (in van Dijk’s 
1996 terminology from Chapter 2.1.2, lagging breadth would be called 
patent breadth, while leading breadth would be patent height). O’Donoghue 
et al. show that lagging breadth would not generate enough stimulus to 
invest in R&D while, conversely, leading breadth could prolong the 
effective patent life and encourage R&D. They even go one step further into 
saying that “without some form of leading breadth, the effectiveness of the 
patent system to promote innovation is seriously impeded” (idem). Their 
main conclusions are that leading breadth is essential, as without it 
innovativeness may become “seriously suboptimal”, and that a specified 
rate of innovation can be obtained via two distinct policies: i) a patent of 
infinite length but small leading breadth (height), or ii) a patent of infinite 
leading breadth (height) and short length. According to the authors, the  
difference between the two policies is that the first one would help to reduce 
R&D costs, while the second would reduce the costs of delayed innovation 
diffusion and alleviate market distortions.  
 
In this subchapter, one could see that the choice of optimal patent regulation 
instruments is influenced by several factors: definition problems (most 
notably because patent offices will have difficulties to define and operate 
with concepts such as patent breadth and height or “leading” versus 
“lagging” breadth), by the characteristics of the innovation (e.g. stationary 
or sequential innovation, elasticity of demand with respect to price or to 
substitution costs), and especially by the welfare goal set by the regulator 
(e.g. reduce wasteful duplication of R&D efforts, boost the speed of 
innovation, or increase consumer surplus and decrease the deadweight loss). 
Thus, the optimality of regulating instruments will always depend on the 
entire context, any choice will generate some tradeoffs and a “one size fits 
all” instrument cannot be found.  
 
2.2.2. Patent Protection and Innovation  
In this subchapter I report on the most important results of the literature 
dealing with the effects of patents and patent systems on innovation. The 
study by Jaffe (2000) reviews some major changes that occurred in the US 
patent system between 1980 and 2000 and attempts to quantify the influence 
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of these changes on technological innovation. Jaffe writes that the changes 
to patent policy and practice in the US have had the general effect of 
strengthening patent protection “institutionally, geographically and 
technologically”. He also notes that these policy changes coincided with an 
unprecedented surge in patent applications (which I describe extensively in 
Chapter 3). Since important modifications to the system of property rights  
occur very rarely, Jaffe declares them to be “an unusual set of natural 
experiments” which should help us better comprehend the effects of patent 
protection. Jaffe groups the changes in US patent policy into four categories 
and discusses them in detail in his paper. I briefly summarize them here, 
based on the information provided by the author: i) the creation of the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which examines previous patent 
decisions and increases the probability of success in court for patent holders; 
ii) the enhancement of “patenting and licensing privileges to inventors in 
universities and government laboratories who create commercially 
exploitable inventions”; iii) widening patent rights to new technology fields, 
especially software and gene research; iv) the agreements to expand patent 
protection and make it more compatible worldwide, which were formulated  
under the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). Unfortunately, Jaffe’s paper only brings – in Jaffe’s own words – 
“disappointing results”. His main conclusion is that “despite the significance 
of the policy changes and the wide availability of detailed data relating to 
patenting, robust conclusions regarding the empirical consequences for 
technological innovation of changes in patent policy are few” (idem). Jaffe 
gives some reasons for the lack of solid conclusions: too many influencing 
factors on innovation change simultaneously, making it rather impossible to 
isolate the effects of policy changes; patents are only one of many elements 
which act upon innovative behavior; the predictions of economic theory are 
sensitive to the assumptions of different models of optimal policy; it is 
problematic to link the theoretical entities to the empirically observed 
phenomena.  
 
The study by Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001) pursues a similar goal to 
that of Jaffe (2000). The former authors try to find evidence of changes in 
R&D spending or innovative output, as a response to the Japanese patent 
law reforms from 1988, which significantly strengthened patent protection. 
Sakakibara and Branstetter first describe the changes to the Japanese patent 
system: i) the reforms broadened patent scope by allowing multiple claims 
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(independent or dependent on other claims) to be included in one patent. 
According to patent experts, after 1988 the scope of protection in Japan 
equaled or even exceeded that of the US and European patent systems 
(Okamoto et al., 1996); ii) patent term restoration for pharmaceuticals was 
extended by up to five years if delays in “the period necessary for drug 
safety and efficacy examinations” occurred (Sakakibara and Branstetter, 
2001). According to the latter authors, this decision gave pharmaceuticals a 
prolongation of effective patent lifetimes. One effect of the patent reform 
was that the growth rate of patent applications decreased after 1988. This 
development seems natural, because the reform allowed more claims to be 
included in one patent and inventors must have taken advantage of this new 
option to save on application costs. While applications leveled off after the 
reform, a large increase in the number of granted patents was observed. The 
increase in grants was a result of the reformed multi-claim system, which 
made “the improvement of an invention over the existing technology easier 
to demonstrate” (idem). Another effect of the reform was a vigorous rise in 
the number of intellectual property lawsuits in Japan. Finally, Sakakibara 
and Branstetter built a dataset of 307 publicly traded Japanese 
manufacturing firms from different industries and performed an 
econometric analysis to establish the effect of the reform on R&D and 
therefore on innovation. Their results found no evidence of an increase in 
R&D spending or on innovative output that could be ascribed to the patent 
reform. This holds true for all industries taken into account, even for 
pharmaceuticals, which experienced particularly strong protection. 
Sakakibara and Branstetter’s findings corroborate the study by Jaffe (2000) 
as well as other results from the literature, which I summarize in the 
following.  
 
Hall and Ziedonis (2001) studied patenting in the semiconductor industry 
and concluded that strengthened intellectual property rights did not induce 
additional innovation; instead, the stronger rights have led to a socially 
wasteful increase of defensive patent portfolios. Schankerman (1998) 
analyzes a dataset of all patent applications at the French patent office 
between 1969 and 1982 and shows that the private value of patent rights 
(computed as returns from holding the patent minus patenting costs) is very 
small for a large majority of patents (about 95%). He concludes that patent 
rights have value, but they are not the main source of returns from inventive 
efforts. Cohen et al. (2000) suggest that patents are relatively weak and 
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imperfect instruments of appropriation of returns, and increases in 
protection might be insufficient to induce more innovation. They also point 
out that the patent system reforms encouraged the use of patents as legal 
weapons, as seen in the augmentation of intellectual property lawsuits. 
Lerner (2009) searches for effects of changes in patent law in several 
countries by looking at changes in the quality and quantity of foreign 
patents filed in the UK. He also finds no evidence of effects on innovation 
after reforms in patent systems. Encaoua et al. (2006) write that some 
countries have experienced a “weakening of the standard criteria for 
granting patents”, following a belief that “more patents are better”, but this 
tendency had negative effects on competition and on subsequent innovation. 
Last but not least, Hunt’s (2006) article develops a simple model that links 
firms’ R&D and patenting decisions. Hunt shows that if firms are 
sufficiently active in their R&D and patenting activities, incremental 
reductions in the cost of attaining patents would result in less R&D and less 
innovation. He therefore recommends raising patenting costs to induce more 
innovation. The main conclusion from this subchapter is that it is unclear 
whether patent protection may always enhance innovativeness; indeed, 
under some circumstances the opposite might be true.  
 
2.2.3. Optimal Rules For Patent Races  
Patent races and their features are extensively analyzed in Chapter 5. 
However, the issue of how to design optimal rules for a patent race given 
certain endogenous regulating instruments belongs to the current chapter, 
and I discuss it on the basis of three most important papers from the 
literature. Denicolò (1996) examines optimal patent breadth and length in 
the context of several firms that are racing for a patent. Denicolò first 
reviews the existing literature (most notably the papers by Gilbert and 
Shapiro (1990) and by Klemperer (1990), which I discussed in Chapter 
2.2.1) and states that in the search for optimal patent regulation “almost 
anything could happen” and there is no regulating instrument which by itself 
can be optimal. Denicolò therefore develops a patent race model with 
several firms and many parameters: a firm’s R&D investments, a hazard 
function giving the probability of success dependent on R&D and time, the 
probability that a firm’s rivals innovate, an interest rate, a current profit of a 
firm, the value of the prize for the winner of the race and for its losers. 
Denicolò’s results are that the optimal mix between patent breadth and 
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length will depend on whether social welfare and post-innovation profits as 
functions of patent breadth are concave or convex. He notes that, since 
economic theory puts “no restriction on the concavity of these functions”, 
the analysis of different models from the literature will lead to contradictory 
results. He suggests an answer to these contradictions. Generally, a 
reduction in patent breadth will lead to intensified competition in the 
product market after the patent race is finished; this happens because a 
limited breadth allows more competitors to innovate around the patent. But, 
as Denicolò puts it, more competition is not always desirable, because it 
may imply social costs such as inefficient production or the duplication of 
entry costs. Thus, if a less broad patent generates socially costly 
competition, it is better to award patents with maximal breadth and minimal 
length. Conversely, a reduction in patent breadth is optimal if more 
competition increases social welfare without reducing too much the 
incentive of firms to engage in innovation and participate in the patent race 
(idem).  
 
The paper by Fershtman and Markovich (2010) presents a two-firm 
asymmetric-ability multistage R&D race model depending on a weak or 
strong regime of patent protection. In Fershtman and Markovich’s setting, 
one firm has “a technological advantage in the early stages of the race”, the 
other firm in the later stages (in the experiment from Chapter 6, I also 
analyze an asymmetric setting in which one firm has a time advantage). 
Their model has the strength that it accounts for the accumulation of 
knowledge during the race. The authors try to accomplish a difficult 
endeavor – they examine “the effect of patents, imitations and licensing 
arrangements on the speed of innovation, firm value and consumers’ 
surplus” (idem). They set up two extreme regimes, one of strong patent 
protection at the end of the race, with a “winner-take-all” feature, and 
another one of weak protection under which any discovery can be 
completely imitated. They discuss which of these regimes performs better, 
depending on three variables: i) the final prize, defined as the market value 
of the patented product minus the cost of innovation; ii) the intensity of the 
duopolistic competition, measured as µ, the ratio between duopolistic profits 
and the profits that would be obtained under monopoly, where a stronger 
duopolistic competition is reflected in a lower µ; iii) the degree of 
asymmetry between the firms’ R&D abilities. Fershtman and Markovich 
provide a numerical analysis of such R&D races and solve it for equilibrium 
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using a wide range of parameter values. Their main finding is that in a 
dynamic R&D race with asymmetric abilities, a weak patent protection in 
the form of perfect imitation may induce higher consumer surplus and 
higher value for firms than strong patent protection. However, this result 
only holds under certain settings, which are specified by the authors: first, 
the result is valid if the two firms’ “asymmetry in R&D abilities is 
sufficiently large”, but not if the firms “have identical or similar R&D 
abilities” (idem). Second, if the market for the patented product is small 
when compared to the cost of innovating, or if the duopolistic competition is 
strong (leading to lower market benefits for the participating firms), the 
weak patent protection regime fails to induce enough stimulus for 
innovation and therefore, the conventional reasoning for strong patent 
protection holds. Fershtman and Markovich also give explanations for their 
results, which are the result of two conflicting tendencies. On one hand, an 
R&D race under weak patent protection (imitation) “always ends up with a 
duopoly - implying a lower prize at the end of the race and thus lower 
incentives to invest” (idem). On the other hand, the R&D process itself may 
work more efficiently under the imitation regime (a reason for this is given 
by Bessen and Maskin (2009) who discuss sequential innovation; I reported 
on their paper in Chapter 1.1.4). But when firms’ R&D abilities are identical 
and imitation is possible, a free rider problem will emerge: a firm will wait 
for others to innovate and then copy the innovator’s product with very little 
effort. According to Fersthman and Markovich, the free riding phenomenon 
“reduces the firms’ incentives to invest in R&D which implies a slow pace 
of innovation and consequently low consumers’ surplus and a low value for 
firms”. For this reason, the weak protection or imitation regime will only 
work if firms are sufficiently dissimilar in R&D abilities. Fershtman and 
Markovich also analyze the effects of licensing, which is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation. Finally, the authors write that “the effect of different 
patent regimes on the race depends mainly on the detailed characteristics of 
the race. Clearly, one cannot find one regime which dominates all the others 
for all possible R&D races. […] A general claim about the appropriate 
optimal patent policy is beyond the scope of this paper”.  
 
The third paper of high relevance for this chapter is the one by Judd et al. 
(2012), who derive optimal rules for patent races. Their paper lies at the 
intersection of the literature on patent regulation and the literature on patent 
races. I discuss it extensively in Chapter 5.1.4, but I only give a brief 
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description here. According to Judd et al., a patent regulator can influence 
the optimality of a patent race by using two regulating instruments of 
regulation: i) the length of the race, defined as the “minimal 
accomplishment” required from the innovating firm in order to be granted a 
patent (in the terms of the current chapter, I would label this as patent 
height); ii) the size of the prize, equal to the benefits for the innovating firm 
from receiving of a patent. However, Judd et al. point out that any 
regulation of these two instruments confronts the patent granting authority 
with a series of very difficult trade-offs, and any attempt by the regulator to 
make an optimal decision eventually results in a vicious circle. After solving 
a complex dynamic multistage innovation race model with a variety of 
parameters, Judd et al. draw conclusions on optimal regulation, which is 
found to depend on various specific objectives of the regulator. The authors 
propose two alternatives to the regulation of patent races: i) to finance the 
prize through taxation and give the prize to the inventor, but make sure the 
innovation is produced on a competitive market; ii) research tournaments, 
where “contestants compete to find the innovation with the highest value to 
the sponsor” (idem).  
 
This chapter gave detailed definitions of the instruments for patent 
regulation: patent breadth, height and length. Patent length is the preferred 
instrument of regulators because it is easy to define and modify. Nordhaus 
(1972) shows that strong patent protection in the form of a long-lived patent 
should only be chosen for radical innovations and in virtually no other case. 
However, even Nordhaus’s conclusion may be refuted if one considers 
sequential innovation on the lines of Bessen and Maskin (2009) or 
Hopenhayn et al. (2006). Besides, as pointed out by Jaffe (2000) as well as 
other researchers, patent breadth and height are abstract concepts that cannot 
easily be linked to patent practices. Therefore, patent offices may only find 
limited use for many results of the literature on regulation. In Chapter 2.2    
I searched the literature for optimal regulating instruments and could not 
find a “one-size-fits-all” solution. Each paper suggests answers that will 
depend on many market specificities as well as varying goals of regulators 
and firms. Overall, I could not find a clear link between the strength of 
patent protection and innovativeness.  
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CHAPTER 3 
The Dangerous Development of Patent 
Applications in Europe 
“Outrageously large applications with high number 
of claims are often filed as smokescreens, and 
contribute to polluting the collections of prior art, 
and their uncontrolled growth in voluminosity 
therefore contributes to a deterioration of the legal 
certainty for all users of the patent system.” 
 Van Zeebroeck et al. (2008) 
 
“The size and length of patent applications at the 
EPO has drastically increased over the past 20 years, 
raising serious questions as to the ability of patent 
offices to manage their workload while upholding 
high standards of quality in the granting process.” 
Van Zeebroeck et al. (2009) 
 
“Is the increase in the number of claims actually 
revealing a better and more systematic use of 
fallback positions in patent drafting and number of 
pages a more thorough disclosure of inventions for 
which protection is being sought?” 
Archontopoulos et al. (2007) 
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Since the 1980s, the number and size of patent applications and grants has 
been growing continuously worldwide, resulting in a dramatic increase in 
the workload of patent offices and, most importantly, raising “serious 
concerns over patent quality standards” (van Zeebroeck et al., 2009). A 
good example for this growth can be observed at the European Patent Office 
(EPO). The Office granted its first patent in the year 1978 and celebrated its 
200,000th grant only 14 years later in 1992, recording an average of 14,000 
patent grants per year (Wissensallmende, 2009, based on EPO data). This 
figure is nonetheless small compared to the 40,000 patent grants recorded at 
the EPO in the year 1997, and the 52,000 grants from 2007 (idem). 
 
Even though a similar development could be observed in the US and around 
the world, this chapter discusses the evolution of patent voluminosity in 
Europe. After the status quo is described, the chapter provides explanations 
for the patent inflation, shows its effects on the system and suggests possible 
solutions.  
 
3.1. How Patent Applications Exploded  
Patent size, or voluminosity, has two dimensions: its total number of claims 
and its total number of pages. Both dimensions have radically surged at the 
EPO during the period 1980-2004. Moreover, the patent size increase was 
accompanied by a boom in the total number of patent applications, and these 
combined factors have put tremendous pressure on patent systems (see for 
example Archontopoulos et al., 2007).  
 
3.1.1. Theory of Patent Claims and Pages 
The number of claims is seen in the literature as a reflection of patent 
breadth – the scope of protection – because more subject matter is included 
with more claims (see Tong and Frame, 1994 or Lanjouw and Schankerman, 
1999). This view is generally accepted, even though there are 
counterexamples related to the wording of the claims: using the word 
“rodent” would take one patent claim; instead, naming three different 
rodents would lead to three claims, even though the scope of protection is in 
this case much smaller (van Zeebroeck et al., 2009). Nevertheless, more 
claims “denote a more detailed definition of the protected area, adding 
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precision: instead of giving a generic term which could be somewhat vague, 
the applicant will list extensively and individually all potential components 
of the subject matter” (idem). The rigorous descriptions included in more 
claims also provide patent holders with increased legal power in case the 
patent is litigated or contested. In such cases, patentees must defend their 
property rights against the objections of a legal examiner. They achieve this 
by “having a series of claims partly overlapping, partly fitted into each 
other” (van Zeebroeck et al., 2009) or, differently put, making claims “serve 
in different contexts” (Archontopoulos et al., 2007) and thereby maximizing 
the “chances for the main claim” (idem) to be considered valid. A different 
interpretation of claims is provided by Stevnsborg and van Pottelsberghe de 
la Potterie (2007), who regard the number of claims as a “strategic choice”: 
the applicant may choose to use more claims in order to hide the real 
invention “in the middle of many non-inventions” and use “vagueness as a 
weapon” (idem). These authors explain that there are two possible reasons 
for such a strategic choice: either the applicant wants to mislead patent 
examiners and especially competitors (in order to avoid relevant knowledge 
from being publicly used and further developed), or the applicant simply 
does not know what the relevant invention is when she files for a patent. An 
example for the latter case, illustrated by the authors and reproduced slightly 
differently here, could be a developer of chemicals who performs research 
and discovers a class of molecules, out of which only some molecules have 
a certain property (for instance that they lower cholesterol levels in 
humans). In case the researcher does not know exactly which molecule has 
the property, she will file claims for all molecules of the class, in order to be 
sure that the most valuable discovery is included in the scope of patent 
protection. In my view, the strategic inclination of patentees signaled by the 
latter authors may also be one of the factors contributing to the upturn in 
patent voluminosity.  
 
The number of pages in a patent application is considered to express “the 
extent of the disclosure of the invention”, because more pages typically 
reflect more in-depth descriptions and more comprehensive drawings (van 
Zeebroeck et al., 2009). The number of pages partly results from the number 
and length of the claims: Archontopoulos et al. (2007) find a correlation of 
0.37 (significant at a 5% probability threshold) between the number of 
claims and the number of pages at filing. Even though the number of pages 
may seem to be a straightforward measure of the size of a patent 
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application, there are some limits to its unbiasedness – the number of pages 
is influenced by the format of the document (font size, margins, paragraph 
or line spacing), by its language and by the presence of illustrations 
(Archontopoulos et al., 2007). In order to alleviate some of these problems, 
the EPO has applied a standard format to Euro-Direct applications since the 
mid-1980s. Besides, the formatting issue disappears when one considers 
granted patents, because these are published by the EPO in a specific and 
very compact format called a “type-set format” (idem). The number of 
illustrations in applications is contained in the EPO’s databases and 
therefore could be controlled for. Moreover, applications have to be 
provided in one of the three official languages: English, French or German, 
which somewhat restricts the language issue (idem). Some language 
heterogeneity issue still remains, but it is not severe – Archontopoulos et al. 
(2007) point out that the 2002 edition of the European Patent Convention 
comprises 73,629 words in German, 84,583 in English and 86,353 words in 
French; however, the number of characters in the three languages was less 
dissimilar, resulting in a comparable number of pages. 
 
3.1.2. Dynamics of Patent Growth and the Role of R&D 
Even though the phenomenon of patent voluminosity and complexity has 
become very stringent after the 1980s, it is not entirely new. Smith (2003) 
writes that as early as 1933 the US Patent and Trademark Office Society 
(USPTO) was already on the search for methods to eliminate multiple 
claims from applications and to design application fees depending on the 
number of claims. Duncan (1965) notes that the problem was repeated three 
decades later: patent offices were again confronted with increasing 
complexity, which led to delays in the handling of applications. As a result, 
patent offices employed more examiners, introduced automatic searching 
and modified procedures to raise filing and renewal fees (idem). In the 
1990s and 2000s, applications of more than a thousand pages, which once 
could not be imagined, started to be filed quite often at the EPO and other 
patent offices worldwide (van Zeebroeck et al., 2009). Several applications 
even reached 100,000 pages or up to 20,000 claims (idem). The growth of 
patent size became so extreme that the term “mega-application” was 
introduced, “often in relation to applications filed together with biological 
sequence listings” (Archontopoulos et al., 2007). In one case, the EPO 
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received an application containing 283 priorities and 80,259 sequences, 
totaling in around 600,000 pages (idem)!  
 
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of claims and pages between 1980 and 2004. 
The average number of claims per patent application more than doubled in 
this period, from 10 claims in 1980 to 21 claims in 2004. From 1985, one 
can observe a temporary reduction in the average number of pages, as a 
result of the implementation of a standardized format for applications at the 
EPO. In 1995, ten years after the standard format was introduced, the 
number of pages picked up from its 1985 level and continued to grow ever 
since. Similarly to the number of claims, the number of pages nearly 
doubled over the entire period, increasing from around 15 pages per 
application in 1980 to 30 pages in 2002. An essential piece of information 
not included in Figure 3.1 is that, additional to the increase in claims and 
pages, the total number of patent filings also grew – it doubled during the 
period 1998-2008 (van Zeebroeck et al., 2009), leading to a truly 
exponential growth trend. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Average number of claims and pages in EPO applications 
between 1980-2004 
 
 
Source: van Zeebroeck et al. (2009), based on EPO data 
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Figure 3.2 provides a different way of looking at the evolution of patent 
voluminosity. Here, two cohorts of EPO applications filed in the periods 
1980-1984 and 2000-2004 are analyzed. The figure shows the evolution of 
the cumulative share of applications filed in the two periods and their 
corresponding number of claims. The distributions of claims contain two 
distinct modes, one at 10 claims and another one at 20 claims. These modes 
reflect the additional claims fees requested at the EPO (starting with the 11th 
claim) and at the USPTO (from the 21st claim). A large share of EPO 
applications is concentrated between the 9th and the 10th claim, showing that 
applicants tried to avoid the additional fees by restricting their protection to 
exactly 10 claims (similarly, many USPTO applications were restricted to a 
number of 20). The most important and striking result from Figure 3.2 is the 
shift of the distribution towards the right side and a significant lengthening 
of the distribution’s tail between the two cohorts. For example, in the period 
1980-1984, 90% of applications contained 19 claims or less; twenty years 
later, between 2000-2004, 90% of applications contained 37 claims or less, 
a virtual doubling in the number of claims. Furthermore, between 1980-
1984 there were almost no applications with more than 50 claims; between 
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Figure 3.2. Cumulative frequency distribution of the number of claims in 
EPO applications 
 
 
Source: van Zeebroeck et al. (2008), based on EPO data 
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2000-2004 there were about 5% of applications with more than 50 claims. 
Both the right shift and the lengthening of the distribution of claims are 
clear signs of the surge in patent voluminosity. 
 
Since the main purpose of patents is to reflect inventive activities (as well as 
offer inventors protection from imitation), some important questions arise. 
Has the explosion of patent applications been accompanied by a 
corresponding increase in R&D activity? Or does it rather reflect a higher 
tendency of firms to patent more? Since many studies indicate that R&D 
activities are a central input for inventions, and thus for patent applications 
(see e.g. Licht and Zoz, 1998), one would expect the first interpretation to 
be the correct one. Unfortunately for society, the literature seems to provide 
support for the second interpretation. Cremers and Licht (2006) give 
evidence that the inflation-adjusted expenditures for R&D have barely 
increased in most countries in the 1990s. Instead, the ratio of patents to 
R&D expenditures visibly increased during that time. Figure 3.3 shows the 
development of the patent-R&D quotient between 1991 and 2002 for 
different regions of the world (it takes into account patent applications in the 
US). Following the logic of the invention production function developed by 
Griliches (1990), the patent-R&D quotient in any year is computed as the 
number of patent applications during that year divided by the R&D capital 
stock from the previous year. The patent-R&D quotient is normalized to a 
base index of 100 in the year 1991 for all regions of the world taken into 
account. Remarkable is the fact that, out of all regions, German companies 
seem to come up with much more patents from their R&D activities. 
 
Kortum and Lerner (1999) add to the discussion on the patent-R&D 
quotient. They test the hypothesis whether a broad increase in research 
productivity underlies the growth in patenting by looking at the US research 
effort in the 1990s. Their data analysis shows no consistency with the 
formulated hypothesis. Instead, they find that the general increase in 
patenting was not accompanied by a surge in any particular research activity 
– research intensity leveled in the 1990s, while patenting continued to rise. 
The authors conclude that the boom in patenting must be due to 
improvements in the management of innovation of US firms, and not to 
R&D intensity. 
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Figure 3.3. Development of the patent-R&D quotient between 1991-2002  
 
 
 
Source: Cremers and Licht (2006), based on OECD data.  
Index for 1991 = 100 
 
  
Chapter 3.1 has shown that the simultaneous boom in patent size and in the 
number of patent filings generated a tremendous workload for patent 
offices, which have to deal with a huge backlog of applications that have not 
been examined yet (Archontopoulos et al., 2007). More claims and more 
pages mean that patent offices have to assign more resources “to searching 
and examining the files, which induces an additional pressure on quality” 
(van Zeebroeck et al., 2009). The latter authors find it critical that the 
broader patent protection “may induce a higher cost to society, and possibly 
more uncertainty for competitors during the examination procedure and 
beyond” (idem). This uncertainty stems from the fact that, given a doubtful 
quality assessment for patent protection, competitors no longer know what 
the scope of protection really is and thus they cannot develop strategies to 
make sure they do not infringe the patent. Furthermore, we have seen in this 
chapter that firms’ increasing tendency to patent was not coupled with 
changes in R&D activities. So, in the words of van Zeebroeck et al. (2009, 
p. 1007), one has to ask the question “whether the change is due to 
EU-15 without Germany 
Switzerland 
USA 
Germany 
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increasing greed on the part of patentees in claiming for more protection, or 
whether it is driven by structural and exogenous changes in patent systems, 
technologies and market conditions”. The next chapter wishes to address 
this question.   
 
3.2. Explanations for the Surge in Patent Voluminosity  
3.2.1. Fees  
As one could observe in Figure 3.2 of the previous chapter, one factor with 
an impact on patent drafting and voluminosity is represented by 
administrative fees of patent offices. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 of this chapter give 
a more detailed overview of the distribution of both claims and pages for 
patent applications. The most remarkable result from the comparison of 
these two figures, also emphasized by Archontopoulos et al. (2007), is the 
different shape of the distribution for claims (tri-modal) versus pages 
(unimodal). The distribution of claims shows peaks at levels of 10, 20 and 
50, while that of pages has only one mode at 50. The mode of 50 in both 
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Figure 3.4. Number of claims in EPO applications 
 
 
Source: Archontopoulos et al. (2007), based on EPO data  
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Figure 3.5. Number of pages in EPO applications 
 
Source: Archontopoulos et al. (2007), based on EPO data  
 
 
distributions represents very large and mega-applications (which I discussed 
previously). But the first two modes in the distribution of claims are the 
ones revealing some interesting facts. Patent applicants appear to react to 
fee policies governing EPO and USPTO applications, which are based on 
claims, and not on pages. As shown in the previous chapter, the EPO 
charges extra fees starting with the 11th claim, while the USPTO does the 
same from the 21st claim. These two thresholds generated the first two 
modes in the claims’ distribution.  
 
In my view, this means that applicants had many applications consisting of 
10 or 20 claims, in order to avoid additional fees. Furthermore, this most 
probably happens because patent offices introduced additional fees based on 
claims, and not on pages. In the words of Archontopoulos et al. (2007), 
patent applicants show some “price elasticity of the number of claims”, but 
no price elasticity of the number of patent pages. Therefore, I think that a 
good solution for patent offices might perhaps be to change the current 
pricing scheme for claims (which at the moment is non-linear), and create 
progressive, monotone increasing fees that charge applicants for each 
additional claim. I will briefly discuss this as a possible solution as well as 
further solutions from the literature during Chapter 3.3. 
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3.2.2. Internationalization  
Archontopoulos et al. (2007) mention three possible routes that a patent 
application can follow before it gets filed at the EPO. It may start as:              
i) “a national priority filing subsequently transferred to the EPO”; ii) a direct 
filing at the EPO; iii) an international application through the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT).  
 
Filing through a Patent Cooperation Treaty procedure may “impact the way 
a patent application is drafted” (van Zeebroeck et al., 2009). The latter 
authors explain the advantages of the PCT procedure. They note that 
through the PCT, which is proctored by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization, applicants may find an important method to reduce patenting 
costs. Van Zeebroeck et al. (2009) outline the PCT procedure: “Under this 
treaty, one can file an “International Patent Application”, which does not 
turn into some sort of international patent, but primarily acts as a vehicle to 
buy a period of time within which to proceed with national or regional (such 
as the EPO) patent applications. Instead of having only a 12-month time 
period within which an inventor must file foreign applications in order to 
claim priority, with the PCT, the inventor can gain an additional 18 months 
before having to incur the relatively large expenses of completing the 
applications at each of the designated offices around the world”. Van 
Zeebroeck et al. (2009) stress out the fact that this additional time “can be 
crucial to the exploitation of an invention” for a number of reasons, which I 
describe in the following: the time can be used to gather the significant 
financial resources necessary for a multi-country application; the inventor 
can search for agents who are willing to pay license fees to use the 
discovery, or for distribution partners, thus securing a portion of the future 
market; most importantly, the time can serve to reduce some of the 
uncertainty associated with the invention, by allowing the applicant to better 
assess the potential value of the discovery before a high cost is incurred. 
Last but not least, the PCT does not require additional fees for excess claims 
(idem), as is the case with direct applications at the EPO or USPTO (see for 
instance Figure 3.2). Therefore, the PCT makes it easier and cheaper for 
inventors to apply for a broader scope of protection. It was probably for all 
these reasons that the PCT option increased sharply from 15% of EPO 
applications in 1985 to a level of 50% in 2000, where it remained quite 
stable until the year 2005 and further (idem).  
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Figure 3.6 compares the cumulative frequency distribution of claims 
according to the filing route the applicant has taken: direct applications to 
the EPO (Euro-Direct) versus PCT applications at the EPO during the 
period 2000-2004. The distribution of Euro-PCT is shifted to the right and 
with a much longer tail than the Euro-Direct distribution, revealing that 
Euro-PCT applications contain significantly higher numbers of claims. To 
this, van Zeebroeck et al. (2008) add that PCT applications are “drafted 
according to US conditions” and are “more influenced by USPTO fee 
regimes”. Van Zeebroeck et al. (2009) run an empirical model in which they 
test a set of hypotheses on the determinants of patent voluminosity, 
including: the internationalization of procedures through PCT, national 
practices, technological complexity and emerging sectors (which are 
explained in the next subchapters). From all these determinants, 
internationalization and national practices were found to have the highest 
explanatory power to account for the patent explosion. A patent filed under 
the PCT option was found to contain more than one claim and about 15 
more pages than an average EPO application. Van Zeebroeck et al. (2009) 
conclude, just like the previous study, that PCT filings follow a “draft once, 
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Figure 3.6. Cumulative frequency distribution of the number of claims in 
Euro-PCT and Euro-Direct applications, 2000-2004 
 
 
Source: Van Zeebroeck et al. (2008), based on EPO data 
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file everywhere” principle; they are “drafted with a US template then 
applied to all other patent offices”. Most importantly, both studies 
mentioned above consider internationalization through the PCT route to be 
the main contributor to the surge in voluminosity.  
 
3.2.3. National Practices 
Looking at differences in national practices also reveals large discrepancies 
in patent size. The largest differences can be found between the US and 
continental Europe. The literature attributes these differences to country-
specific patent drafting styles, patent law as well as cultural factors. For 
example, van Zeebroeck et al. (2009) point out that commercial contracts 
are much larger in the US, showing differences in the legal system and 
culture that must have similarly affected US patent drafting practices.  
 
Figure 3.7 displays the average number of claims and pages in EPO 
applications filed in 2002 according to their priority country. These 
geographical patterns show that two main groups of countries emerge. The 
first group, depicted in the upper-right portion of the figure, is mainly 
composed of Anglo-Saxon countries: the US, the UK, Australia and Canada.  
 
This first group is characterized by applications with an above-average 
number of pages and claims. The second group, found in the lower-left part 
of the figure, is mostly made up of continental European countries such as 
Germany, France, Italy and Switzerland, which have smaller applications in 
terms of pages and claims. Van Zeebroeck et al. (2009) emphasize the fact 
that the main difference between these two groups of countries is their legal 
system, with common law governing the first group and civil law the 
second. It is the common law regime which leads to larger documents. Van 
Zeebroeck et al. (2009) also compared the size of patent applications for 
non-US applicants targeting the US market first with that of US applicants 
filing outside the US. They found that non-US applicants conceived longer 
applications when filing in the US, while US applicants filing outside their 
country drafted shorter applications. From this the authors concluded that it 
must be “the American patent system itself that induces a larger size, 
implying that patentees who apply to the US specify and formulate their 
claims in much more detail than would be required by the continental 
European system” (idem). The authors also signal Japan’s somewhat special 
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Figure 3.7. Average size and number of EPO applications according to 
priority countries 
 
 
Source: Archontopoulos et al. (2007), based on EPO data. The size of the 
bubbles reflects the number of EPO applications from the corresponding 
country. 
 
 
position – Japanese patents are known to have fewer claims than other 
countries; however, they have a larger number of pages, indicating that 
Japanese applicants are asked for longer descriptions of their inventions, 
which potentially leads to a higher level of information disclosure (idem). 
All in all, one can conclude that there are large differences between the US 
patent drafting style and other systems. Van Zeebroeck et al. (2009) found 
the US style to be a significant and large determinant of patent 
voluminosity. Furthermore, Archontopoulos et al. (2007) found the so-
called “US syndrome” to be even more pronounced with PCT than non-PCT 
filings. The US drafting style, the PCT route and the effect of common law 
are the most important factors increasing patent size.  
 
3.2.4. Technological Complexity 
Van Zeebroeck et al. (2009) formulate their hypothesis about the 
relationship between patent size and technological complexity as follows: 
“As technology becomes more complex, more words may be required to 
3. The Dangerous Development of Patent Applications in Europe 
53 
 
describe and claim it. Notably because a dwarf standing on a giant’s 
shoulders may really see farther than the giant himself, architectural 
inventions tend to lead to increasingly complex inventions and technologies 
over time, produced by larger and larger teams of inventors with 
complementary skills and expertise. […] It may be expected that the rise in 
technological complexity will drive the size of subsequent patent 
applications.”  
 
To test this hypothesis, van Zeebroeck et al. (2009) used four variables and 
examined their effect on patent size: i) the number of inventors specified in 
the application; ii) the number of International Patent Classification (IPC) 
classes which correspond to an invention, where a larger number of classes  
designates a higher technological diversity; iii) backward patent citations, 
representing “the number of citations made to previous patents, which 
indicates a larger use of prior patented art”; iv) non-patent citations, “the 
number of references to the scientific literature included in the document, 
which is generally used to identify science-based inventions” (idem). All 
four variables were shown to be “highly significant and positive 
determinants of patent size” (idem). In the following, I summarize the 
authors’ results with respect to each of the four variables mentioned above. 
First, the study found that four additional inventors will be associated with 
one further claim and four extra pages, which means that each inventor 
potentially brings an important input to the patent. Second, an application 
which contains three more IPC classes (and is therefore more complex) will 
also have one more claim and 2.5 more pages. The third result is that 
building on more patented prior knowledge increases patent size:                 
5 additional backward patent citations induce one more claim and 0.5 
additional pages. Fourth, the same applies to science-based inventions, 
where 6 supplementary non-patent citations will add one claim and 2 pages 
(idem). All these results show that technological complexity will indeed 
increase patent size through its claims and pages.  
 
3.2.5. Emerging Sectors 
Technological specificities also play a role for patent drafting practices. The 
EPO subdivided its applications into 14 general technical areas called “Joint 
Clusters” (van Zeebroeck et al. 2008). Figure 3.8 presents the size of patent 
applications as a function of claims and pages for the 14 technological 
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sectors. As in Figure 3.7, one can notice the almost linear relationship 
between the number of claims and that of pages, indicating that patent size 
typically grows in both its dimensions depending on the country of origin 
and on the technical sector. From Figure 3.8 one can derive that the 
technical areas with the largest patent size are young, emerging sectors: 
biotechnology, organic chemistry and computers. Van Zeebroeck et al. 
(2009) provide a few explanations for this phenomenon, which I regard as 
plausible. They suggest that “the vocabulary of more recent technologies 
may be less standardized than in more established fields, requiring more 
detailed descriptions. Emerging technical fields rely more on recent science 
than older fields, and are based on (as yet) less well-known natural 
phenomena, which require more explanation than artefacts based on long 
recognized and accepted mechanisms” (idem). The authors give two 
examples: biotechnology is based on molecular biology, while software is 
based on mathematics, operational research and algorithms – most of these 
fields belong to more recent science. It should be added that the much larger 
size of biotechnology applications is probably influenced by the 
incorporation of genetic sequences. Finally, van Zeebroeck et al. (2009) 
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Figure 3.8. Average size of EPO applications according to technological 
sector, 2000 
 
 
Source: van Zeebroeck et al. (2008), based on EPO data. 
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stress out that “markets where technology is the most important competitive 
argument” might also contain more licensing and cross-licensing, for which 
the scope of protection must be defined with greater accuracy, again leading 
to larger applications (idem). Therefore new, emerging, science-based, 
highly competitive sectors contribute to the surge in patenting. 
 
3.3. Effects of the Patent Boom and Possible Solutions 
One could see throughout this chapter that patent size has recently 
experienced a tremendous growth in both pages and claims. This growth, 
which was not coupled with an increase in R&D activities, can be explained 
by five factors. The fee structure seemed to have an influence on reducing 
or compressing the number of claims. Internationalization through the PCT 
procedure and national practices, which are severely influenced by the US 
drafting style, were the strongest contributors to patent voluminosity. 
Following the “draft once, file everywhere” principle, patent applicants 
typically opt for an American template whenever they want to file an 
application with international coverage. Belonging to common law, and not 
to civil law, has a significant effect on patent size. Furthermore, technology 
plays an essential part: more complex “architectural inventions” depending 
on more inventors, more IPC classes and more prior art lead to larger 
applications. The same applies to new, emerging and competitive sectors. 
Van Zeebroeck et al. (2009) also note that even though these factors explain 
an important part of the variance in patent size, there remains a significant 
unexplained trend in the increase of size. They attribute this general trend to 
“an inexorable path towards more complexity, towards more complete, 
detailed and hence voluminous literature in every field of activity, such as 
the user manuals of electronic devices, the documentation of mass-market 
consumer goods, official or technical reports, or even laws. Patents may be 
just another playground for this generalized verbosity, encouraged by the 
decreasing costs of drafting and disseminating written information” (idem).  
 
As stated before, the effects of the patent boom are of utmost social and 
economic importance. The increasing pressure put on patent offices leads to 
a questionability of quality standards in the granting process. Excessively 
large applications “may generate uncertainty in a specific field or indicate 
that larger areas of knowledge are being appropriated by individual agents” 
(van Zeebroeck et al., 2008). This uncertainty may compromise the 
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reliability of the patent system altogether, because it means “not only more 
prior art to sift through for the inventor, patent searcher, patent examiner 
and the general public, but also a growing scope of the state of the art to 
invent around or to avoid in order to prevent ultimate litigation” (idem). 
Stevnsborg and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2007) raise serious 
concerns about applicants “polluting the technological field” by hiding 
major inventions in the midst of very large applications. Archontopoulos et 
al. (2007) also doubt that the number of patent pages is a good indicator for 
the amount of disclosure of inventions. Overall, it appears that the patent 
boom might eventually deteriorate the legal certainty of the patent system.  
 
Another important effect is that of seriously delaying the patent granting 
process. Figure 3.9 presents the average time necessary to reach a decision 
to grant a patent at the EPO as a function of the number of claims and pages 
in the application. This figure shows a very strong relation between 
application size and processing time: the more claims and pages, the larger 
the delay before granting. This fact “reinforces the idea that larger 
applications monopolise and consume more resources from patent offices 
for their processing and hence contribute to the increase in granting delays 
and backlogs” (Archontopoulos et al., 2007). The problem becomes even 
bigger when one considers that larger applications are typically filed in 
technical sectors which already have more applications with existing delays 
(van Zeebroeck et al., 2008). Figure 3.9 only presents a static view of 
granting periods. From a dynamic point of view, the situation is even more 
worrying: Archontopoulos et al. (2007) note that the duration until the 
granting decision increased over time, from 36 months in the early 1980s to 
about 57 months in the 2000s. Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and Franҫois 
(2006) add an interesting note to this discussion. They suggest that a large 
chosen number of claims may point out to an intentional choice by patent 
applicants to postpone the granting process, which comes with high 
validation fees and translation costs. In my view, a sign of such a strategy is 
also the increasing share of PCT applications, through which patentees use 
additional time to raise funds and assess the real value of an invention 
before incurring the cost of the actual grant. As one final effect, “the growth 
in document size also results in increasing handling, printing, and shipping 
costs of patent documents and, when translations are needed, an increase in 
these costs as well” (van Zeebroeck et al., 2008).   
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Figure 3.9. Average time to grant decisions at the EPO depending on 
application size 
 
 
Source: van Zeebroeck et al. (2008), based on EPO data. Considered were 
applications filed between 1995 and 1997 and granted by January 31, 2006.  
 
 
Looking at Figure 3.9, there is one more observation that I would like to 
make, based on combined information from this figure and earlier parts of 
the dissertation. In the beginning of Chapter 2.1.3, I mentioned survey 
evidence by Mansfield (1984), who was reporting that about 60 % of 
patented innovations were imitated in less than four years after market 
introduction; moreover, Levin et al. (1987) concluded that almost all 
patented products are duplicated in less than five years. Figure 3.9 shows us 
that about 54 months, or 4.5 years, are necessary for an applicant to be 
granted a patent, if the application is very small and consists of very few 
claims (1-5). The larger the patent size, the larger is the delay between 
application time and the granting decision: Figure 3.9 shows that 
applications comprising of more than 17 claims are granted after more than 
60 months, or 5 years, while very large applications with more than 45 
claims necessitate more than 72 months, or 6 years, to be granted. In light of 
the information from Mansfield and Levin et al., one can conclude that for 
most patents (and especially for medium-sized and large ones), the granting 
decision takes so long that in the meantime the corresponding patents will 
have become worthless, since they have been effectively duplicated on the 
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market. This observation raises once more the question about the value and 
relevance of patents to their applicants.  
 
So can anything be done to reduce or slow down the growth in patent 
voluminosity? The literature does come up with some potential solutions. 
Dack and Cohen (2001) proposed a number of measures to be taken, from 
which I mention the most important: a more rigorous approach to evaluate 
how clear and precise applications are, the introduction of fees based on the 
number of claims for PCT applications (which do not exist yet, despite the 
essential influence of the PCT route on voluminosity) as well as a statutory 
limitation on the number of claims (in order to circumvent the phenomenon 
of mega-applications). The EPO has already taken one important step, by 
introducing a rule (named Rule 29(2) from January 2002) “with the 
intention to induce applicants to file fewer independent claims within the 
same category” (Archontopoulos et al., 2007). However, the rule showed 
only limited impact (van Zeebroeck et al., 2008), and the EPO announced 
that it needs to review its fees policy to properly respond to the increase in 
patent size (Pompidou, 2005). For patent offices, the delicate issue in setting 
claim-based or page-based fees is to “ensure that a point is not crossed when 
it becomes cheaper to divide an application than pay excess claim fees” (van 
Zeebroeck et al., 2008).  
 
With respect to the fee structure, I reiterate an idea from Chapter 3.2.1: a 
large share of applications can be found for 10 claims at the EPO, and for 20 
claims at the USPTO. The 10th, the 20th and the 50th claim are the three 
modes of Figure 3.4. I discuss the first and second mode (10 and 20 claims) 
in this paragraph, while the next paragraph deals with excess claims (and 
therefore includes the third mode of 50 claims). The 10th and 20th claims 
reflect, in my view, a non-linear pricing scheme introduced by patent 
offices: applicants generate many patent applications with, say, 10 claims, 
because they would be charged additionally from the 11th claim. Thus, I am 
raising the question whether a monotone increasing pricing scheme for 
claims would be better to stop the flood of applications. In other words, 
instead of charging applicants only for the 10th or 20th claim, patent offices 
could introduce fees on each additional claim, that is, on the 2nd, the 3rd, the 
4th claim, and so on; alternatively, additional fees could be charged in 
intervals (e.g. for the 3rd, 6th, 9th claim, and so on). However, this might not 
solve the problem because, in the words of van Zeebroeck et al. (2008), 
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applicants might find ways to break an application into separate parts rather 
than pay fees for additional claims. My recommendation is to perform 
further analyses or perhaps empirical investigations to reveal the optimal fee 
structure.   
 
One approach that proved to work until now was adopted by the USPTO. In 
December 2004, the USPTO set up a new patent fee schedule which 
prescribed “significantly higher fees for excess claims and pages”, with the 
goal of influencing patent drafting practices (van Zeebroeck et al., 2008). 
The measure was successful and the average number of claims per 
application dropped from 28 to about 23 claims; moreover, the schedule had 
an extensive impact on other patent offices worldwide, including the EPO 
(idem). The main conclusion for this chapter is that the fee structure can be 
a very useful tool to reduce the explosion of patent applications. However, 
an optimal fee structure must be designed very intelligently, taking into 
account all the incentives and trade-offs it might generate. 
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CHAPTER 4 
When Patents Hurt Our Society: 
Evidence from the Pharmaceutical 
Industry  
“The patenting of drugs and vaccines to treat public 
health emergencies remains a controversial 
subject.” 
 Klein (2009) 
 
“Health care professionals who choose the 
prescription drugs that patients consume may have 
only attenuated incentives to minimize the cost of 
drugs to the users.” 
Caves et al. (1991) 
 
“The mythic costs of R&D are but one part of a 
larger, dysfunctional system that supports a 
wealthy, high-tech industry, gives us mostly new 
medicines with few or no advantages (and serious 
adverse reactions that have become a leading cause 
of hospitalization and death), and then persuades 
doctors that we need these new medicines. It 
compromises science in the process, and consumes 
a growing proportion of our money.” 
Light and Warburton (2011) 
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4.1. Profits from Pharmaceuticals and the Role of Patents 
In the year 2011, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America, or US pharma industry, declared that “Drug patents are good for 
our health” (PhRMA, 2011). Many researchers and involved actors have 
challenged this statement and pointed out to different perspectives. The 
National Institute for Health Care Management Foundation (NIHCM) is a 
non-for-profit organization who does research on the US health care system. 
NIHCM (2000) points out that the pharma industry has been the most 
profitable of all US industries during the last half of the 20th Century, 
“notwithstanding efforts by both the private and public sector to control 
health care spending”. Figure 4.1 emphasizes this view.  
 
 
Figure 4.1. Median profits as percentage of revenues for pharmaceutical 
companies (Rx Firms) versus Fortune 500 firms 
 
 
 
Source: Schondelmeyer (1999), data from Fortune Magazine 1958-2000 
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One can see in Figure 4.1 that the median profits of pharmaceutical 
companies (as percentage of revenues) were significantly higher than those 
of the Fortune 500 companies (the 500 most successful companies in the 
US) over the period 1960-2000. While the median profits of Fortune 500 
firms remained consistently below 6% of revenues, pharmaceutical firms 
achieved profits between 8-10% of revenues in the period 1960-1984.        
In 1984, the Hatch-Waxman Act was passed by the US Congress with the 
goal of encouraging the manufacture of generic drugs (drugs that are 
chemically identical to brand name drugs, but are marketed under their 
chemical names and without brand advertising). On the other hand, the 
Hatch-Waxman Act counterbalanced the promotion of generics by 
increasing the length of patent protection for brand name drugs, resulting in 
a surge of profits in the pharmaceutical industry (NIHCM, 2000). Indeed, 
Figure 4.1 shows that median profits for pharmaceutical companies 
increased to more than 10% of revenues right after 1984 and continued to 
increase to levels of more than 18% by the end of the 1990s.  
 
The existence of such overblown profits, combined with concerns about 
healthcare costs, availability of life-saving drugs and the questionable levels 
of innovativeness (as described in Chapter 4.2) have led to much criticism 
of the pharma industry and raised the debate whether the level of 
pharmaceutical patent protection is at desirable levels. 
 
The US pharma industry’s response to such criticism (PhRMA, 2011) was 
that patent protection is absolutely vital in order to maintain the industry’s 
incentive to innovate and bring any life-saving drugs to the market. The 
industry suggests that any threat to the existing level of patent protection 
would be “in no one’s interest”. The industry’s main argument usually 
revolves around the cost of research and development for drugs: “creating a 
single new medication costs, on average, about $1 billion”, which are 
funded “from one source alone: private investors” (PhRMA, 2011). The 
industry maintains that it takes ten to fifteen years of development and 
testing before a typical drug arrives on the market (PhRMA, 2012).  
 
However, according to different sources, the real figures for the 
development costs are far, far lower. Angell (2004, p. 46) estimates that the 
real cost per drug is “well under $100 million”. Angell explains how the 
pharma industry dramatically inflates the cost figures by not considering 
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R&D tax deductions and by including foregone opportunity costs as out-of-
the-pocket costs (opportunity costs represent here the theoretical additional 
revenue that would have been achieved by investing in a portfolio of 
financial securities instead of pharmaceutical R&D). Such opportunity costs 
more than double the cost estimate for drug development (idem). Light and 
Warburton (2011) point out to other tricks that the pharma industry 
sometimes uses to increase the cost figures: substantial taxpayer subsidies 
are not considered, trial costs are inflated, R&D time is exaggerated, and 
median costs are in fact much lower than the reported mean costs. Besides, 
the cost reports are not performed by independent institutions, but by 
centers that are directly funded by the pharma industry and get unique 
access to the data (Light and Warburton, 2011).  
 
In spite of the profit and cost considerations mentioned above, the 
conventional view is that patents play a special role in the pharmaceutical 
industry, especially compared to other industries. This view is endorsed not 
only by the industry itself (PhRMA, 2011), but also by research studies such 
as Cohen et al. (2000) and Scherer (2007, 2009). In their study, Cohen et al. 
(2000) analyzed data from a 1994 survey of R&D managers who were 
working in 34 industries of the US manufacturing sector. Cohen et al.’s 
(2000) results showed that R&D managers from the pharmaceutical industry 
consistently rated patents’ importance for the appropriability of profits as 
higher than did R&D managers of other industries.  
 
One explanation for the alleged higher importance of patents in 
pharmaceuticals is given by Scherer (2007). He points out to a conundrum 
faced by the pharmaceutical industry: while the costs of research and 
development of the chemical formula for a new medicine are astronomical 
(as one could see above), the costs of actually manufacturing a drug are 
quite low (once the chemical compound is known, it can be reproduced 
easily and quickly). So the threat of imitation for pharmaceuticals could be 
greater and with more severe consequences than it is in other industries. 
Indeed, the World Health Organization (2012) attests that there exists a 
large market for copies of drugs that are offered at reduced prices, and 
counterfeit drugs are proliferated at a very high rate around the world.  
 
Another reason why the pharmaceutical industry is sensitive when it comes 
to patents can be found in Kesselheim and Mello (2007). They point out that 
4. Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry 
64 
 
the regulatory approval process that has to respected in order to bring a drug 
to market requires the disclosure of many aspects of a drug's composition, as 
well as its development and therapeutic effects. Therefore, the 
pharmaceutical industry should, at least in theory, rely less on secrecy about 
the product and it needs to rely more on patent protection. However, there is 
a contradiction between the conventional view and the industry practice: 
Cohen et al. (2000) interviewed R&D managers of pharmaceutical 
companies and found out that they named other instruments as more 
important for the appropriation of profits. The R&D managers stated that 
secrecy and first-mover advantage are more important than patents, while 
patents are used as legal weapons in order to block rivals, to negotiate or to 
prevent legal suits.  
 
All in all, one finds many contradictions when it comes to the role of patent 
protection in the pharmaceutical industry. The increase of protection 
through the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 was followed by tremendous 
increases in profits. The industry is suspected to dramatically inflate 
development costs and to be secretive about its development data. Even 
though patent protection is rated as more important in the pharmaceutical 
industry than in other industries, in reality its role may be overestimated: 
other instruments seem to guarantee the protection of profits, while patents 
are often used for legal battles. So it seems to me that the main purpose of 
patents – that of keeping incentives alive for the industry to innovate – may 
not be fulfilled in the pharmaceutical industry to the extent that a healthy 
advanced society wants and needs. The following chapter brings more 
information which can be useful in the debate whether the rate of patent 
protection vis-à-vis industry innovativeness is optimal or not.  
 
4.2. The Questionable Innovativeness in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry 
In a study from 2002 (NIHCM, 2002a), the National Institute for Health 
Care Management classified new drugs by their level of innovativeness. The 
classification for being more or less innovative is based on criteria used by 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The study by NIHCM (2002a) 
examines drugs approved for sale in the US market between 1989 and 2000. 
When a pharmaceutical company applies to the FDA for approval of a new 
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drug, the FDA classifies the drug based on its chemical composition, and on 
its therapeutic potential. According to NIHCM (2002a), the FDA classifies 
drugs into three groups: 
• new molecular entities (NMEs) are any compounds which have 
never been approved for sale on the US market. This also includes 
molecules which differ somewhat from other molecules in the same 
class of drugs;  
• incrementally modified drugs (IMDs) are compounds that already 
exist on the market, but are newly offered in a different dosage or a 
different method of administration; 
• other drugs are identical in form and composition to existing drugs 
on the market, but they are newly offered by a different 
manufacturer.  
 
Since I am looking for a measure of innovativeness for the industry, the 
above classification gives reasons to believe that NMEs are the most  
innovative (and “the most therapeutically and economically significant” 
according to DiMasi et al., 1991), IMDs are modifications of existing drugs, 
while other drugs are just re-packaged drugs (which I can call routine or 
fake innovations4). As stated before, the FDA also classifies drugs 
according to their therapeutic potential. Drugs showing only a minor 
therapeutic improvement are considered "standard", while drugs offering a 
major or a completely new therapeutic improvement are considered 
"priority" (DiMasi and Faden, 2011). Given the two described dimensions 
for drug classification (new vs. incremental and standard vs. priority), I 
obtained four categories of pharmaceutical innovations, with standard IMDs 
and NMEs as the least innovative drugs, and priority IMDs and NMEs as 
the most innovative ones.  
 
The data in Figure 4.2 provided by the NIHCM (2002a) depicts the 
development of innovativeness in the pharmaceutical industry: the least 
innovative drugs, the standard IMDs and NMEs have had the strongest 
percentage increase between periods 1989-1994 and 1995-2000, with 62% 
and 26% respectively. During the same periods, drugs with better 
therapeutic effects (the priority IMDs) have increased by 9% only, while the 
most radical innovations (the priority NMEs) increased by a mere 3%.  
                                                 
4 According to the terminology given by Schade (2013).  
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However, the computations given by the NIHCM (2002a) have some 
limitations, because the percentages are based only on the change from the 
older period (1989-1994) to the newer period (1995-2000) and the base 
index from the older period was completely neglected by the NIHCM. For 
these reasons, I have run my own computations of the percentages taken by 
each of the four categories in each of the periods. These computations are 
also included in Figure 4.2 in the third and fourth columns.  
 
 
Figure 4.2. The development of standard and priority NMEs and IMDs 
between periods 1989-1994 and 1995-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*category change divided by total change 
Source: NIHCM (2002a). With additional computations by the author in the 
third and fourth columns 
 
 
The numbers I have computed myself give a totally different image from 
that of NIHCM (2002a). Looking at the third and fourth columns of Figure 
4.2, one can notice that the development of the four categories has not, by 
far, been as drastic as in the original interpretation given by the NIHCM. 
Overall, standard NMEs and priority IMDs have varied very little between 
the two periods considered: standard NMEs increased very slightly, from a 
percentage of 21.71 % to 23.20 % of the total, while priority IMDs fell very 
slightly, from 9.43 % to 9.31 % of the total. On the other hand, there has 
been a noticeable increase in standard IMDs (from 48 % to 53.43 % of the 
% category 
1989-1994 
% category 
1995-2000 
48.00 % 53.43 % 
21.71 % 
9.43 % 
20.86 % 
23.20 % 
9.31 % 
14.06 % 
100.00 % 100.00 % 
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total), to the detriment of priority NMEs (which fell from 20.86 % to         
14.06 % of the total).  
 
Therefore, one could suggest that the innovativeness of the pharmaceutical 
industry has slightly fallen from the initial period of 1989-1994 to the new 
period of 1995-2000. However, unlike some critics of the industry would 
like to argue (see for instance Light and Warburton 2001 in the next 
section), I found another possible explanation5 for the apparent decrease in 
innovativeness (or shift to more incremental innovation), based on my 
computations from Figure 4.2. Namely, it could be that there are some “true 
innovators” who produce mostly priority NMEs, but there are much more 
“copycats” who only produce standard IMDs. Based on the data I have in 
this dissertation, it is hard to disentangle the true explanation for the 
questionable innovativeness in pharmaceuticals. However, the following 
Chapters 4.3 and 4.5 also point out to some intuition that it has become 
increasingly difficult for “true innovators” to come up with radical 
medicine, and that the market for the proliferation of “imitations” has been 
flourishing lately. Thus, it is hard to tell whether patent protection should be 
increased or decreased. If it is the case that imitation has become the more 
prominent type of “innovation”, patent protection for radical pharmaceutical 
innovation should be enhanced, and not reduced.  
 
In this section of the current subchapter, I provide some of the literature 
which is critical of the pharmaceutical industry. Light and Warburton (2001) 
write a comment which criticizes the pharma industry and accuses it of 
falling levels of innovativeness: “R&D costs need not be such an 
insuperable obstacle to the development of better medicines. The deeper 
problem is that current incentives reward companies to develop mainly new 
medicines of little advantage and compete for market share at high prices, 
rather than to develop clinically superior medicines with public funding so 
that prices could be much lower and risks to companies lower as well”.   
 
Contributing to the criticism, the NIHCM (2002a) study directly attributes 
the rise in IMDs to the strengthening of intellectual property protection, 
through the Hatch-Waxman Act from 1984. The act allows for patents to be 
extended by another three years, if the FDA approves a "new use" for an 
existing patented drug (idem). Furthermore, the act extended the length of 
                                                 
5 I am thankful to Christian D. Schade for suggesting this interpretation. 
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patent protection for brand name drugs, giving them up to five more years 
of protection (NIHCM, 2000, pp. 4-5; Scherer, 2009, p. 197). Other sources 
(e.g. The New York Times, 2011) express their concern that the major 
pharmaceutical companies have very few promising new drugs under 
development, and try to extend protection of older drugs for as long as 
possible. On the other end of the spectrum, there are researchers such as 
Grabowski and Wang (2006), who insist that the pharmaceutical industry 
remains very innovative. They point out that simple counts of NMEs are 
misleading and that further analyses would give a different picture, 
according to which very high-quality radical medicine continues to be 
introduced on a large scale.  
 
Overall, it is very difficult to understand whether the industry’s 
innovativeness has fallen or has remained at desirable levels. The literature 
remains controversial on this topic, with many arguments left on both sides. 
Should an entity such as a patent regulator understand which level of 
protection is optimal to encourage innovativeness, questions still remain 
about the most effective regulating instrument for pharmaceuticals. As we 
have seen in Chapter 2, regulators could rely on instruments such as patent 
length, height or breadth. I believe that the optimal choice of a regulatory 
instrument would be a very hard decision. Patent length is the easiest to 
implement, for it is quite straight-forward: it would just imply setting a 
shorter or longer lifetime of a patent. Patent height, defined in Chapter 2 as 
stronger novelty requirements, or as restrictions on the improvement of 
patented products, could work for pharmaceuticals, especially for the IMDs: 
here, the regulator could reduce the spread of IMDs by setting harsher 
(higher) conditions for patenting. Patent breadth would be the most difficult 
regulating instrument. One can recall Table 2.1, which synthesizes the 
myriad of definitions for this instrument as well as Lerner (2009, p. 343) 
who recognized how difficult it is to measure and interpret patent breadth. 
Based on the definitions from Table 2.1, I believe that patent breadth is the 
most delicate instrument: for example, setting a large breadth for a new 
molecule (the position of a chemical radical or structure of an isotope) 
might block competitors from innovating around the patented molecule, and 
thus it may reduce the future innovativeness of a pharmaceutical compound 
or class of compounds.  
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4.3. Competition with Follow-on Drugs  
So, most of the innovative activity in the pharmaceutical industry is based 
on incremental innovations, also called “follow-on” drugs or “me too” drugs 
in the literature (e.g. in DiMasi and Faden, 2011). This chapter describes the 
nature of competition for “me too” drugs.  
 
A “follow-on” or “me too” drug is generally defined as “a drug with a 
similar chemical structure or the same mechanism of action as a drug that is 
already marketed” (idem). Such slightly modified drugs have been the 
subject of much controversy. Some argue that follow-on drugs “often 
provide useful alternatives or enhanced therapeutic options for particular 
patients or patient subpopulations, as well as introduce price competition” 
(idem). Critics of “me too” drugs consider that only drugs which make it to 
the market first (“first-in-class” drugs) represent genuine and valuable 
innovation, while “me too” drugs lead to duplication of R&D costs and to a 
waste of resources that could be better directed elsewhere (Angell, 2004, 
Hollis, 2005).  
 
DiMasi and Faden (2011) analyze the timing of patent filing and the entry of 
products in 94 therapeutic classes on the United States market between 1960 
and 2007. In each therapeutic class, they took into consideration the 
introduction of the first-in-class compound, as well as that of follow-on 
drugs (on average, in each class, about 4 follow-on drugs were introduced 
after the first-in-class). In the following, I will look at their results on 
developments of the speed and quality of innovation over time.  
 
Figure 4.3. shows that, over the last four decades of the 20th century, the 
mean length of the period of marketing exclusivity for first entrants in a US 
therapeutic class declined substantially, falling by about 84% from 10.6 to 
1.7 years from the 1960s to the end of the 1990s. A decreased marketing 
exclusivity is an indicator that it became easier for imitators to bring follow-
on pharmaceutical products to the market. DiMasi and Faden (2011) run 
regressions showing that the speed of market entry for competitors to first-
in-class drugs increased by about 3 years per decade throughout the period 
from 1970 to 1999. This fact contributes to the discussion from Chapter 4.2, 
where we have seen a large growth of IMDs. Here one can notice consistent 
reasons for the growth on incremental innovation, to the detriment of radical  
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Figure 4.3. Period of marketing exclusivity for first entrants to a therapeutic 
class in the US (time from first-in-class approval to first follow-on approval)  
 
  
Source: DiMasi and Faden (2011) 
 
 
innovation (in the form of NMEs): the decreasing market exclusivity made 
it more likely for “copycats” to access the market, and more difficult for 
“true innovators” to hold on to their market status as radical innovators. For 
such reasons, patent protection for “true innovators” could and should be 
enhanced.  
 
So competition in pharmaceuticals did increase (in the form of the speed of 
market entry), but was it all competition of purely incremental innovations 
offering only minor improvements over existing treatments? A previous 
study by DiMasi and Pacquette (2004), confirmed by DiMasi and Faden 
(2011) provide a surprising answer to this question. Only about one-third of 
all follow-on drugs (32% precisely) received a priority rating by the FDA. 
Such a priority rating is only given to drugs delivering significant advances 
in treatment or offering treatment to a condition for which no adequate 
therapy exists. Consequently, DiMasi and Faden conclude that the first-in-
class drug is not necessary the best, and there is innovation of considerable 
value in follow-on drugs. However, DiMasi and Faden’s argument can be 
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reversed. The fact that 32 % of follow-on drugs received a priority status 
implies that the remaining 68 % did not receive the priority rating. From a 
simplified perspective, one could regard the matter as follows: only about 
32 % of pharmaceutical manufacturers seem to be somewhat alike “true 
innovators”, while the other 68 % seem to resemble “copycats”, which 
strengthens the argument for increased patent protection.   
 
Competition within a therapeutic class also has some effect on drug prices, 
although this effect is not entirely intuitive. Lu and Comanor (1998) show 
that drugs with advanced therapeutic effects (class A and B drugs) are sold 
for “substantial price premiums over their existing substitutes”, and these 
high prices only drop slowly over time. Drugs offering little improvements 
over existing substitutes (class C drugs) enter the market at lower prices but, 
paradoxically, these prices increase substantially during the time after 
launch. Still, both entry prices and subsequent increases “are lower when 
there are more competing products” on the market (Lu and Comanor, 1998).  
 
We have seen in this section that the speed of market entry for follow-on 
drugs substantially diminished during the last decades of the 20th century, 
there was increased competitiveness in all drug classes, and many follow-on 
drugs represented innovations of considerable quality. Moreover, 
competition slightly affected drug prices. DiMasi and Faden (2011) provide 
several reasons for their results, some of which are: “increased opportunities 
from advances in biomedical science; shifts in drug development 
approaches that make connectedness to scientific networks more important; 
legislation making generic entry easier; […] expansion of prescription drug 
insurance to a larger segment of the population”.  
 
4.4. Patent Races in Pharmaceuticals 
In this chapter I first look at racing behavior among pharmaceutical 
companies for the attainment of patents, and briefly contrast it with 
considerations from theoretical models. Second, I present empirical 
evidence for patent races in pharmaceuticals. 
 
When it comes to patent races, one of the main concerns in the theoretical 
literature is that the racing firms may be involved in wasteful duplication of 
R&D efforts, and many resources could have been allocated to more 
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productive purposes (Scotchmer, 2004). But is this really the case in 
practice, and do firms indeed compete to the extent that rent dissipation 
occurs in the pharmaceutical industry? 
 
A study by Cockburn and Henderson (1994) suggests that such a wasteful 
behavior does not occur. They analyze the modern game theoretic literature 
on patent races (which will be extensively described in Chapter 5.1) and try 
to match empirical findings to the predictions of this literature. They first 
motivate the selection of the pharmaceutical industry for their study: the 
industry "has often been held up as a prime example of the types of strategic 
racing behavior predicted by the literature" (idem). The reason for the 
relevance of pharmaceuticals is the industry's high degree of technological 
competition with heavy investments in R&D (idem). These investments are 
necessary since "successful research is a key contributor to commercial 
success" (idem), yet they are subject to extremely high uncertainty: DiMasi 
et al. (1991) estimate the success rate of clinically approved chemical 
compounds to be around 23%, but they point out that a very small portion of 
investigated compounds enter clinical trials at all.  
 
Even though the pharmaceutical industry is highly relevant in the search for 
patent races, Cockburn and Henderson (1994) criticize the low applicability 
of the game theoretic patent race literature for the typical “multi-product 
multi-project” R&D firm, due to some critical assumptions: the so-called 
"winner-take-all" setting present in most patent race models, and the 
deterministic R&D function fundamental to many of these models. 
Cockburn and Henderson also state that testing the predictions of this 
literature cannot be done without the use of "heroic assumptions" (e.g. total 
appropriability of profits and consumer surplus, lack of knowledge 
spillovers or perfect substitution of competing projects). They also show 
that relaxing these assumptions usually leads to indeterminate results: 
“competitive industries may invest too much, too little or just about the right 
amount in research” (idem). 
 
Cockburn and Henderson (1994) “use unusually detailed data on research 
investments and outcomes gathered at the level of individual research 
programs conducted within ten pharmaceutical firms over a period of more 
than seventeen years”. The chosen firms include the most important 
American and European manufacturers, account for 25-30% of worldwide 
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R&D and sales, and add up to about 2.700 observations indexed by firm, 
research program and year.  
 
Cockburn and Henderson run simple correlations in R&D investments and 
outputs across firms, focusing on drug discovery and not on drug 
development, since the first is much more relevant for R&D activity. The 
authors find very weak correlations between investment levels across firms 
(which become insignificant when including measures of technological 
opportunity and demand shocks), but very high and significant 
autocorrelations of investment levels within the same firm. They interpret 
these results as proof of significant unobserved firm heterogeneity in 
investment patterns and they reject the hypothesis that firms are entrenched 
in cut-throat patent races or "tit-for-tat" strategies. According to the study, 
competition for a single prize (the "winner-take-all" setting central to the 
patent race literature) appears to be an inappropriate description for patent 
races in pharmaceuticals, as does the "me too" (or responsive) investment. 
Instead, the authors find that competing R&D projects across firms seem to 
be complementary, while “the industry is characterized by substantial 
spillovers of knowledge and similar research can lead to related but 
significantly different outcomes” (idem). Moreover, drivers of investment 
decisions are better characterized by “the heterogeneous capabilities of the 
firm, by adjustment costs, and by the evolution of technological 
opportunity” (idem).  
 
It might be true that the patent race literature has some weaknesses, in that it 
over-simplifies reality. It might also hold that the literature should 
accommodate elements typical for multi-project multi-product R&D firms, 
such as multiple prizes in R&D competition. However, a patent race model 
which would incorporate so many details would lead to an extreme surge in 
mathematical complexity and could not be delivered to subjects 
experimentally. In order to develop any patent race model of manageable 
complexity (and, even more difficult, a model feasible for experimental 
testing), one cannot easily expect to generate models of multi-project multi-
product heterogeneous R&D firms with multiple prizes. Instead, I believe 
that one has to keep the critical assumptions of “winner-take-all” and 
deterministic (or stochastic) R&D functions, and focus on a one-project, 
one-product heterogeneous R&D firms with a single prize. This assumption 
is not necessarily too hard. One can imagine isolating a single product or 
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project that firms compete on, and look away from all the complexities of a 
multi-project competition, with all the interactions it involves. Indeed, in my 
experimental Chapter 6 I keep these vital assumptions from the patent race 
literature, in order to prevent an already given high complexity from 
reaching extreme levels. Perhaps it is so that Cockburn and Henderson’s 
(1994) expectations are too much to ask, and that their multi-project, multi-
prize assumptions simply do not apply in the context of a more or less 
“simple” patent race model. Or, maybe these authors’ findings are only 
valid for the pharmaceutical industry and different results would be obtained 
in other industries. 
 
DiMasi and Faden (2011) also investigate the nature of racing behavior in 
pharmaceuticals. They ask the question whether firms engage in patent races 
or mostly in imitation. In order to answer this question, DiMasi and Faden 
analyze data from the Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development 
(which maintains databases of new drugs and biopharmaceuticals approved 
in the US). The authors find that “all of the follow-on drugs for classes in 
which the first-in-class drug was approved from the late 1980s onwards 
were synthesized before the first-in-class drug was approved. Indeed, for 
classes in which the first member was approved since 1990, 80% or more of 
the follow-on drugs were in clinical trials somewhere in the world before 
the approval of the first-in-class drug” (idem). Even more, “for drug classes 
in which the first-in-class drug had been approved since the 1970s, 90% had 
at least one follow-on drug in its class with its first worldwide patent filed 
before the first-in-class drug was approved” (idem). DiMasi and Faden 
conclude that these figures are proof for a race to market among drugs in a 
therapeutic class, and not for low-risk imitations of already marketed 
breakthrough drugs.  
 
Combining the results by Cockburn and Henderson (1994) and those of 
DiMasi and Faden (2011), I can conclude that racing behavior with 
pharmaceuticals exists to some degree, but that patent races are not of the 
"winner-take-all" type which concerned researchers due to the duplication 
of R&D efforts. Therefore, this assumption simply does not seem to hold in 
the context of pharmaceuticals. Instead, in such a context the market 
accommodates several prizes for several market players. Most importantly, 
Cockburn and Henderson interviewed several R&D managers from the 
pharmaceutical industry about their research strategy. The managers 
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answered that they mostly avoided head to head competition, and that they 
generally viewed racing behavior as highly unproductive. Instead, the 
managers employed other criteria when making their decisions: “the size of 
the unmet medical need, the scientific potential of a field, and the 
idiosyncratic capabilities of their researchers”, as well as the “views of their 
marketing departments” (idem). So, firms try to avoid strong racing and 
settle to the sharing of the market, resulting not in one single winner, but in 
several winners.  
 
Figure 4.4 gives information that is relevant to the subsequent discussion 
about racing behavior with pharmaceuticals. The figure presents the ten 
most important players in the pharmaceutical industry. One can see that 
Pfizer and GlaxoSmithKline are the worldwide market leaders, and that 
about 55% of the world revenue for pharmaceuticals is concentrated in the 
hands of the top ten companies.  
 
Several empirical examples are in tune with the conclusion formulated 
above – that races result in several winners, not just in one winner. A first 
example is the racing behavior for the development of statins, which are 
drugs that lower cholesterol levels. Table 4.1 shows that, over time, there 
whitepuppettext 
 
Figure 4.4. Market shares for the ten largest pharmaceutical companies 
worldwide 
 
Source: ETC Group (2008) 
Others  45,2% Pfizer  8,9% 
GlaxoSmithKline 8% 
   
Sanofi-Avensis 7,6% 
Roche 5,4% 
AstraZeneca 5,3% 
Johnson & Johnson 4,6% 
Novartis 4,5% 
  Merck & Co 4%   Wyeth 3,4% 
  Lilly 3,1% 
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were races to market between the main industry actors. However, in the end 
the market settled to accommodate more than one player (or "winner"). 
 
In Table 4.1, I found significant competition and racing behavior in the case 
of statins. Merck cannibalized its own market by introducing Zocor, a more 
potent statin than its previous product, Mevacor. Pfizer's drug, Lipitor, 
which came to market after the approval and marketing of four previous 
drugs in the same therapeutic class, became the best-selling drug in history 
(Simons, 2003), showing again that follow-on drugs may provide valuable 
innovation. At the other end of the quality spectrum, Bayer's 1998 drug 
Baycol was later withdrawn after increasing evidence that it causes muscle 
failure, resulting in at least 52 deaths (Cable News Network, 2001). So, 
there are significant differences between drugs in the same class, as 
illustrated by the example of statins, which were also shown to have 
differing effects for different patient populations in a study by Chong et al. 
(2001). The "winner-take-all" setting could not be confirmed in the case of 
statins: if one winner "took it all", only one statin would have survived on 
the market; instead, statins continue to co-exist up to this day. 
 
A second example for the mildness of "racing", re-enforcing the conclusion 
I stated above that the market allows for several "winners", is the case of 
blood pressure lowering drugs, whose development I present in Table 4.2. 
At first glance, it might seem from Table 4.2 that firms engage in patent 
races. The fact that Squibb and Merck with their drugs Captopril and 
Enalapril held 82% of the US market in 1990 (Cockburn and Henderson, 
whitepuppettext 
 
Table 4.1. Racing behavior for the development of statins INVISIBLE 
WHITE TEXT 
Introduction 
Year 
Producing 
Firm 
Drug 
Name 
1987 Merck Mevacor 
1991 Sankyo Pravachol 
1991 Merck Zocor 
1994 Novartis Lescol 
1997 Pfizer Lipitor 
1998 Bayer Baycol 
Source: Simons (2003) 
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1994) indicates that the other nine compounds from Table 4.2 could be seen 
as evidence for wasteful over-investment by the losers of the race. But a 
more profound exploration of the further developments of these drugs 
shows a different reality. In fact, many of the companies which were 
initially involved in developing blood pressure lowering drugs continued to 
engage in “fundamental research and open exchange of information” 
(Patchett et al., 1980). They continued to publish actively, even at rates 
exceeding those for the patented drugs listed in Table 4.2 (Cockburn and 
Henderson, 1994). Some of these companies formed joint ventures and 
many developed alternative therapies (idem).  
 
My general conclusion for this subchapter is that there are strong patent 
races and competition among pharmaceutical companies, but no "winner-
take-all" setting and no wasteful duplication of efforts. Instead, firms avoid 
cut-throat competition, they make use of their initial investments, develop 
further projects based on their gained knowledge, and may even co-operate. 
Knowledge spillovers flow throughout the industry, and the market has 
enough room to accommodate several winners. 
 
 
Table 4.2. Racing behavior for the development of blood pressure lowering 
drugs  
 
Patenting 
Year 
Producing Firm Drug Name 
1977 Squibb Captopril 
1980 Merck Enalapril 
1980 Merck Lisinopril 
1980 Dainippon Alacepril 
1982 French public sector Perindopril 
1982 Warner Lambert Quinapril 
1982 Squibb Fosinopril 
1982 Chugai Moveltipril 
1982 Takeda Delapril 
1983 Hoechst Ramipril 
1983 Hoffman La Roche Cilazapril 
Source: Cockburn and Henderson (1994) 
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4.5. Generics: Beyond the Death of Patents 
The purpose of generic drugs is to replicate the therapeutic effects of brand 
name drugs, but at lower prices, thereby increasing people’s access to 
medicine. Producers of generics in the US must respect strict requirements 
by the FDA in order to get approved – they must show that their generic 
drugs are bioequivalent to the brand name drugs (NIHCM, 2002b). 
Bioequivalence means that the generic must contain identical active 
ingredients, in the same amount, and with the same effects on the body as 
the innovator drug (idem). NIHCM (2002b, p.10) writes that “today, 
virtually all generic drugs are essentially the same as the innovator drugs 
they copy”. A generic drug is only allowed to enter the market after the 
patent for the brand name drug has expired. Since generics’ producers do 
not have to duplicate the R&D effort – the most significant cost factor in a 
drug – but instead they only have to incur manufacturing costs, generics can 
be offered at greatly reduced prices. It is therefore expected that generic 
drugs entering price competition should quickly conquer the market and 
drive down prices after the original patent expires. However, the current 
chapter will show that this is not always the case, and that generic 
competition contains some unexpected complexities.  
 
As stated before in Chapter 4.1, the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 was passed 
with the purpose of reducing barriers to generic competition. NIHCM 
(2000) explains the effects of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Before the Act, 
manufacturers of generics had to undergo “expensive clinical trials to prove 
the product’s safety and effectiveness” (idem). Moreover, they could not 
perform any generic development while the original drug was still under 
patent protection. After Hatch-Waxman, generic companies were allowed to 
forego full clinical trials if they could prove that the generic was 
bioequivalent to the brand name drug. In addition, the Act permitted 
generics’ manufacturers “to make or use a patented product, perform all 
necessary testing, submit an application and even receive tentative approval 
before the relevant patents on the originator drug expire” (idem). Thus, a 
manufacturer could “bring its product to market on the very day that the 
branded drug loses its protection” (idem), dramatically decreasing the time 
between patent expiration and generic market entry. On the other hand, to 
compensate for this decrease, brand name drugs received extended patent 
protection for several years (as pointed out in Chapter 4.1). 
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The study by Magazzini et al. (2004) examines generic competition in four 
countries: the US, the UK, Germany and France. The study analyzes the 
development of generics’ market shares and prices in the four countries by 
using sales data for drugs with expired patents between 1986 and 1996. 
Magazzini et al. found that market penetration rates for generics were 
highest in the US and lower in the European countries. They attributed this 
phenomenon to the amount of price regulation in different countries – strong 
price regulation (as in Europe) discourages generic entry, while weak 
regulation (as in the US) promotes generics by allowing higher profits to be 
made. However, even though generic penetration is higher in the US, drug 
prices follow a very surprising development. Magazzini et al. show that, in 
Germany, the UK and France, prices of brand name drugs steadily decrease 
after generic entry and eventually converge with generic prices. Entirely 
against expectations, in the US, prices for brand name drugs increase after 
patent expiration! 
 
So what explains the paradox of rising prices for brand name drugs after 
patent expiration in the US? Magazzini et al. (2004) provide a part of the 
answer: many European countries have nationalized or heavily regulated 
health care systems and have implemented many regulatory measures 
designed to keep the cost of health care under control. In Germany, 
insurance companies have to take into account a reference price system 
when they make drug purchases, and there is a ceiling on total 
pharmaceutical expenditures (Huttin, 2002, p. 86). In the UK, doctors are 
given a fixed budget for drug expenditures and this makes them very 
conscious about drug prices (idem, p. 82). France also has a national budget 
for drugs and, above all, it regulates drug prices directly (idem, p. 81).  
 
The study by Caves et al. (1991) gives the other part of the answer to the 
question above. Caves et al. examined prices, market shares and advertising 
for thirty US drugs that lost patent protection between 1976 and 1987. They 
showed that an essentially different mindset reigns in the US compared to 
Europe. In the US, the health care professionals who choose which drugs 
should be prescribed for their patients do not have the incentives to 
minimize the cost of drugs to the users, or to their insurers. Instead, there 
exists a misalignment between the interests of patients and the incentives of 
rent-seeking pharmaceutical companies. While consumers are sensitive to 
prices (because more expensive drugs are reflected in higher health 
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insurance premiums), US physicians often have little or no information 
about drug prices (in stark contrast with European systems). Physicians’ 
behavior is largely influenced by extensive sales promotions by 
pharmaceutical firms, which also include direct visits to health care 
professionals designed to inform them about new drugs and increase their 
brand loyalty. Caves et al.’s study found that generic drugs in the US were 
sold at an average of about 60% of the price for the original brand name 
drugs from 1976-1987. Since this represents an important discount, one 
would expect brand name drug prices to fall and converge to generic levels, 
just like in Europe. However, this is not what the study found – brand name 
market share lost to generic competition was quite low and generic 
penetration was only 36% in 1987. Moreover, new generic entrants do not 
seem to affect prices for brand name drugs but instead they only have an 
influence on the prices of already existing generics. The authors’ conclusion 
is that the intensive marketing practiced by pharmaceutical firms generates 
brand allegiance and goodwill in medical professionals, who, in the absence 
of information about prices and influenced by a “business as usual” 
mentality, prescribe the more expensive drugs to their patients.  
 
These factors explain how prices for brand name drugs could increase in 
spite of the market entry by generic competitors. Marketing efforts by the 
pharma industry maintain a strong price differentiation between brand name 
and generic drugs even after patent protection has expired. This has two 
important implications. Firstly, it means that the initial goal of generic 
competition which I have stated at the beginning of the subchapter – 
offering the same therapeutic effects at lower prices – might not really be 
fulfilled in the US, or not to the extent that would benefit most people. 
Secondly, it means that pharmaceutical firms have well-functioning 
alternatives to patent protection: after the death of patents, marketing 
measures are effectively used to maintain high market shares for brand 
name drugs.  
 
4.6. Conclusions and Recommendations for Patents and 
Pharmaceuticals  
As Chapter 4 shows, the market for pharmaceuticals is fairly complex and 
contains many unexpected intricacies. Generally, it is unclear whether 
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patent protection is at optimal levels, and the effect of patents on industry 
innovativeness is the subject of hot debates in the literature. It is furthermore 
questionable whether patents benefit the industry or society.  
 
The pharma industry was the most profitable of all US industries during the 
second half of the 20th Century, with median profits significantly higher 
than the average Fortune 500 companies. Attempts to encourage generic 
competition such as the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act were somewhat 
unsuccessful: market penetration for generics remained low, brand name 
market shares stayed high and prices for brand name drugs even increased 
due to marketing efforts by pharmaceutical firms. The Hatch-Waxman Act 
also had unintended consequences for society, as the amount of additional 
patent protection for pharmaceuticals seems to have led to an explosion of 
industry profits. In spite of the existence of such large profits, it remains 
questionable whether the innovativeness of the industry has increased or 
not. Based on the limited data I have gathered in this dissertation, it seems 
that there has been a shift from radical innovation (in the form of new 
molecular entities) to more incremental medicine. However, this might be 
the result of an increased easiness of “copycats” to access the market, at the 
detriment of “true innovators” of medicine. The most competition seems to 
take place with incremental innovations, or “me too” drugs. There are signs 
of patent races in the industry, but racing behavior is not of the “winner-
take-all” type described in the patent race literature; instead, the market 
accommodates several winners who have no interest in cut-throat 
competition.  
 
Last but not least, patents’ role for pharmaceuticals seems to be somewhat 
overrated. R&D managers named different protection instruments (secrecy 
and first-mover advantage) as more important than patents, while patents are 
used as legal weapons. Furthermore, even after the death of patents, the 
pharma industry still performs very well by building brand loyalty and 
strong bonds with medical professionals, which again shows that patents 
might not be of essential importance to protect market share.  
 
My recommendations for the regulation of the pharma industry are as 
follows. Patent regulators should decide whether or not “true innovators” 
should be protected agains “copycats” and consequently the levels of patent 
protection can be enhanced or reduced. There should be increased taxation 
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on the industry’s profits. In the US, third-party payers such as state 
reimbursement programs and private insurance should put pressure on 
medical professionals (or at least inform them better), so that more generic 
medicine can be prescribed. Ethical considerations should be brought into 
the foreground – medicine is not a regular product; instead, drugs save lives 
and public policy should do its best to guarantee access to drugs for as many 
people as possible. Finally, the industry’s innovativeness should be spurred 
by concentrating on smaller firms: Fershtman and Markovich (2010) write 
that “in the pharmaceutical market small startups are typically more 
efficient in the development of a new drug than the big pharmaceutical 
companies”. Therefore, a shift towards small entrepreneurial firms might 
help to encourage the pharma industry’s innovativeness.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Patent Races and Their Problems 
“Roughly speaking, early introduction time can be 
made still earlier by raising the benefits of being 
first, reducing the benefits going to imitators, 
increasing the rivals' innovation rate h or reducing 
the rivals' imitation rate k. The preceding statement 
needs to be qualified, as changes in many of the 
parameters affect the firm's behavior in ambiguous 
ways. This ambiguity is consistent with the findings 
of Scherer [1967a, A/N]; the consequence of a 
parametric change upon the choice of introduction 
time will often depend on all the circumstances.”  
   Kamien and Schwartz (1972) 
 
“Conclusions from these types of models are also 
rather fragile: small changes in the timing of moves, 
the information structure of the game or the 
treatment of spillovers can easily reverse or weaken 
any given theoretical result.” 
 Cockburn and Henderson (1994) 
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5.1. Economic Models of Patent Races. When Models Become 
Too Complex 
The long, complicated and, as we will see, largely unresolved odyssey of the 
patent race literature starts in the late 1960s, with a prodigious creation of 
"traditional" theoretical models throughout the 1970s and especially '80s, a 
sign of research fatigue in the '90s6, and the development of model 
extensions and further discussion after the year 2000.  
 
One issue does need clarification before I can proceed with the analysis of 
the patent literature: where is the boundary between models of optimal 
patent regulation (which I have extensively examined in Chapter 2), and 
models of (optimal) patent races? One hint to help us draw a line is the 
review by Reinganum (1989), which has been catalogued as "excellent" in 
virtually any subsequent study on patent races. Most of the patent race 
papers quoted by Reinganum (1989) are analyzed in this chapter. However, 
in my view, the scientific delimitation between the two types of models 
comes from the fact that models of patent regulation deal with issues that 
can be influenced by policy-makers: patent height, breadth and length, as 
well as their macroeconomic and social effects. By contrast, patent race 
models are applied to isolated industries with n number of firms, in which 
agents compete for the earliest possible introduction date of their 
innovations and rewards are given by success in the market. As Judd et al. 
(2012) put it, models of patent regulation endogenize patent policy but 
abstract from the R&D competition (the race) itself. Models of patent races 
take patent policy as given (or exogenous) and focus on the competition in 
itself.  
 
5.1.1. The "Traditional" Patent Race Literature 
Yoram Barzel (1968) opens the floor with his question about the optimal 
timing of innovations in a competitive industry. It is this question which 
sparkled later research and eventually led to the development of the patent 
race literature. In creating his model, Barzel (1968) builds on Kenneth 
Arrow's (1962) concept of "learning by doing". Both these papers were 
                                                 
6 Most probably after Reinganum's (1989) groundbreaking literature review.  
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pioneering at the time: previously, the literature had treated technical change 
as exogenous to the economic system and imposed on the production 
function of firms. So Barzel's contribution is twofold: it endogenizes the 
production of innovations (as did Arrow), and it opens the way for patent 
races. According to Barzel, innovators' behavior in an industry is under the 
pressure of two opposing forces. On one hand, competition within the 
industry leads to firms' necessity to be the first to innovate and generate 
premature discoveries or introductions of new products. To accomplish this, 
large resources need to be devoted to innovating activity. On the other hand, 
firms are often unable to reap the full benefits from their innovations, which 
leads to under-investment. Therefore, the date of innovation introduction 
will diverge from the social optimum, depending on several market 
conditions which are elucidated below. The most important working 
assumptions of Barzel's model are: a) constant capital cost of developing an 
innovation; b) growing demand; c) reduction of unit costs at constant quality 
through the innovation; d) a royalty rate per unit of output for the innovator. 
After performing a profit maximization problem for the firm, there are two 
possible outcomes in the industry: either there is monopoly and the 
innovator captures all the benefits from the innovation (in which case there 
is no economic growth), or there is competition and the benefits are diffused 
among several market players. In the latter case the innovation is introduced 
too early or too late, but there is a catch: growth is only positive if the 
innovation is introduced too late. In the case of early introduction, the rate 
of growth falls back to zero (the value of the supramarginal project, the 
profit, is reduced to zero, due to the higher cost of faster development). I 
conclude from Barzel's model that society (or the industry) can only benefit 
from the cost-reducing effects of an innovation if it accepts a lower speed of 
the innovation. 
 
Kamien and Schwartz (1972) improve on Barzel's (1968) model. They also 
discuss the choice of development period and introduction time of 
innovations by firms under competition, compared to a situation without 
competition. Their assumptions - or factors taken into account by the profit 
maximizing firm - are: a) increasing cost with the compression of the 
development period; b) reduction of profit opportunities with the 
prolongation of development period; c) a subjective probability of rival 
innovation or imitation. Assumption c) represents the main departure of 
Kamien and Schwartz (1972) from Barzel's paper. Barzel treats rivalry 
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according to game theoretic and reaction curve considerations on 
oligopolistic markets with perfect information (each firm knows what the 
other players want to do). Kamien and Schwartz (1972) add stochasticity to 
the model via “a single subjective probability distribution over the 
introduction date of any rival product” (idem). This element of stochasticity 
is in tune with the uncertainty-related nature of most research and 
development activity (Nelson et al. 1967), and therefore we can consider 
Kamien and Schwartz's (1972) paper an improvement over Barzel's. Kamien 
and Schwartz (1972) set up the firm's choice problem mathematically and 
show their solution properties. They state that their results contradict 
Barzel's findings: under intense competition firms will not develop too early 
(they will not drive supramarginal values to zero), but they will rather 
postpone development indefinitely, or even drop out completely; only when 
the conditional probability of rival introduction is low enough, “driven 
below the rate of growth of the benefits stream will an expected profits 
maximizing firm deem it worthwhile to embark upon development” 
(Kamien and Schwartz, 1972). Generally, a firm's behavior will be under the 
pressure of two forces: on one hand, a firm will want to reduce its R&D 
costs by pursuing a longer lived development strategy; on the other hand, 
waiting too long will increase the probability that a rival will be first to 
introduce the innovation. The second effect, according to Kamien and 
Schwartz (1972), opens up the possibility that there might be parameter 
settings in which early introduction is possible, depending on the possibility 
of imitation by rivals. They acknowledge that "changes in many of the 
parameters affect the firm's behavior in ambiguous ways" (idem). Kamien 
and Schwartz also find this ambiguity to be consistent with the findings by 
Scherer (1967a), and thus the former authors suggest that in models of 
competition with R&D "the consequence of a parametric change upon the 
choice of introduction time will often depend on all the circumstances".  
 
So if I were to draw an early conclusion after the analysis of only two patent 
race models, it would be one similar to the conclusion I will actually draw 
later on (when models get incredibly hairy): even the simplest patent race 
models are very sensitive to changes in assumptions and parameters, and 
results can change drastically by only slightly tweaking on any of the model 
assumptions. This conclusion also leads to the question: how would real 
people react when faced with conditions resembling those assumptions? 
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And this question gave motivation to perform a laboratory experiment, 
which I present in the sixth chapter.  
 
Kamien and Schwartz (1976) start with the hypothesis that there is an 
"optimal" degree of rivalry “between the extremes of monopoly and perfect 
competition”. They draw this argument from several empirical studies. 
Scherer (1967b), using data on 56 industry groups, concludes that when the 
four largest firms in an industry exceed 50-55% of the market share, 
"additional market power is probably not conducive to more vigorous 
technological efforts". Mansfield (1963) investigates innovative behavior 
(as proportion of innovations introduced by the four largest firms) in the 
iron and steel industries during 1919-1938 and 1939-1958 and suggests that 
a lower concentration of market power would result in more innovation. His 
data is precisely quantified by Williamson (1965), who comes up with even 
more drastic recommendations: the four largest firms in an industry should 
have a combined market share of only 5-30% for optimal innovative activity 
(here innovative activity is defined as “proportion of innovations in relation 
to market share” (idem) of the largest players in the industry). Thus, Kamien 
and Schwartz (1976) develop a model to test the empirical finding that the 
rate of innovative activity increases with industry competition only up to a 
maximum point, after which it declines with further increase in competition. 
They derive the optimal level of “technological rivalry for innovation […] 
via comparative statics analysis of two related models of the profit-
maximizing firm” (idem): in one model, imitators can obtain some rewards, 
while in the other model perfect patent protection is granted. Similarly to 
Kamien and Schwartz (1972), a firm chooses its own development period 
(introduction date), and there is the same assumption that the speed of 
innovation increases the costs. However, Kamien and Schwartz (1976) no 
longer have the assumption of uncertainty of development present in their 
paper from 1972. In their 1976 paper, Kamien and Schwartz assume that the 
development function is known with “a high degree of certainty”, and it 
depends on “accumulation of effective development effort by expenditure of 
money”. They find that stronger competition in an industry will first elicit a 
higher R&D investment by the firm, but will eventually cause the intensity 
of innovative activity to decline. This way, Kamien and Schwartz (1976) 
prove that there is generally some intermediate degree of rivalry, at which a 
firm's R&D expenditure will be maximal.  
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Loury (1979) questions the same argument studied by Kamien and Schwartz 
(1976) and the empirical studies associated with the later study: is there an 
optimal degree of competition (somewhere between pure monopoly and 
atomistic competition) that maximizes R&D performance? Loury (1979) 
criticizes the studies by Kamien and Schwartz (1972, 1976) on the grounds 
that the latter only perform partial-equilibrium analysis, “studying the 
behavior of an individual firm that views market conditions parametrically” 
(Loury, 1979). Loury points out that, in reality, each firm is the rival of all 
the other firms: "Thus, the likelihood of rival precedence depends on the 
R&D strategies chosen by other market participants, and cannot be treated 
as a parameter when analyzing changes in those decisions" (idem). Loury 
(1979) does his analysis under different assumptions than Kamien and 
Schwartz (1972, 1976). Loury’s assumptions are the following: a) the 
choice variable of a firm is R&D expenditure in a point in time; b) there is 
technological uncertainty for the development of the innovation (no firm 
can be sure when any of its rivals' R&D efforts will be successful); c) the 
probability of success is an exponential function of a hazard rate (a 
conditional probability density function expressing the idea that the present 
R&D efforts will affect the chance of R&D success in the next moment, 
given that the innovation has not succeeded yet); d) the completion time is 
an inverse of the hazard rate; e) investment is a sunk cost; f) equilibrium 
occurs when each firm's investment decision maximizes its profits, subject 
to the other firms' R&D investment strategies being given; g) rivalry is 
greater when the number of identical firms increases;    h) the returns to 
R&D efforts initially increase, but eventually decrease (e.g. because the 
supply of successful ideas or talented researchers is limited). Loury's (1979) 
results are that an increase in competition will reduce firms’ individual 
investments, because competition diminishes the probability of success (and 
therefore the expected benefits). However, even though on an individual 
level investment decreases, through the larger number of firms present on 
the market, the aggregate level of investments will increase, and this will 
result in faster innovation. So in Loury's model, “atomistic competition is 
the market structure giving optimal innovative activity” (idem).  
 
Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) also analyze the relationship between market 
structure and innovative activity. First of all, they point out to the many 
difficulties of measuring this relationship: that it is not the case of a single 
firm making an R&D expenditure decision, but several firms making “a 
5. Patent Races and Their Problems 
89 
 
complex of decisions”; that imitation behavior can lead to a wasteful 
duplication of R&D efforts; that excessively risky projects can lead to too 
high industry concentration and finally that each firm decision must be 
“made within an industrial structure which is itself endogenous” (idem). 
Dasgupta and Stiglitz criticize the general presumption (endorsed by 
Arrow’s 1962 research) that there is under-investment in R&D both under 
competition, and under monopoly (this presumption is partly derived from 
the fact that knowledge has the characteristics of a public good). Dasgupta 
and Stiglitz underline that one of their most important conclusions of their 
1980 paper is that, unlike in Arrow (1962), there can also be over-
investment in the industry. Their model assumptions are: a) firms have fixed 
costs of R&D; b) firms choose quantities (through output and R&D 
expenditures), therefore there is Cournot competition; c) there is a perfect 
capital market, such that firms are not forced to resort to internal financing 
for the development of an R&D project; d) firms are engaged in a game of 
perfect information. Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) then solve each firm’s  
maximization problem of the expected payoff with respect to the number of 
firms in the industry. Their results are quite complex. First of all, a pure 
monopolist has “insufficient incentive […] to undertake R&D expenditure” 
or “to engage in risky research ventures” (idem). On the other hand, 
competitive markets will “encourage firms to engage in overly risky 
research projects”, and to excessively increase the speed of research (idem). 
However, “industry-wide R&D effort is positively correlated with 
concentration” in the industry (idem). Dasgupta and Stiglitz also show that 
their results become more ambiguous when we consider barriers to entry, 
the degree of risk aversion in society, and the elasticity of demand. My own 
conclusions from this study are that, except for the case of pure monopoly, a 
concentrated industry (with a few number of players) will lead to R&D 
efforts that are not too high and also not too low.  
 
Lee and Wilde (1980) also compare a regime of perfect patent protection 
with a regime of competition. Lee and Wilde (1980) run a variation of 
Loury’s (1979) model with one important modified assumption: a) instead 
of a fixed sunk cost (like in Loury, 1979), a flow cost (a variable cost) is 
paid, until the moment when some firm develops the innovation and wins 
the race. Further assumptions are: b) the timing of success depends on the 
size of this flow cost; c) competition should reduce both expected benefits 
and expected costs, because the flow investment will be made for a 
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stochastically shorter period of time; d) competition is measured, like in 
Loury, as the total number of rivals in the industry. The results by Lee and 
Wilde (1980) are in total contradiction to Loury’s (1979) results: the 
individual equilibrium investment will not decrease, but increase with 
competition! As a further result, aggregate investment in the industry will 
also increase with competition, and therefore, the completion time of the 
innovation decreases. Even more, opposing Loury (1979), an increase in 
aggregate investments (by all firms in the industry) will increase individual 
investments. Lee and Wilde’s different results to Loury’s study can be 
attributed to the modified assumption of the cost structure (which is a flow 
or variable cost in Lee and Wilde, and not a fixed cost as in Loury). 
However, the reliability of Lee and Wilde’s results becomes questionable 
when one takes into account parallel research by other scholars. For 
instance, Futia (1980), who modifies the condition of perfect patent 
protection to allow imitation, obtains opposite results to Lee and Wilde: 
when imitation is fast and complete, there may be an inverse relationship 
between the aggregate investment in the industry and the number of firms 
(Futia, 1980). Moreover, Reinganum (1984) points out that one alternative 
form of imitation (different than the elimination of patent protection) is 
represented by positive knowledge spillovers. In the case of knowledge 
spillovers, aggregate investment will be inversely related to the number of 
firms (Spence, 1982), and results become similar to the case of regular 
imitation through the loosening of patent protection.  
 
Reinganum (1982) develops a theory of dynamic optimal resource 
allocation to R&D in an industry with n firms. Reinganum emphasizes that 
she combines two alternative approaches which had been used in the 
literature to analyze R&D with competition: a static game theoretic analysis 
(Loury, 1979, Lee and Wilde, 1980, Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980) and a 
decision theoretic analysis (Kamien and Schwartz, 1972). In Reinganum 
(1982) the combination of the two approaches results in the following 
setting: rivals will be strategic agents, but their strategies will be functions 
of development time. The assumptions of Reinganum’s (1982) model are: a) 
each firm has private knowledge about its own research; b) knowledge 
acquisition is achieved by the expenditure of resources, and it is 
deterministic; c) the success of the innovation is non-deterministic – the 
completion of the innovation is influenced, but not determined, by 
knowledge acquisition; d) the probability of success is an exponential 
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function of the accumulated knowledge; e) research investment is a sunk 
cost; f) there are n firms; g) there is discounting. Furthermore, Reinganum 
compares one setting with perfect patent protection with one setting where 
imitation is allowed. Reinganum (1982) performs a dynamic game theoretic 
analysis by computing the Nash equilibrium in investment rules, where the 
optimal strategy depends on the number of firms, the innovator’s and 
imitator’s profit, time and the discount rate. Reinganum’s (1982) results are 
that, first of all, perfect patent protection unambiguously increases the speed 
of innovation. This result is due to the increase in the rate of investment and 
the corresponding cost increase with time; as a consequence, knowledge 
generation and the probability of success also increase with time. Even an 
increasing number of rivals (higher competition) under perfect patent 
protection will lead to higher R&D investments, which also reduce 
development time. Secondly, Reinganum (1982) also analyzes the effect of 
imitation and concludes that it will depend on the ratio between the 
innovator’s payoff and the imitator’s payoff: the higher the appropriability 
of returns for the innovator, the higher will be investments into knowledge, 
and the faster the speed of innovation.  
 
Reinganum’s (1982) result that competition will lead to higher innovation 
speed is contradictory to Kamien and Schwartz (1976), who had shown that 
increasing rivalry will reduce R&D efforts after a certain point. Reinganum 
(1982) attributes this contradiction to the game theoretic analysis used in her 
paper vis-à-vis the decision theoretic analysis of Kamien and Schwartz 
(1976). Reinganum’s (1982) results become even more ambiguous with 
imperfect patent protection, or competition: similarly to Kamien and 
Schwartz (1972), the existence of intense competition will make technical 
advance not a worthwhile option for the firms, so they may not embark in 
the development at all. 
 
Reinganum’s (1984) article justifies the use of game theory with R&D 
races, provides a literature review on the current research and suggests for 
the first time that patent race models should be empirically tested. She 
reiterates the argument that, depending on the cost structure (fixed cost in 
Loury, 1979 versus flow cost in Lee and Wilde, 1980) one obtains 
contradictory results: R&D investments decrease with competition for the 
case of fixed cost, but increase with competition in a setting with flow 
(variable) cost, and an increase in aggregate investment will reduce 
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individual investment in the case of a fixed cost, but increase individual 
investment for the flow cost setting.  
 
Furthermore, Reinganum (1984) points out that “there is an inverse 
relationship between the magnitude of an innovation and the likelihood that 
it is invented by a current industry leader”, independent of the cost type 
(fixed or flow). This is because an industry leader with a current advantage 
over the other firms has an incentive to protect his current profits, not to 
innovate. An innovation with technological uncertainty would bring the 
leader lower expected future profits. This argument is endorsed in the study 
by Freeman (1982), who shows that for large innovations market 
challengers will invest more in R&D than incumbent monopolists. A study 
by Ungern-Sternberg (1980) brings a complementary result to Freeman 
(1982) by proving that for small innovations the opposite is true: an 
incumbent monopolist typically invests more than a challenger, and the 
probability that the monopolist will succeed first decreases with the 
magnitude of the innovation. An individual firm's investment will decline 
with the number of anticipated innovations, because anticipated future 
innovations reduce the value of incumbency and increase the potential value 
to challengers. If the innovation production function is deterministic, the 
current industry leader will persist as a monopolist, because it will patent 
innovations before potential entrants do.  
 
Last but not least, Reinganum's (1984) paper deals with licensing. Her main 
result is that licensing will encourage research when production costs are 
similar, but will discourage research when production costs are dissimilar 
(by taking a look at Fershtman and Markovich's (2010) study from Chapter 
2, I found that Reinganum's (1984) result is contradicted and research is not 
discouraged for asymmetric costs). Reinganum's (1984) result on licensing 
is based on two different incentives to license: with similar costs, ex post 
incentives are large - firms are interested in monopoly and the reduction of 
production inefficiencies, which leads to more investment; with dissimilar 
costs, ex ante incentives are large - firms are afraid of the threat of low-cost 
competition and would like to eliminate any wasteful R&D expenditures, 
which leads to less investment. One solution proposed by Reinganum 
(1984) is licensing at a low royalty rate; this makes R&D expenditures 
unattractive to potential entrants, and subsequently the chance that 
challengers discover a very low-cost technology is eliminated or greatly 
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reduced. A very important result by Reinganum (1984), which helps to 
create a bridge to asymmetric patent races (the topic of the next section) is 
that over the course of developing an innovation some firms fall behind and 
drop out of the research activity. The industry activity will become more 
concentrated. As we shall see, this result is confirmed for other asymmetric 
patent race models, such as Fudenberg et al. (1983) and Harris and Vickers 
(1985).  
 
5.1.2. The 1980s: A Shift Towards Multistage Two-Player 
Patent Races 
Most racing models from the 1970s and early 1980s, most notably Kamien 
and Schwartz (1972), Loury (1979), Lee and Wilde (1980), Dasgupta and 
Stiglitz (1980) and Reinganum (1982) assume that there is a single stage of 
development in the innovation process, and all competing firms have the 
same technological potential. These models are static and symmetric - in the 
sense that firms are considered identical and competition is finished when 
any of the firms completes the single development stage. The models are 
based on quite unrealistic assumptions, because most innovations require 
several stages of development, and firms are usually in asymmetric 
positions - that is, technologically ahead or behind. Moreover, learning is 
not possible in the mentioned models. Due to these shortcomings, many 
researchers felt the need to develop alternative patent race models in order 
to accommodate dynamic aspects of R&D competition, asymmetries 
between industry players and learning effects.  
 
In the following, I describe the most important of the theoretical models on 
asymmetric races with leader and follower. Few of these models were 
considered suitable for experimental testing; my experimental investigation 
from Chapter 6 is also based on an asymmetric setting. For theoretical 
models with experimental counterparts, a brief comparison of their results is 
provided in this section. 
 
Fudenberg et al. (1983) develop a model of a dynamic multistage stochastic 
innovation process. The model was experimentally tested in the study by 
Silipo (2005), which I describe in Chapter 5.2. The main conclusions of 
Fudenberg et al. are overthrown by Silipo's experiment (however, we shall 
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see that Silipo significantly altered Fudenberg et al.'s assumptions). The 
paper by Fudenberg et al. (1983) investigates whether the patent race will be 
characterized by strong competition, or whether it will converge into a 
monopoly. Fudenberg et al. identify three cases: 1) there is ε-preemption, 
that is, one firm has an “arbitrarily small headstart” over its rival, innovation 
is deterministic, and the rival has no chance of catching up; 2) the multi-
stage game allows for "leapfrogging" in the sense that the large number of 
steps necessary to complete the innovation permits the rival to compete and 
jump ahead of the other firm; 3) the patent race is deterministic but there is 
lagged information, the monitoring of R&D efforts is imperfect, firms 
cannot be fooled by empty threats and for these reasons both players may 
compete. The first case of ε-preemption is present in the model by Dasgupta 
and Stiglitz (1980) which I discussed before. In Fudenberg's adaptation a 
firm's current chances of making a discovery depend only on its “stock of 
experience”, where experience is a function of R&D engagement.                
ε-preemption is induced by the fact that R&D is a viable activity for a 
monopolist, it is not profitable for both firms to engage in it, and one firm 
enters the patent race before the other firm. Fudenberg et al. compute the 
equilibrium, in which one firm engages in R&D, and the other firm drops 
out of the patent race. Cases 2) and 3) represent situations of vigorous, 
continuous competition, the basis of other models such as Loury (1979), Lee 
and Wilde (1980) and Reinganum (1982). In these models, preemption is 
not possible and firms compete until a discovery is made. In case 2) R&D 
takes place in two stages. In the first stage there is preliminary invention 
(e.g. the concept of the research program is defined), while in the second 
stage there are several R&D progress steps (Fudenberg et al., 1983). Just 
like in case 1), one firm begins the race before the other firm, and there is no 
room on the market for both firms (because they would make a loss). The 
probability of success at a certain point in time again depends on 
experience, but there is a chance for the lagging firm to complete the first 
stage before the leading firm, resulting in the leading firm dropping out 
before the second stage begins. This phenomenon is defined as 
“leapfrogging” (idem). In case 3) modeled by Fudenberg et al., a firm may 
make progress without revealing information to another competitor, or 
information is lagged in the sense that a firm at time t only knows about the 
R&D activities of competitors up to time t - 1. In each point of time, a firm 
may invest zero effort (yielding no additional knowledge), low effort 
(leading to one unit of knowledge), or high effort (resulting in two units of 
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knowledge). Discovery occurs when any firm accumulates N knowledge 
steps. The authors show that in any perfect equilibrium, if the lag between 
the firms is equal to or larger than two steps, the follower drops out. If the 
lag equals one step, the follower decides between high effort and quitting, 
while the leader decides between high effort and low effort. If the lag is zero 
(firms are tied), they compete vigorously if the number of steps left is small 
enough, and otherwise they randomize between low and high effort. The 
main departure of the model by Fudenberg et al. (1983) from the models by 
Loury (1979), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) and Reinganum (1982) is the 
fact that experience does not play a role in the latter models. In Fudenberg's 
model, experience is essential and it might cause the patent race to 
degenerate to a monopoly from the start (in the extreme case 1), while in the 
multi-stage cases 2) and 3) strong competition is possible.  
 
Harris and Vickers (1985) also develop an asymmetric model of a 
multistage stochastic innovation process of a patent race and they explain 
the reasons why this asymmetry might exist. I describe these reasons, 
closely following the authors’ argumentation. For once, the two firms could 
value the patent differently: the incumbent, who wants to keep her 
monopoly position, is more probable to value the patent higher than a 
challenger. Or, the incumbent has more knowledge due to her market 
experience. The third possibility is that firms have different R&D efficiency 
levels. In their paper, Harris and Vickers (1985) focus on two cases: one 
"pure" case, in which the challenger's technology is not superior to that of 
the incumbent (here the incumbent's only concern is to prevent the rival 
from winning the patent) and one "hybrid" case, in which the new 
technology is superior to that of the incumbent (here the incumbent has an 
additional incentive to win the patent, in addition to stopping the rival). The 
main result of Harris and Vickers (1985) is that the incumbent has 
considerable advantages from her asymmetric position, and she will also go 
to great lengths in order to keep her advantage. This result is also confirmed 
in the more advanced model by Harris and Vickers (1987), which I describe 
in the following. 
 
Harris and Vickers (1987) is another theoretical patent race model which 
was later experimentally tested in the prestigious publication by Zizzo 
(2002), which I discuss in Chapter 5.2. Zizzo's experiment found only 
limited support for the conclusions of Harris and Vickers, while the most 
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important of the theoretical study's results were downright contradicted by 
the experimental test. In the model by Harris and Vickers (1987), two firms 
compete for the multi-stage development of an innovation with the goal of 
achieving patent protection. In each round their strategy choice is the 
investment effort rate, which is x for firm 1 and y for firm 2. In turn, the 
investment effort influences the probabilities of winning in any round. 
These probabilities are 
yx
x
+
  for firm 1 and 
yx
y
+
for firm 2. Whoever 
wins a certain number of rounds completes the innovation, wins the race and 
gets the patent. The main assumption about costs is that the cost function is 
convex in investment: c(x) = xµ. In the model, a quadratic cost function was 
mostly used: c(x) = x2. Harris and Vickers explain in mathematical terms 
that the convexity of the cost function is a necessary condition for the 
existence of a unique equilibrium in their model. However, in this 
dissertation I regard the convexity assumption as questionable. Cost 
convexity implies that it is easy and cheap to develop the first units of 
knowledge, but increasingly expensive to generate later knowledge. In my 
view, reality could be different: setting up a research facility generates large 
sunk costs and little knowledge in the beginning; at later stages of 
development, learning effects could increase the ratio of knowledge to costs, 
leading to a concave cost function. The main results of the study by Harris 
and Vickers (1987) are that leaders make greater investment efforts than 
followers, and the leader invests more the larger the gap relative to the 
follower. The follower invests more the smaller the gap relative to the 
leader, so the correlation between gap and investment should be more 
negative for followers than for leaders. When the gap becomes large 
enough, the follower drops out completely and the leader does almost all of 
the investment by herself. Therefore, investments are greatest when the gap 
between competitors decreases. The latter result is in tune with the 
predictions by Grossman and Shapiro (1987), who find that players close to 
each other invest more when the gap is small (e.g. one step) than when the 
gap gets larger (e.g. two steps or more). That is, if players are neck-to-neck 
in the race and they have fewer progress steps to go, they should invest 
more than if they have more progress steps to go.  
 
Grossman and Shapiro (1987) analyze a dynamic R&D model and look at 
how the effort level by firms varies over the course of a race. Like in most 
previous patent race models, success is uncertain, the probability of 
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breakthrough depends on the allocation of resources, and there is a "winner-
take-all" setting, so that inventing around the patent is not possible. 
Grossman and Shapiro criticize the model by Fudenberg et al. (1983), which 
according to the former authors severely restricts a firm's ability to vary its 
R&D intensity. Grossman and Shapiro build on the model by Lee and Wilde 
(1980) by adopting their stochastic structure. However, Grossman and 
Shapiro “allow for progress […] by introducing a single intermediate step in 
the research programme facing each firm”. The research program requires 
the completion of two phases of equal difficulty, where “the two stages may 
be thought of as research and development, respectively” (idem). Another 
assumption of the model is that each firm has full information about the 
progress of its rival. Grossman and Shapiro state that, even with this simple 
structure, a “rich set of possibilities” is encountered, depending on the 
parameters of the model. In the results section, competition is shown to be 
“most intense when both firms are even and each has completed the initial 
phase of the research project. When a lagging firm draws even with a rival  
that was formerly ahead in the race, both competitors respond by increasing 
their research efforts. […] When the two firms are at different stages in the 
innovation process, the one that is ahead has a greater incentive to invest in 
R&D than the one that is behind” (idem). These results confirm the 
theoretical predictions by Harris and Vickers (1987) as well as Fudenberg et 
al. (1983).  
 
Park (1987) suggests in his paper that he “adopted a simple structure” for 
his racing model, but keeping some “essentials of innovation competition 
such as stochastic R&D production, multiple stages, and choices with 
varying degrees of risk”. Park's model is based on Lee and Wilde's (1980) 
single stage model of competition, which was extended to a two-stage 
model of development. Park (1987) says that the main objective of his paper 
is to see “how the expected benefits, the cost of R&D, and interactions 
between competing firms combine to determine their dynamic R&D 
strategies over time”. More precisely, Park analyzes how a firm changes its 
R&D strategies depending on its competitive position (ahead or behind). 
There are two possible development paths leading to the final innovation: 
one is “a big simple jump with a small success rate” ("all-or-nothing" 
strategy), the other is “a stage-by-stage development” which progresses 
slow but safe (idem). In the paper, the cost of the two development paths is 
considered to be equal, an assumption I shall use later in the experimental 
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chapter of this dissertation. Park's results are again similar to those of 
Fudenberg et al. (1983), as well as Harris and Vickers (1987) and Grossman 
and Shapiro (1987): a leader allocates more resources to R&D than a 
follower, because the value of an R&D race is greater for the leader than for 
the follower. In Park's model, the follower prefers the riskier big jump 
strategy to the safer stage-by-stage development and the leader sticks with 
the safe strategy. Moreover, competition is shown to be more intense when 
development is more advanced - that is, when the current stage is late rather 
than early.  
 
Another branch of the patent race literature that is worth mentioning in the 
context of multistage (two-player) patent races is concerned with sequences 
of innovations where the technological history of the firms matters. Here I 
have to name the prominent papers by Reinganum (1985), Vickers (1986) 
and Beath et al. (1987), fulminating in the paper by Delbono (1989). The 
paper by Reinganum (1985) somewhat jumps out of my definition of two-
player races, as she analyzes an n-player asymmetric model with one 
incumbent and several challengers. In Reinganum's (1985) paper, firms 
compete to introduce a sequence of innovations. The most important 
assumption she makes is that innovations are considered "drastic", meaning 
that whoever innovates obtains an advantage over the previous technology 
and can earn monopoly profits until the next innovation is introduced. 
Reinganum refers to this as the equivalent of the Schumpeterian process of 
"creative destruction" (Schumpeter, 1942). The main conclusion from 
Reinganum's paper is the following: creative destruction is due to the fact 
that the incumbent has an incentive to impede innovation and protect her 
current position in order to continue to earn monopoly profits. Her rival will 
therefore intervene at some point, inducing creative destruction. Beath et al. 
(1987) criticize Reinganum's (1985) "drasticness" assumption and show it 
may be correct for process innovation in fast-changing industries, but it does 
not hold for product innovation. With the "drasticness" assumption 
invalidated, Beath et al. (1987) point out that firms' “profits from winning or 
losing a particular patent race will depend on previous history and the 
sequential structure is therefore essential”. Beath et al. (1987) also pick at 
the fact that in Reinganum (1985) the sequential structure does not have an 
effect on the general conclusion from the paper (which was stated above). 
Beath et al. emphasize the central role of the sequential innovation structure: 
firms are interested to win a particular race “not just for the immediate 
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profits it brings, but also for the strategic advantage/disadvantage it may 
confer in subsequent patent races”. The same reasoning can be found in the 
paper by Bessen and Maskin (2009), who deal with sequential innovation, 
and in the paper by Vickers (1986) I mentioned just above. Vickers (1986) 
develops a model in which firms bid for patents in an auction, and the 
highest bid wins the patent. Vickers shows that if prices and quantities are 
determined in a Cournot equilibrium (generated by quantity competition), 
firms will engage in a game of action and reaction (or Catching Up as we 
shall call it below) with falling prices over time. If firms are involved in a 
Bertrand (price) competition, one firm will persistently dominate the other 
(which later is denoted as Increasing Dominance). Both the paper by Beath 
et al. (1987) and the later one by Delbono (1989) are extensions of Vickers 
(1986). Beath et al. are concerned to see how Vickers' insights carry over to 
sequential product innovation. Beath et al. point out to a shortcoming of 
Vickers’ model: the latter only works under the assumption of slow 
technical progress. If, however, technical progress is sufficiently fast, the 
model by Vickers becomes indeterminate (Beath et al., 1987). The latter 
authors say that it is vital to distinguish between process innovation, in 
which case a firm “will only ever employ the single best technology for 
which it currently holds a patent”, and product innovation where the same 
principle no longer applies (idem). Beath et al. find that “firms' responses 
are far more complex in the case of product innovation”: here, firms may 
wish to respond by using a set of products rather than just one single 
product, and the consequence can be either action-reaction (Catching Up) or 
Increasing Dominance. With process innovation, firms respond with their 
latest or best technology and the consequence is only Increasing (or 
persistent) Dominance on the market. Delbono (1989) also builds on 
Vickers (1986) but reformulates the latter’s model to also account for 
incremental innovations. In Delbono’s paper, “payoffs – and thus profits 
and incentives – […] depend on the total number of patents previously won 
by the firms”. Delbono underlines that this setting covers situations in which 
technological changes “do not allow the innovator to overtake the rival” and 
thus depicts the case of incremental innovations. Delbono finds that with 
incremental innovation, “both Bertrand and Cournot competition imply 
Increasing Dominance”. What we can see is that even in a small niche of the 
patent race literature containing the four papers described in this paragraph, 
researchers have dealt with quite specific assumptions and heterogeneous 
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settings. Consequently, their results are just as specific, heterogeneous and 
impossible to generalize.  
 
5.1.3. Reinganum’s (1989) “Excellent Review” 
The review of patent race literature done by Reinganum (1989) was highly 
praised in the scientific community, with virtually every subsequent patent 
race paper quoting the review. In this section I sketch her most valuable 
findings.  
 
Reinganum (1989) classifies the pre-1989 patent race literature into four 
streams: 
a) symmetric noncooperative models; most notable here are Scherer 
(1967a), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), Loury (1979), Lee and Wilde 
(1980), Reinganum (1982), Kamien and Schwartz (1972), which I  
have dealt with earlier in this chapter and have largely called the 
“traditional” patent race literature; 
b) asymmetric models; among others I found Arrow (1962), 
Reinganum (1985), Fudenberg et al. (1983), Harris and Vickers 
(1985), Grossman and Shapiro (1987). Additionally I covered papers 
which are not included in Reinganum (1989): the important paper by 
Harris and Vickers (1987), which had an experimental 
implementation, as well as the papers by Park (1987), Vickers 
(1986), Beath et al. (1987) and Delbono (1989); 
c) models of licensing; I touched the topic of licensing as I looked at 
the studies by Reinganum (1984) and Fershtman and Markovich 
(2010). A thorough analysis of licensing models within patent races 
is beyond the scope of this dissertation; 
d) models of innovation adoption and diffusion; these models are also 
not dealt with in the dissertation.  
 
The review by Reinganum (1989) also emphasizes the existence of two 
paradigms which may come into play within every of the scientific papers 
listed above: the first paradigm is that of deterministic innovation, while the 
second paradigm involves stochastic innovation. Under the two different 
paradigms, results of the literature may vary considerably (as we can see 
below in this section). Moreover, Reinganum (1989) formulates 16 
assumptions and 40 propositions which capture the mathematical 
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specifications of her selected papers. I limit my analysis to a verbal 
explanation of her findings.  
 
Reinganum’s (1989) main results from the first literature stream of 
symmetric noncooperative models are as follows: aggregate expenditure on 
R&D in an industry is “too high relative to the cooperative optimum”; there 
is overentry and overinvestment, until all profits are dissipated; firms 
“forego intertemporal efficiencies which could be realized by investing at a 
lower rate over a longer time planning horizon” (idem). 
 
The second literature stream including asymmetric models is especially 
relevant to this dissertation due to the already performed experiments (albeit 
with results in non-concordance with theory). I adopt the asymmetric setting 
as the most interesting case in Chapter 6. Reinganum (1989) points out that 
results under the asymmetric setting are “particularly sensitive” to the 
paradigms mentioned above: “the presence or absence of technological 
uncertainty” (idem). If the innovation is uncertain, the leader invests less 
than the follower, and the role of the leader changes from one firm to 
another (in Reinganum’s words, it “tends to circulate around the industry”). 
This diminishes the value of future races for the leader, because firms 
expect the leader to change constantly; at the same time it increases the 
value of future races for the follower, because she can still win the race 
through luck (in technical terms, luck is represented through the stochastic 
nature of the innovation). If, differently, innovation is deterministic, 
Reinganum shows that in most models the leader invests more than the 
follower. The role of the leader stays constant and persistent. This increases 
the value of future races for the leader, because she then knows she can keep 
her position forever. My experiment in Chapter 6 has a very special nature: I 
model the race so as to incorporate both a setting of uncertain innovation, 
and a setting of deterministic innovation. I therefore experimentally test the 
very core of the asymmetric patent race literature.  
 
It is worth mentioning Reinganum’s (1989) results from the third and fourth 
streams of literature named above, which are based upon the analysis of 
around fifteen scientific papers. For licensing models, Reinganum finds that 
research joint ventures have fewer incentives to innovate and also reduce the 
amount of innovation diffusion. However, there are some benefits: scale 
efficiencies occur and the wasteful duplication of R&D efforts criticized in 
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the literature is avoided. In models of innovation adoption and diffusion, 
Reinganum finds the following: without network effects, each firms invests 
too early, thereby reducing the value of adoption for the other firms. With 
network effects the opposite is true – there is "excess inertia", or no firm 
invests early; rather, each firm waits to imitate the innovation.  
 
5.1.4. Further Ramifications of the Patent Race Literature 
There are several ramifications of the post-1989 patent race literature which 
I have selected because they were published in highly ranking journals. 
Examples may range from Hartwick (1991), who links patent races to firms’ 
market entry and bases his work on Lee and Wilde (1980), to Baye and 
Hoppe (2003), who show the strategic equivalence of innovation 
tournaments, rent-seeking contests and patent races. Such examples could 
surely continue, but they only bring additional complexity to an already 
hardly comprehensible literature. For the sake of having delivered a nearly 
complete image of the patent race literature, this section will briefly present 
two further ramifications of the literature: perpetual (or endless) races and 
optimal rules for patent races. I have chosen these ramifications because 
perpetual races are linked to an experimental investigation, while the other 
ramification is based on a very recent study and tries to synthesize an 
optimal design for patent races, which I regard as an appropriate end for 
Chapter 5.1.  
 
Perpetual races were first analyzed in the paper by Aoki (1991), while 
Hörner (2004) builds up closely on Aoki by also modeling such perpetual 
races. Looking further, one finds that the theoretical model by Hörner was 
tested experimentally by Breitmoser et al. (2010), a paper I describe in 
Chapter 5.2.1. Interestingly, the results by Breitmoser et al. support the 
reasoning I formulate in my experimental Chapter 6. Breitmoser et al. point 
out, just as I do, that the predictions of theoretical models are highly 
sensitive to small changes in the parameters; however, when put in an 
experimental setting, subjects’ strategies are far less sensitive. With patent 
races, people are simpler than models. In the case of perpetual races, 
Breitmoser et al.’s experimental results are more stable than the predictions 
of the theoretical models by Aoki and Hörner.   
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Turning back to the paper by Aoki (1991), we find a model of two firms 
who are equally efficient and engage in competition for R&D projects in an 
infinite number of periods. In Aoki’s basic model, the R&D technology of 
the firms is assumed to be deterministic, with any firm choosing between: i) 
making a costly effort and advancing by one unit of knowledge and ii) 
making no effort and staying where it is. Only the firm with more units of 
knowledge may sell the product and may earn a monopoly profit. Aoki 
computes the resulting equilibrium: for a sufficiently low cost-profit ratio, 
both firms invest when they are in even positions, the follower is indifferent 
between decisions i) and ii) when she is one step behind the leader, and the 
follower drops out if the gap is equal to or exceeds two, because in this case 
the follower’s continuation value becomes zero. So the prediction of Aoki's 
model is that investments in R&D will be largest and competition fiercest 
when firms are closest to each other.  
 
Hörner (2004) draws on the models by Aoki (1991) and by Harris and 
Vickers (1987). Hörner uses Aoki's assumption that the leader of the race 
earns a larger payoff, as well as Harris and Vickers' setting that firms may 
decide between exerting high and low effort, where high effort is more 
expensive than low effort but high effort increases the probability of making 
technological progress. Similarly to Aoki, Hörner models a “dynamic 
competition between two firms that repeatedly engage in an innovative 
activity” with an indeterminate time horizon (idem). Differently from Aoki's 
deterministic innovation setting, in Hörner the “state of competition” 
(defined as “the difference between the number of innovations introduced 
by the firms”) “evolves stochastically according to their effort level” (idem). 
As we already have gotten used in the world of theoretical patent races, 
Hörner's results contradict Aoki's, probably due to the stochastic and not 
deterministic nature of the innovation. Hörner finds it generally not true that 
competition and therefore effort levels are highest when firms are closest, 
but rather competition is strongest when a leader is sufficiently ahead, as she 
tries to secure her position. Competition is also high when the lead is very 
small, as firms try to defend or regain leadership; when the gap between 
firms is of intermediate length, firms’ effort levels will be lower (idem).  
 
The last paper I present in this chapter is the one by Judd et al. (2012), who 
derive optimal rules for patent races. Judd et al. emphasize the fact that their 
paper lies at the intersection of the literature on patent regulation and the 
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literature on patent races; they combine elements from both streams of 
literature in order to find an optimal patent race design. According to Judd 
et al., a patent granting authority (the regulator) can influence the outcome 
and optimality of a patent race by using two instruments of regulation, 
which I describe closely following Judd et al.’s reasoning: 
• the race length, which is determined by the minimal accomplishment 
required from the innovating firm(s) in order to be granted a patent. 
A short race (or early grant of the patent to one firm, after only few 
steps of the innovation development) has the disadvantage that it 
gives an extended monopoly to the patent holder. On the other hand, 
a long race (or late grant of the patent) induces many firms to get 
involved in parallel developments of the same innovation and leads 
to a wasteful duplication of development costs; 
• the size of the prize, defined as the benefits accruing to the 
innovating firm from receiving of a patent. The regulator may 
increase the size of the prize by: granting long patents, granting 
broad patents or charging small patent renewal fees. The regulator 
may choose between two strategies: “offer a big prize to a single 
innovator or offer a smaller prize but use a race to threaten each firm 
that the prize will go to its competitor” (idem). 
 
Judd et al. (2012) continue by showing that the regulation of these two 
instruments makes the patent granting authority face a series of difficult 
trade-offs. For one thing, the regulator would like to speed up the innovating 
process because this benefits consumers. However, an early introduction 
time of the innovation by a firm comes with some disadvantages: over-
investment cost and welfare loss through monopoly. The over-investment 
cost, or the waste, can be reduced by setting a short race (early patent grant), 
but this makes it “difficult to filter out the less efficient firm”, because even 
firms with high development costs are motivated to join the race for only a 
few stages (idem). Both the over-investment cost and the welfare loss 
through monopoly can be reduced if the regulator decreases the reward (the 
prize) by diminishing the patent length or breadth. But then firms have 
fewer incentives to innovate fast (because this is more costly), which brings 
the regulator back to the problem she wanted to solve in the first place 
(faster innovation).  
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To arrive at recommendations about an optimal race design, Judd et al. 
develop a dynamic multistage innovation race model between two firms 
with heterogeneous cost of R&D effort. Their model is very complex and 
contains a variety of parameters: the time of granting the patent; the time of 
innovation completion; the social value of the innovation; the prize to the 
innovator as a fraction of the social value; the ratio between deadweight loss 
and monopoly profits. Furthermore, costs may be linear or convex, and the 
analysis is done under two settings: when the regulator is interested to 
maximize the social surplus, or to maximize the consumer surplus. Judd et 
al. solve their model by performing long and complicated numerical 
analyses and provide their results, which I synthesize in the following.  
 
Under most circumstances, races of “nontrivial duration” are part of an 
optimal policy, because they: a) motivate “firms to invest and complete the 
innovation process quickly” and b) help filter out inferior innovators with 
high development costs (idem). The decision between short and long races 
depends, according to Judd et al., on the regulator’s objective (social versus 
consumer surplus maximization), on the “social returns to innovation” and 
on the “inefficiency costs of compensating the patent winner” (idem). A 
patent granting authority who wants to maximize social surplus should 
choose races of medium length and small prizes in case deadweight losses 
are present. If deadweight losses are excluded from the analysis, optimal 
policy becomes conditional on the firms’ cost asymmetry: when firms are 
homogeneous in terms of costs, large prizes and no races should be chosen; 
when firms are heterogeneous in their costs, long races and smaller prizes 
are socially preferable. If the patent authority wants instead to maximize 
consumer surplus, it should choose lower prizes and grant the patent at later 
stages, as these strategies transfer benefits directly from the innovators to 
consumers. Another important contribution by Judd et al. (2012) is that they 
present two quite viable alternatives to patent races. One alternative is to 
finance the prize through taxation and give the prize to the inventor, but 
then to make sure the innovation is produced under a regime of competition. 
This would “avoid the monopoly inefficiencies of a patent but at the cost of  
distortionary taxation to finance the prize” (idem). The second alternative is 
represented by research tournaments, in which “contestants compete to find 
the innovation with the highest value to the sponsor” (idem). Judd et al. 
point out that research tournaments are “particularly useful when research 
inputs are unobservable and research outcomes cannot be verified by 
5. Patent Races and Their Problems 
106 
 
courts”. In an innovation race “the quality requirement is fixed” and “the 
time of innovation is variable”, while in a tournament “quality is variable” 
and the terminal date is fixed (idem). 
 
5.1.5. The Theoretical Patent Race Literature Is Inconclusive 
Throughout this chapter we have navigated through a very stormy sea of 
theoretical patent race models – a literature full of contradictions and 
lacking stability and reliability. Early in this literature, Scherer (1967a) as 
well as Kamien and Schwartz (1972) were signaling that, in models of 
competition with R&D, small changes in parameters will have unpredictable 
consequences on all model results. We have seen in this chapter that 
virtually any of the theoretical papers on patent races published in highly 
ranking journals after Barzel (1968) only added to the complexity and 
confusion, without bringing clarifying elements. Kamien and Schwartz's 
(1972) results contradict those by Barzel (1968). Lee and Wilde (1980) 
contradict Loury (1979). Reinganum (1982) contradicts Kamien and 
Schwartz (1976). Compatible, harmonious results are found in the papers by 
Fudenberg et al. (1983), Harris and Vickers (1985), Park (1987), Grossman 
and Shapiro (1987) as well as Harris and Vickers (1987). But the results by 
Fudenberg et al. (1983) are overturned in the experimental study of Silipo 
(2005) and Harris and Vickers (1987) are mostly contradicted by the 
experimental findings of Zizzo (2002). The harmonious results I mentioned 
fail to withstand experimental testing. The ramifications of the patent race 
literature I discussed in this chapter - the models where technological 
history matters, the endless race models and the paper on optimal rules for 
patent races - address research questions that are incompatible and only 
increase the literature's complexity. Reinganum's (1989) excellent review 
does a good job at categorizing the different models and it provides valuable 
general conclusions for each stream of the pre-1989 literature. Reinganum 
(1989) successfully synthesizes the results of this literature into 40 
mathematical propositions and 16 assumptions, which are of great 
theoretical value. However, a subsequent study by Cockburn and Henderson 
(1994) found it hard to match these theoretical results with empirical 
evidence, as it is difficult to find features of industries to which the 
theoretical findings can be applied.  
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Cockburn and Henderson (1994), who try to test some assumptions and 
results of the patent race literature in the pharmaceutical industry (in which 
patents and racing are considered to be of outmost importance), argue that in 
general patent race models are “very difficult to test”. The authors point out 
that firms' investment behavior “is critically dependent on a wide range of 
factors, including the nature of the payoff function, the spillover regime, the 
information structure of the game and the extent and nature of asymmetries 
between players, all of which are rather difficult to capture empirically”. 
Cockburn and Henderson also assert that only “few of the models in the 
existing literature can be easily nested”, that “discriminating empirically 
amongst these models is a daunting prospect” because theoretical models 
trying to simultaneously include interactions between the relevant factors 
“quickly become intractable”, and that conclusions from the models are 
fragile, with small changes in any factor being able to “easily reverse or 
weaken any given theoretical result”.  
 
These considerations are in tune with the high degree of heterogeneity 
between results of studies which we encountered in the literature review of 
this chapter. The theoretical patent race literature is too complex and unable 
to deliver any reliable predictions. Each theoretical paper contradicts some 
other one, or studies aspects (parameters, settings, research questions) that 
are incompatible with other papers. Most importantly, theoretical models 
also need experimental testing. As we shall see in the next chapter, the 
theory from the patent race literature is largely contradicted by experiments. 
 
5.2. How the Experimental Evidence Contradicts the Patent 
Race Literature 
This chapter is separated into two subchapters. In Chapter 5.2.1 I analyze 
the four experimental studies which took models from the theoretical patent 
race literature as their basis, and I compare the results from theory with 
those from experiments. In Chapter 5.2.2 I describe patent race experiments 
which, differently from those in 5.2.1, did not root their theoretical basis in 
the standard patent race literature, but instead developed their own 
theoretical models and then tested them experimentally. Towards the end of 
both subchapters, I provide summarizing tables with the features of each 
experimental study.  
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5.2.1. Experiments Testing the Theoretical Patent Race 
Literature 
As we have already seen in the previous chapter, Silipo's (2005) 
experimental study is based on the theoretical model by Fudenberg et al. 
(1983); Harris and Vickers’ (1987) study, a theoretical extension of 
Fudenberg et al., was tested in Zizzo (2002) and Kähkönen (2005); Hörner’s 
(2004) study, a theoretical extension of Aoki (1991) and Harris and Vickers 
(1987), was tested experimentally by Breitmoser et al. (2010).  
 
Silipo (2005) experimentally investigates cooperative versus competitive 
behavior with respect to the relative position (gap) between two subjects 
(firms) in a patent race setting. Even though Silipo's study is based on the 
theoretical model by Fudenberg et al. (1983), it contains a significant 
departure from the latter: Silipo adds the possibility that the subjects make 
the R&D investment jointly, in order to save costs. A cooperation of this 
sort was not possible in Fudenberg et al., and therefore I have to underline 
from the beginning that the experimental study does not represent a direct 
test of the theoretical model.  
 
The reason why Silipo (2005) introduces the option of cooperation between 
firms involved in a race can be well understood. Previously, Vonortas 
(1997) as well as Hagedoorn (2000) had found that both the creation and the 
falling apart of joint ventures represented  essential factors in the 
development of R&D cooperation in the United States between 1985 and 
1998, with a surge in the generation of research partnerships between 1985 
and 1995 and some decline afterwards. On one hand, Silipo emphasizes the 
importance of cooperation and R&D joint ventures in reality, and on the 
other hand Silipo gives three reasons for choosing the model by Fudenberg 
et al. (1983) as a theoretical basis for his experiment. First of all, the model 
by Fudenberg et al. takes into account the learning process and the 
accumulation of knowledge during the patent race (which was absent in 
most of the other patent race models). Second, Fudenberg et al. allow firms 
to change their decisions during the race, depending on their relative 
position, and this allows us to analyze both situations: when they are 
symmetrically or asymmetrically positioned. Third, the model by Fudenberg 
et al. is more appropriate to examine the effects of the game’s information 
structure on innovation and cooperation incentives. So it is easily 
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understood that Silipo wants to get the best of both worlds: from theory and 
from practice. However, by introducing the option for cooperation Silipo (as 
he states himself) makes a radical departure from Fudenberg et al.’s model – 
an essentially different model is now being analyzed, which I regard as a 
very critical problem for Silipo’s paper as well as for the consistency of the 
patent race literature.  
 
In relation to the theoretical model, as in Fudenberg et al., in Silipo’s paper 
R&D is deterministic and subjects participating in the multi-stage race make 
a costly effort to accumulate units of knowledge over time. The first subject 
to reach N units of knowledge wins the race and is awarded the patent. In 
relation to the experimental implementation, Silipo's experiment was run 
with 172 subjects who played 86 races in dyads. In each round, the players 
could accumulate 0, 1 or 2 units of knowledge with convex costs ($0, $0.44 
and $1.11, respectively). Silipo designed his experiment such that no player 
could buy two units of knowledge more than ten times. That is, no player 
could accumulate more than 20 units of knowledge in large chunks (chunks 
of 2 units each), and after the achievement of 10 x 2 = 20 units, each player 
was forced to choose either 0 or 1 unit of knowledge per round. In other 
words, there is a maximum cap on the choice of the high effort strategy (in 
the form of 2 units of knowledge). I regard this issue as a very critical 
assumption and Silipo does not give any reason for the decision to design 
the experiment in this fashion. Each round consisted of two stages. In the 
first stage, subjects decided whether to cooperate or to invest alone. In the 
second stage, if cooperation had been agreed on, subjects undertook the 
R&D effort jointly at a cost advantage; if cooperation had not been reached, 
each subject made an independent and simultaneous investment decision. 
The winner of the race was the first player to achieve N = 30 progress steps, 
and her payoff equaled the prize minus the total costs. If both players 
cooperated throughout the race and reached 30 steps jointly, they split the 
difference between the prize and the total costs. Silipo's experiment had a 
between-subjects design with six treatments generated by varying the prize 
(high prize of $37.94; low prize of $18.97) and the initial positions of the 
two players (symmetric, both starting with (0,0) units of knowledge; 
asymmetric, with (0,1); asymmetric, with (0,2) units of knowledge). 
  
Silipo's (2005) findings contradict Fudenberg et al. (1983) as well as Harris 
and Vickers (1987), who had predicted that firms would compete vigorously 
5. Patent Races and Their Problems 
110 
 
when close to each other (when the gap is small) and that the race would 
degenerate into a monopoly when the gap is large. As stated above, this 
should come as no surprise, because Silipo's introduction of the cooperative 
option changes the research question. Silipo's results are that subjects 
starting from the symmetric position (0,0) typically cooperate at the 
beginning of the race to save on investment costs; as they approach the 
finishing line, subjects break cooperation because of the incentive to get the 
monopoly prize. Subjects starting with asymmetric position (0,1) were 
found to cooperate if the cost saving is large enough to turn an unprofitable 
project into a profitable one. Subjects starting with asymmetry position (0,2) 
never cooperate. Silipo's main conclusion is that, if the cooperative option is 
included, subjects or firms would use it, leading to less wasteful duplication 
of investment efforts (which is quite an intuitive result). Furthermore, Silipo 
finds that in general firms cooperate when they are close to each other 
(opposite to Fudenberg et al., 1983 and Harris and Vickers, 1987), in order 
to reduce the costs of the innovation, but they break the cooperation as they 
come closer to the finishing line, because the cost-reduction effect weakens 
and the incentive to win the monopoly prize increases. Firms far away from 
each other never cooperate. A further result by Silipo is that cooperation 
reduced the speed of innovation when compared to a competitive R&D 
market.  
 
Zizzo (2002) performs an experimental investigation of the multi-stage 
patent race model by Harris and Vickers (1987). Zizzo first of all 
emphasizes the importance of his research: it tests for dual uncertainty. 
Real-world patent races are confronted with two types of uncertainty: 
technological uncertainty (a given investment in R&D leads to an uncertain 
output in the development of an innovation) and dynamic uncertainty 
(firms’ “incentives to invest in R&D may change as the race unfolds,  
according to the position of a firm in the race relative to its competitors and 
relative to the end of the race”, idem). Zizzo points out that the earlier work 
on patent race theory (most notably Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980 as well as 
Gilbert and Newbery, 1982) focused only on the first type of uncertainty, 
the technological one. As emphasized by Zizzo, in these types of models the 
uncertainty is modelled as an exponential process and the patent race is 
“memoryless” in the sense that firms decide in a single round how much 
effort they want to put up, after which the winner or loser of the race is 
determined. Later papers (such as Fudenberg et al., 1983 or Harris and 
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Vickers, 1985) concentrated on the second type of uncertainty only, the 
dynamic uncertainty. Zizzo writes that the latter research “factored out 
technological uncertainty by having a deterministic relation between 
investment and progress in the race”. The result of these models is the so-
called ε-preemption: a small advantage on the side of one firm (the leader) 
at the beginning of the race ensures that the leader wins the entire race and 
the follower drops out immediately after the race begins. 
 
Zizzo (2002) criticizes the above-mentioned papers because “neither lack of 
memory nor ε-preemption appear plausible features of real-world races”. 
Instead, Zizzo prefers to experimentally test a theoretical model which 
reunites technological and dynamic uncertainty, as this would lead to “a 
better characterization of patent races” (idem). For this reason, Zizzo 
chooses the model by Harris and Vickers (1987) as a suitable benchmark 
(Zizzo points out that Grossman and Shapiro, 1987, who also deal with dual 
uncertainty, are just a special case of Harris and Vickers, 1987, so the latter 
paper contains the more general and thus more appropriate model). So Zizzo 
builds an experiment around Harris and Vickers (1987), trying to depart as 
little as possible from the theoretical model. Zizzo keeps the multi-stage 
nature of the race as well as the investment levels, probabilities of winning 
and cost considerations present in the theoretical model. The only difference 
to the theoretical model is the introduction of a budget constraint, which is 
necessary to run the experiment, for practical reasons (subjects cannot be 
endowed with infinite amounts of money). Zizzo tests in his experiment the 
main results of Harris and Vickers (1987): leaders should invest more than 
followers, and even more with a larger gap; the correlation between gap and 
investment should be more negative for the followers; when the gap gets 
large enough, the leader should do all of the investment. 
 
In Zizzo's experimental design 36 subjects (nine sessions of four people 
each) played in dyads a “prize race” (with one practice stage, one payoff-
relevant stage and changing counterparts between the two stages). In every 
race subjects were endowed with 500 points and the value of the prize was 
set at 1000 points. In every round of the race, the two players of a dyad had 
to decide on the levels of their investments x and y, where their probabilities 
of winning the round were 
yx
x
+
  and 
yx
y
+
, as in the model by Harris 
and Vickers (1987). The cost of an investment x was convex, assuming the 
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quadratic form c(x) = x2, and it was subtracted from a subject's endowment 
with each investment decision. As I stated before in Chapter 5.1.2., the 
convex cost function is in my view a hard assumption, because it assumes 
that the cost of developing the project grows exponentially with each new 
unit of knowledge. I believe that economies of scale and learning effects 
with R&D projects should lead to a reduction of the marginal development 
cost and therefore to a concave (not a convex) cost function. In Zizzo’s 
experiment, if a subject won a round, she would make one progress step; if 
both players invested zero, no subject made any progress. After the decision 
was made, information on the winning probability, the investment of the 
other player, and the winner was provided. The first player to complete 10 
progress steps became the winner of the race and received the prize of 1000 
points. Again, the only structural difference to Harris and Vickers' (1987) 
model was that subjects faced a budget constraint in the experiment. 
 
Following Zizzo’s (2002) univariate analysis, we find that subjects played 
an average of about 16 rounds per dyad. They were tied (the gap was zero) 
in almost 20% of the rounds, and were either leaders or followers in the 
other rounds. Zizzo notes that all participants varied their investment efforts, 
whereas the median investment was 4.5 with a mean of 4.06 and a standard 
deviation of 2.15. More than 95% of the subjects’ decisions were lower than 
an investment of 7. Participants with an economic or mathematical 
background had significantly higher investments, while older people 
invested less than younger people. Even though the experimenters expected 
participants to run out of money in the later parts of the race, this never 
occurred; on the contrary, subjects’ investments were higher than the 
median and the mean in the last rounds of the race. More generally, Zizzo 
found a positive and significant correlation between investment and round.  
 
Some of Zizzo's (2002) results confirm those of Harris and Vickers (1987), 
but the most important theoretical results do not hold in the experimental 
study. What was confirmed is a general tendency for investment to increase 
as the two competitors get closer to each other, but only for the later stages 
of the race (as the race approaches its end). Zizzo states that this might be 
the result of an unexplained correlation between investment and progress 
throughout the race, and not a confirmation of the theoretical paper. Most of 
Zizzo's results do not confirm the model by Harris and Vickers (1987): 
leaders did not invest more than followers; the race did not converge to 
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monopoly as the gap between competitors widened but instead followers 
remained in the race until the gap reached very high levels (5-7 steps); 
investment did not increase when subjects were close to each other (1-2 
steps). Zizzo suggests that the budget constraint present in the experimental 
study - which is not modeled in the theoretical study - might be responsible 
for the diverging results and the limited support for Harris and Vickers 
(1987). I agree with Zizzo’s suggestion, because I believe it makes a large 
difference whether an agent has a budget constraint or whether its budget is 
unlimited. Still, Zizzo underlines the fact that real-world R&D departments 
also face budget constraints and thus the absence of a constraint in Harris 
and Vickers (1987) is a mere weakness of their theoretical model. Zizzo's 
main conclusion is that we generally expect a too high degree of rationality 
on the side of economic agents; instead, participants in the experiment are 
subject to bounded rationality and cannot make optimal decisions. Zizzo's 
recommendation for future research is to try and “explain the strong positive 
correlation between investment and progress in the race”. Zizzo also points 
out that the contradicting results between theory and experiment “present a 
puzzle for economists who believe in patent race theory as a suitable 
approximation to real-world patent races”, a point of view that I am 
supporting in my dissertation.   
 
Kähkönen (2005) replicates the patent race experiment run by Zizzo (2002), 
presents its results and compares them to the original experiment. 
Furthermore, the “data sets of both experiments, the replication and the 
original, are pooled and analyzed jointly” (Kähkönen, 2005). The 
heterogeneity between the experiments is considered and Kähkönen asks 
whether the differences between experiments are just random variation. 
According to Hunter (2001), replications can be categorized into two main 
classes: statistical replications and scientific replications. Statistical (or 
exact) replications have to be identical to the original experiment, in the 
sense that the exact same sample, variables and procedures are used. 
Scientific (or close) replications are equivalent to the original experiment, in 
the sense that the same dependent and independent variables have to be 
analyzed, the same basic procedures have to be employed, and the sample 
must come from an equivalent population for the goals and objectives of the 
study. Kähkönen’s replication is considered to belong to the latter category 
– it is a scientific replication. Therefore, according to the author, any 
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differences between the experimental results should be due to random 
variation (sampling variability).  
 
Like in Zizzo (2002), in Kähkönen (2005) a sample of 36 subjects played in 
dyads a patent race game. The ages and educational backgrounds of the 
subjects were similar to those in the original experiment. The experimental 
design followed Zizzo’s experiment very closely, with the only exceptions 
of language (Finnish), currency (Euro), a different experimental software 
and a different random number generator. The univariate results were 
strikingly similar to the original experiment: the average duration of the race 
was 16.6 rounds (versus 16.1 rounds in Zizzo); the percentage of tied rounds 
was 17.06 % in Kähkönen (versus 18.90 % in Zizzo); investments were 
slightly higher (but the difference was not statistically relevant, as computed 
by Kähkönen) in the replication, with median 5, mean 4.51 and standard 
deviation 1.61, vis-à-vis 4.5, 4.06 and 2.15 in the original experiment. Just 
like in Zizzo, in the replication we still find a positive and significant 
correlation between investment and round. Even though at first glance it 
appears that the only difference between the experiments is random 
variation, a deeper econometric analysis by Kähkönen finds out that the two 
different data sets cannot easily be pooled and analyzed together, because 
they show different statistical properties. Kähkönen points out that the 
unobserved effects in Zizzo were analyzed using a random effects estimator 
(showing subject-specific effects), while in Kähkönen the random effects 
model is inappropriate, and a fixed, game-specific effects estimator is used. 
Eventually, the data were pooled together using a mixed model (featuring 
both random and fixed effects).  
 
Kähkönen concludes that “the replication was mostly successful and the 
results of the replication experiment are generally in line with the original  
one”. However, according to the author, the statistically different properties 
of the two data sets show that the differences between experiments cannot 
be reduced to just random variation between samples. Kähkönen states that 
the subject-specific variables were not universally valid across experiments 
– from the demographic variables only age and educational background 
were significant in both experiments. With respect to the theoretical paper 
by Harris and Vickers (1987), Kähkönen, consistent with Zizzo, finds only 
limited support for the theoretical model. Just as before, we find that the 
leaders did not always make greater efforts than the followers, the followers 
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did not drop out of the race when the gap increased and the investment 
efforts did not increase when the gap was very small (in the neck-to-neck or 
tied situation). Kähkönen recommends that more research and more 
experiments should be conducted, and more advanced methods to control 
for the underlying heterogeneity are needed. 
 
Breitmoser, Tan and Zizzo (2010) perform an experimental study on 
perpetual patent races, based on the original theoretical papers by Aoki 
(1991), Hörner (2004) and including elements from Harris and Vickers 
(1987). Perpetual patent races have the characteristic of a “dynamic 
indefinite” time horizon and they are R&D races featuring “uncertainty and 
multiple prizes” (Breitmoser et al., 2010). The latter authors emphasize the 
fact that there are many industries in which firms compete for the 
development of innovations “without clear finishing lines” (opposite to most 
patent race models described in Chapters 5.1.1. to 5.1.3., where the finishing 
line and the exclusive awarding of a patent were an essential feature). In 
such industries, “innovations are gradual, technology progresses 
incrementally, and patents are less crucial in defining relative market 
positions. A leading firm earns more than a lagging firm, e.g. higher product 
quality justifies a higher price mark-up or captures a larger market share” 
(idem, p. 446). However, there is no “winner-take-all” feature in this type of 
competition, and firms coexist in the industry. Relevant examples of such 
industry structures can be found in the pharmaceutical industry (Cockburn 
and Henderson, 1994), for semiconductors (Gruber, 1994) as well as for 
disk drives (Lerner, 1987).  
 
The modelling used by Breitmoser et al. (2010) follows the reasoning used 
by Hörner (2004), who defines patent races as games consisting of several 
rounds and with an infinite time limit. In each of the rounds, the 
participating firms have to choose between high and low R&D effort. As in 
Harris and Vickers (1987), in Breitmoser et al.’s model high effort is more 
expensive than low effort, but increases the probability of making a 
technological advancement. Furthermore, in accordance to the perpetual 
race model by Aoki (1991), in each round of Breitmoser et al.’s game, the 
player who is leading in the race earns a larger benefit than the follower.  
 
Based on these features, the model by Breitmoser et al. predicts several 
types of stationary Markov perfect equilibria. A Markov perfect equilibrium 
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is a set of mixed strategies for all players, which satisfies the following 
criteria: i) memorylessness (each player’s mixed strategy is only dependent 
on the current state of the game); ii) only the payoff-relevant information is 
included (and any signals, negotiation or cooperation between players are 
excluded); iii) the players’ strategies form a subgame perfect equilibrium of 
the game (Maskin and Tirole, 2001). Based on this concept, Breitmoser et 
al. predict a variety of possible Markov perfect equilibria, which can be 
characterized into absorbing equilibria, reflecting equilibria and other 
equilibria. In an absorbing equilibrium, the follower gives up on exerting 
high effort and thus the position of the leader remains unchanged throughout 
the race (similar to the concept of ε-preemption which we have encountered 
in Fudenberg et al., 1983). In a reflecting equilibrium, the leader relaxes and 
exerts low effort, which allows the follower to catch up by exerting high 
effort, with the final result that the lead in the race “constantly changes 
hands” and nobody has an unchallenged position (Breitmoser et al., 2010). 
Finally, other equilibria are characterized by Breitmoser et al. as being 
“neither absorbing nor reflecting” equilibria.   
 
Most importantly, Breitmoser et al. underline the fact that Markov perfect 
equilibria “are highly context-sensitive” and their stability will depend on 
the parameters of the race, “such as the discount rate, the cost of and 
probability of progress for high versus low effort, and the benefits from 
staying ahead” (idem). The main purpose of Breitmoser et al.’s paper is to 
verify in a controlled laboratory experiment whether the context-sensitivity 
of the predicted equilibria will hold with real players. Interestingly, they 
come to a conclusion similar to my results from the experimental Chapter 6: 
while the theoretical equilibrium predictions are rather unstable, the 
subjects’ real strategies are far less sensitive and follow certain paths. In 
their paper, Breitmoser et al. employ best response and quantal response 
models of perpetual patent races, and they compare their predictive 
performance. Different from a best response model, in a quantal response 
model: i) subjects have positive probabilities for playing any strategy;        
ii) “the higher a strategy’s payoff, the higher its probability of being 
played”; iii) subjects “take the “mistakes” resulting from quantal responses 
into account in equilibrium play” (idem). Breitmoser et al. find that the 
quantal response equilibrium is a powerful tool to explain the variance in 
subject responses.  
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As stated before, according to Breitmoser et al.’s (2010) mathematical 
framework, a set of two players play a race for an infinite number of rounds. 
In each round each player can choose between high effort (H) and low effort 
(L). The cost of H is c > 0 and the cost of L is normalized to zero. The effort 
levels H and L influence their respective probabilities of success αH and αL. 
When a player is ahead in the race, she realizes a payoff R; when she is 
behind, she gets a payoff of –R; when the players are tied, each of them has 
a probability of 50% of being behind or ahead. Players discount future 
payoffs by a discount rate of δ. By varying αH and αL, the authors generate 
four relevant treatments labelled from A to D. Treatment A is a control 
treatment in which the high effort strategy is always dominated in all states. 
All other treatments B, C and D have varying states in which either high 
effort or low effort should be exerted. The features of Breitmoser et al’s 
experiment are synthesized in Table 5.1.  
 
 
Table 5.1. Features of Breitmoser et al.’s (2010) experiment INVISIBHITE 
TEXT 
Players’ 
strategies 
High effort (H) Cost c > 0 Probability of 
success αH  
Low effort (L) Cost is zero Probability of 
success αL 
Players’ 
payoffs 
R if ahead 
-R if behind 
If tied, probability of 50 % of being behind or ahead 
Discount rate of 
future payoffs δ 
Treatments 
αH = 0.5 αL = 0.25 Treatment A 
αH = 0.9 αL = 0.25 Treatment B 
αH = 0.5 αL = 0.1 Treatment C 
αH = 0.9 αL = 0.1 Treatment D 
 
 
Further in their paper, Breitmoser et al. describe their experimental design. 
In June 2005 the authors ran a computerized experiment in Frankfurt 
(Oder), Germany. “Subjects were students from the faculties of Business 
Administration and Economics, Cultural Science, and Law. A total of 90 
subjects participated in the 9 sessions (with 10 subjects per session)” (idem). 
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Each subject had to play three sessions for each of the conditions B, C and 
D; each session contained the control treatment A and one of the other three 
treatments B, C and D. Each session contained ten stages, and subjects were 
randomly matched at the beginning of each stage. In order to implement the 
perpetual nature of the race, each stage consisted of several rounds, and in 
every round the probability that the stage would end was of 10%, which was 
communicated to all participants (idem).   
 
Descriptive statistics and univariate statistical tests performed by Breitmoser 
et al. show that the average investment in the experiment was 0.669 and it 
varied very little between treatments (investment levels were 0.686, 0.611, 
0.706 and 0.683 in treatments A, B, C and D). Subjects studying economics 
“may have invested slightly less”, and “there is no evidence of age or 
gender effects” (idem). There was a significant negative correlation between 
investment levels and progress in a session. The authors also ran logistic 
regressions with individual level and session level random effects, taking 
investment as the dependent variable. Independent variables were: tied 
situation; leader situation; positive gap; negative gap; stage; stage squared; 
round; round squared. Results show that “investment tends to be highest at 
the beginning of each stage, perhaps as players try to grab the lead when 
faced with new co-players. Increasing the gap between competitors lowers 
investment in all treatments”, and in this case the market converges to a 
monopoly (idem). 
 
The main results of the experiment run by Breitmoser et al. show that 
subjects’ strategies cannot generally be rationalized. Compared to 
theoretical predictions, subjects’ investment rates were higher than 
expected, and their “behavior was less context-sensitive” than theory 
forecasted (idem). “Most of the subjects exert high effort in states where 
doing so is dominated. […] In all our treatments except the control 
treatment where low investment was always predicted, competition tended 
to evolve into an R&D leadership monopoly: a market structure with an 
entrenched leadership and lower aggregate investment than if competitors 
stay neck-to-neck” (idem).  
 
Breitmoser et al. point out that it is difficult to assess the validity of 
equilibrium analysis even in a controlled environment where the optimal 
strategic behavior can be computed mathematically with great precision. 
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Breitmoser et al. add to their results the similarities to other empirical 
studies which found very weak support for the reliability of equilibrium 
analyses in the case of R&D races (such as Meron and Caves, 1991 or 
Cockburn and Henderson, 1994). Dealing with a similar problem, Cohen 
and Levin (1989) note that existing field studies have some fundamental 
limitations: they cannot measure strategic behavior and they face 
heterogeneous R&D motivations from the participants in a technology race. 
Breitmoser et al. suggest that their data is appropriate to explain the failure 
of the equilibrium concepts in the experiment. One explanation for this 
failure, provided by the latter authors, could be that the experiment does not 
allow its participants to gather sufficient learning. Another explanation is 
that “to players, the long-term payoff implications of different actions may 
not be sufficiently dissimilar, or saliently so, to justify a sharp distinction 
between optimal and sub-optimal actions” (idem). Since optimal strategies 
lack transparency, the concept of quantal response equilibria was employed 
and provided “a plausible analytical tool” for the experimental data (idem). 
The authors state that, combined with a rivalry motive, the Markov quantal 
response equilibrium explains an astounding “95% of the variance in the 
empirical distribution of responses”, while optimal response equilibria are 
completely unreliable: in most cases, they perform worse than chance 
(idem). Breitmoser et al.’s recommendations for future research are 
“allowing for even more learning, varying the number of R&D competitors, 
reconsidering modeling assumptions, and analyzing welfare and policy 
implications” (idem). 
 
The main design features of the experiments I have discussed in this chapter 
are summarized in Table 5.2.  
 
 
Table 5.2. Main design features of the experiments from Chapter 5.2.1. 
Silipo (2005) 
• tested the theoretical paper by Fudenberg et al. (1983) 
• model of a multi-stage race with costly efforts to accumulate units of 
knowledge over time 
• first player to achieve N = 30 units of knowledge wins the race and is 
awarded the patent 
• number of subjects: 172, who played 86 races in dyads 
• effort levels: 0, 1 or 2 units of knowledge with convex costs $ 0,        
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$ 0.44 or $ 1.11 
• each round consisted of two stages: stage 1) decision on whether to 
cooperate or invest alone; stage 2) investment decision 
• if both players cooperate throughout the race and reach 30 steps 
jointly, they split the prize minus the total costs 
• between-subjects design with six treatments generated by varying the 
prize (high or low) and the initial positions of the two players: (0,0); 
(0,1); (0,2) 
• the findings of the paper contradict the original paper by Fudenberg et 
al. (1983) 
Zizzo (2002) 
• tested the paper by Harris and Vickers (1987) 
• participants were 36 subjects in 9 sessions à 4 subjects who played in 
dyads a “prize race” 
• in every race, players were endowed with 500 points, the prize was 
set to 1000 points, and the decisions on investment for player 1 and 2 
were x and y, with probabilities of winning the round x/x+y and y/x+y 
• convex cost of investment, with c(x) = x2, which was subtracted from 
each subject’s endowment 
• after the decision, information on the winning probabilities, 
investment of each player and the winner was provided 
• the winner made one progress step in each round 
• the first player to complete 10 progress steps became the winner of 
the race and received the prize of 1000 points, from which the 
investment costs were subtracted 
• results showed only limited support for the theoretical predictions by 
Harris and Vickers (1987) and most of the predictions did not hold in 
the experimental study 
Kähkönen (2005) 
• replication of the patent race experiment by Zizzo (2002) 
• a sample of 36 subjects played in dyads a patent race game; the 
subjects had ages and educational backgrounds similar to those in the 
original experiment 
• the experimental design followed Zizzo’s experiment very closely, 
with very few exceptions 
• results were strikingly similar to those in the original experiment; 
however, the differences between the two experiments cannot be 
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reduced to random variation between samples, but to the different 
properties of the two data sets 
Breitmoser et al. (2010) 
• tested the models by Aoki (1991), Hörner (2004) and Harris and 
Vickers (1987) 
• a set of two players play a race for an indeterminate number of rounds 
• in each round, each player chooses between high effort H and low 
effort L; the effort levels H and L influence the probabilities of 
success in a round αH and αL  
• when a player is ahead in the race, she realizes a payoff R; when she 
is behind, she gets a payoff of -R 
• treatments or conditions A, B, C and D were generated by varying the 
probabilities of success αH and αL  
• 90 subjects participated in 9 sessions à 10 subjects 
• each subject played 3 sessions for each condition B, C and D, while 
condition A was included in each session as control treatment 
• each session contained ten stages, and subjects were randomly re-
matched at the beginning of each stage 
• each stage consisted of an indeterminate number of rounds, and 
participants were informed that in each round the probability that the 
stage would end was of 10 % 
• the main results of the experiment show that subjects’ strategies 
cannot generally be rationalized; subjects’ behavior was less context-
sensitive than theory forecasted  
 
 
To sum up my conclusions from Chapter 5.2.1, I found that the predictions 
of the theoretical patent race literature are inconclusive when the models are 
tested experimentally. Indeed, only four experimental tests of traditional 
patent races have been performed, and I have described them extensively in 
this chapter. First, I found that the theoretical model of Fudenberg et al. 
(1983) is not supported by the experimental study of Silipo (2005). Here the 
problem was that Silipo significantly modified Fudenberg et al.’s original 
research question by introducing the cooperative option, and therefore it is 
no wonder that the results of the two studies contradict each other. Second, 
there are the contradictory results between the prestigious theoretical model 
by Harris and Vickers (1987) and its experimental tests in Zizzo (2002) and 
Kähkönen (2005). Here, the experiments were designed extremely close to 
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the theory (with the exception of a budget constraint, which was needed in 
the experiment and represented a reasonable assumption). Yet, Harris and 
Vickers’ predictions about investment behavior as a function of the gap 
between competitors generally do not hold when tested experimentally. As 
Zizzo points out, these contradicting results severely undermine the 
predictive power of the patent race literature as a “suitable approximation to 
real-world patent races”. Third, the theoretical work on perpetual races 
elaborated by Aoki (1991) and Hörner (2004) does not produce the expected 
predictions in the experiment run by Breitmoser et al. (2010). Here, 
theoretical models are very sensitive to parameter changes, while 
participants’ real investment behavior in an experimental race is not 
context-sensitive at all, and the authors conclude that the subjects’ decisions 
are difficult to rationalize.  
 
For the sake of completion, the next chapter presents experiments with 
patent races not rooted in the traditional literature (experiments based on 
own theoretical models), and it adds to an already very high level of 
complexity. 
 
5.2.2. Experiments Testing Their Own Theoretical Models 
In this chapter, I will chronologically present four studies - published in 
highly ranking scientific journals - which develop own theoretical models of 
R&D or patent racing and then test these models experimentally. I leave out 
unpublished papers dealing with patent race experiments (e.g. Cantner et al., 
2004 and 2005, among others). Towards the end of the chapter I will 
formulate my general conclusions from Chapter 5.  
 
The study by Isaac and Reynolds (1992) performs a series of laboratory 
experiments in the context of R&D racing. In the experiments, a small 
number of sellers have to compete by making decisions about pricing, 
production and cost-reducing R&D. The sellers receive rewards for their 
innovative behavior, but these rewards depend strongly on the type of 
competitive market: large differences can be observed in a monopoly 
market versus a four-seller competitive market. The type of competitive 
market also has a significant effect on output and pricing of the innovation: 
“aggregate R&D is higher under competition than under monopoly and 
prices follow marginal cost reductions much more quickly under 
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competition than under monopoly”, strongly resembling a type of 
Schumpeterian competition (idem). The experimental results are in high 
accordance with theoretical predictions.  
 
Isaac and Reynolds’ (1992) study is mainly based on the concepts of market 
evolution and non-price competition, which were introduced by Schumpeter 
(1950). Schumpeter’s view of the competitive process is that of a dynamic 
process: under firms’ innovative efforts, markets continuously change and 
evolve; not price competition matters, but the firms’ underlying competition 
in technology, R&D and quality. This type of competition “strikes not at the 
margins of the profits and the outputs of existing firms but at their 
foundations and their very lives” (Schumpeter, 1950, p. 84). Furthermore, 
Isaac and Reynolds build up their theoretical approach based on important 
studies about the relationship between R&D and market structure, on a 
careful selection of studies dealing with competition and cost reduction, and 
on previous research on the topic of stochastic innovation (which has a 
branch in the patent race literature through the papers by Loury, 1979 and 
Lee and Wilde, 1980, but was further extended through the studies by 
Mortensen, 1982 and Stewart, 1983). According to stochastic innovation 
theory, each of N firms simultaneously chooses a level of R&D investment, 
and their choices “generate probabilities of innovative success for each 
player” (Isaac and Reynolds, 1992) resulting in distinct rewards for 
successful and unsuccessful players (similarly to Harris and Vickers, 1987). 
The levels of rewards are affected by factors such as patent protection, 
imitation and the competitive nature of the market (Isaac and Reynolds, 
1992). The study by the latter authors goes beyond the stylized facts of the 
stochastic innovation theory. Isaac and Reynolds develop a framework in 
which sellers make decisions on pricing and output in a product market. 
These decisions, together with the product buyers’ decisions (which were 
computer simulated), endogenously determine the sellers’ private benefits to 
cost-improving R&D. The authors write that “the experimental environment 
is explicitly dynamic. Price and output decisions are made over a sequence 
of market periods and cost reductions for a seller are cumulative over the 
course of an experiment” (idem). Isaac and Reynolds point out that this 
dynamic framework allows them to study the development of price, 
marginal cost and market share during an experiment, based on subjects’ 
behavior.  
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In the following, I describe the implementation of the experiments by 
synthesizing information from Isaac and Reynolds’ paper. In the 
experiments, sellers played a number of fifteen periods. During the first five 
periods, sellers had no opportunity to perform R&D in order to reduce their 
costs (the purpose of this was “to familiarize the subjects with the cost and 
demand conditions”, idem). Starting with the sixth period, sellers 
participated in an innovation stage followed by an output market stage. In 
the innovation stage, sellers could purchase draws (with a cost of 10 cents 
per draw) from a bingo cage with balls labeled from 1 to 10. If the ball with 
the number 10 was among the player’s draws, the seller was considered an 
innovator and her marginal costs were reduced by 25 cents per unit. The 
levels of R&D investments and their success were made public before the 
subsequent (market) stage began. Isaac and Reynolds (1992) ran twelve 
experiments: two experiments were controls, each consisting of four sellers 
without the possibility of innovation; six experiments had four-seller 
markets with the possibility to innovate; the remaining four experiments 
were monopoly control experiments (in which there is only one seller in the 
market, but she can still choose to innovate).  
 
The results of the experiments by Isaac and Reynolds confirm the 
theoretical strength of the concept of Schumpeterian competition. When 
they find themselves on competitive (four-seller) markets, sellers engage in 
costly innovation and when they succeed, prices start falling and the 
industry gets more concentrated. To make sure that these results indeed 
represent Schumpeterian competition, the authors compare the results of 
competitive market experiments with those on monopoly markets. The data 
strongly indicates that in all monopoly settings, “final market prices are 
above the original competitive equilibrium prices” (idem). Furthermore, the 
competitive markets generated significantly higher levels of total welfare, 
and almost all this welfare is transferred to consumers; on monopoly 
markets, total surplus is lower, and most of the surplus accrues to the 
monopolist. Average aggregate investment was also found to be much 
greater in the four-seller markets vis-à-vis the monopoly markets (due to the 
fact that the monopolist is not under pressure to innovate, while the 
competitive sellers lose market share if they do not). All in all, Isaac and 
Reynolds’s (1992) study is based on a solid theoretical foundation (that of 
Schumpeterian competition), and the results of their experiments show 
strong support for the theory.   
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Sbriglia and Hey (1994) performed an exploratory study in the field of R&D 
competition through a series of experiments. The purpose of their study was 
to find out “how firms search for innovations that will allow them to gain 
significant profits, as in the case of patentable innovations, and how they 
adjust their search strategies in order to take account of the competition 
from other potential innovators” (idem). Further aspects under investigation 
mentioned by the authors were related to the distribution of firms' spending 
during the search process, the role of information in the experiments and 
factors that would influence firms’ decisions to enter or exit the 
competition. The experiments were designed as innovation races in which N 
subjects competed “to discover an unknown combination of elements” that 
represented a “patentable innovation” (idem). A subject who made the 
discovery alone was awarded the whole prize V, or she had to share the 
prize equally with other players if they made the discovery simultaneously. 
Subjects who did not make the discovery had to pay for their own search 
costs (which were subtracted from a participation fee). The unknown 
combination of elements was represented by n letters of the alphabet (e.g. 
ZDNFVKL with n = 7), which were randomly selected from a set of m 
letters. Sbriglia and Hey suggest that this design is reflective (albeit in a 
highly simplified form) of the research process in the pharmaceutical 
industry. In order to find the correct combination, subjects could buy “trial 
combinations of n letters” in each round and were informed about which 
letters were correct, at the end of each round (idem). As stated by the 
authors, 57 subjects participated in 15 total experiments, including 3 pilot 
studies, 7 experiments with a deterministic information structure and 5 with 
stochastic information. The information structure was linked to whether a 
player had knowledge about other players’ search performance perfectly or 
stochastically. 
 
The main results from Sbriglia and Hey’s (1984) study are related to the 
patterns of behavior for different players, who were categorized into 
winners and losers. The authors write that “in all experiments, the winners 
applied a successful search procedure and did not play randomly”. 
Generally, winners “invested more than their participation fee” and also 
more than the losers (idem). The authors found that losers played less 
aggressively or were less lucky with their search process. The experiment 
also allowed subjects to decide not to enter the competition at all. A 
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questionnaire asked players about their reasons not to enter, and found out 
that some subjects decided not to enter because of “lack of a specific search 
strategy” and because they preferred the certain participation fee to the 
“uncertain investment necessary to find the unknown combination” (idem). 
I believe that non-entering subjects acted so because of their risk attitudes 
(that is, risk aversion), but one cannot test this hypothesis because Sbriglia 
and Hey did not measure risk attitudes in their experiment. Finally, the role 
of deterministic versus stochastic information was analyzed and the authors 
concluded that subjects largely ignored their opponents’ search performance 
and were mainly concerned with their own speed in the race. Sbriglia and 
Hey generally conclude that their experiment offers a realistic framework of 
research competition for a patentable innovation, and that it provides useful 
insights into the link between strategy, skill, information and incentives to 
enter or quit the race as well as timing and level of investment.  
 
The important contribution by Amaldoss and Jain (2002) was concerned 
with an experimental investigation of an asymmetric mixed-strategy game 
in the context of a patent race. The authors start their paper by emphasizing 
the importance of the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium concept, which has 
been used, among others, in R&D and pricing models. Its popularity is, as 
stressed by the authors, due to the fact that a mixed-strategy equilibrium 
often exists when there are no pure-strategy equilibria in a game. Amaldoss 
and Jain point out to empirical evidence which reinforces the concept: in 
laboratory experiments, the mixed-strategy equilibrium was shown to 
account well for subjects’ behavior in symmetric settings but it leads to 
theoretical results that are counter-intuitive in asymmetric settings. 
Amaldoss and Jain’s study contains an asymmetric setting of two firms 
which race “to develop a product and obtain a patent”. The asymmetry lies 
in the fact that one of the two firms “values the patent more because of its 
market advantages, such as brand reputation and distribution network” 
(idem). The authors write: “Intuition would suggest that the firm that values 
the patent more will invest more and, consequently, win the patent more 
often. However, our theoretical results show that, in fact, in equilibrium the 
opposite is true: The player who has less to benefit from winning the patent 
will invest more aggressively and win the patent more often” (idem). 
Mathematically, the reason for these surprising results is intimately 
connected to the nature of a mixed strategy: the equilibrium strategy of a 
player i is computed based on the payoffs of the opposing player, player j, 
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and the other way around. As one can also find in Chapter 6.1.3, this 
happens because player i randomizes between its strategies so as to make 
player j indifferent between all of player i's strategies, and vice versa. 
Amaldoss and Jain acknowledge that in their study this mathematical result 
also has a plausible real-world interpretation: a market advantage on the side 
of the market leader “can provoke aggressive investment by competitors and 
potentially impede innovation” by the leader (idem). Therefore, according to 
the authors, the failure to innovate by the leader is not due to management 
inefficiencies (or naïve, nonstrategic players), but it arises from strategic 
behavior (or perfectly rational players).  
 
In the following, I briefly describe verbally and mathematically the model 
by Amaldoss and Jain (2002). Here, two firms on the market competitively 
invest in R&D in order to win a patent. Any firm can invest an amount x ϵ 
[0, c], where c “represents the financial constraints imposed on the firm by 
the capital market” (idem). The investment is made in increments of c, so a 
firm can invest (0, c/k, 2c/k, 3c/k, …, c) units (idem). Like in Gilbert and 
Newberry (1982) as well as Fudenberg et al. (1983), “the firm that invests 
more wins the patent” (Amaldoss and Jain, 2002). Firms are asymmetric in 
the valuation of the patent: one firm (firm L) has a lower payoff from 
winning the race, denoted as rL, than the other firm (firm H), which writes a 
payoff of rH, and rH > rL. Furthermore, c < rL. The financial constraint c and 
the two firms’ payoffs ri are common knowledge. If both firms invest the 
same R&D amount xi, Amaldoss and Jain make the assumption that the 
“firms engage in Bertrand competition and both firms make zero profits 
from the patent” (idem). The authors model firm i's payoff as: 
 
   
 
I found it quite a critical assumption that the payoff of any firm was 
modeled as -xi, if firms invest the same amount xi. I cannot find any link to 
real-life situations in which firms would suddenly make a loss if they 
invested the same amount of R&D expenditures as another firm. However, 
this working assumption is essential to Amaldoss and Jain’s paper. In the 
following, the authors characterize the equilibrium solution. They show in 
their Proposition 1 that the unique equilibrium of the game is “for Firm H to 
(5.1) 
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invest ic/k discrete units of capital (where i = 0, 1, …, k)” with the following 
probability: 
 
  
 
Similarly, for Firm L the probability is: 
 
  
 
Amaldoss and Jain show formally how Proposition 1 leads to the following 
results: 1) “Firm L’s equilibrium strategy does not depend on rL, but rather 
depends on rH”; 2) “on average, Firm L invests more than Firm H”; 3) “Firm 
L is more likely to win the patent” (idem). The authors point out again that 
these three results “are not consistent with intuition, but are the only results 
consistent with strategic thinking about the game” (idem). No other 
propositions or results were formulated.  
 
In the next section of their paper, the authors proceed with the experimental 
test of the theoretical model. Their main research question is whether real 
subjects will play according to normative equilibrium predictions, or will 
apply a heuristic with no normative basis (of the type: “high-reward subjects 
should invest more than low-reward subjects”, idem). Participants to the 
experiment were 36 student subjects. They played in two groups of 18 
subjects each, generating two versions of the same experiment. In each 
experiment, the 18 subjects were “randomly divided into nine low-reward 
players and nine high-reward players, and their reward condition remained 
the same throughout the experiment” (idem). Each subject played 80 trials 
of the same game, all subjects were randomly re-matched at the beginning 
of each trial (randomly changing opponents) and each subject was given 
feedback on both players’ investments, the winning player and both payoffs 
at the end of each trial. The parameters of the experiment are summarized in 
Table 5.3. 
 
 
(5.2) 
(5.3) 
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Table 5.3. Parameters of Amaldoss and Jain’s (2002) experiment 
 
Financial constraint c = 2 
Basic increment k = 2 
Reward for the high-reward player rH = 7 
Reward for the low-reward player rL = 4 
Endowment at the beginning of each trial 2 francs 
Possible investments 0, 1 or 2 francs 
If subjects invested the same amount xi, each received a 
payoff of -xi 
 
 
The results of the study by Amaldoss and Jain showed that, on the aggregate 
level, both the low-reward subjects and the high-reward subjects conformed 
to the predictions of the theoretical model, which shows the power of the 
mixed-strategy equilibrium concept. There were some deviations from the 
normative predictions, but only for a subset of the high-reward subjects, and 
only for the first 40 trials; in the last 40 trials the behavior of these subjects 
converged to the predictions, which I interpret as learning effects. As 
expected, low-reward subjects played more aggressively and invested more 
than high-reward subjects. However, although aggregate results show 
support for the theory, individual decisions do not: one still finds that low-
reward subjects invested more, but there is considerable heterogeneity in all 
subjects’ decisions and the distribution of investments significantly differed 
from the model predictions. In order to explain individual decisions, 
Amaldoss and Jain employed an adaptive learning model, namely the 
experience-weighted attraction learning model by Camerer and Ho (1999). 
Reasons given by Amaldoss and Jain for the selection of the learning model 
are that it allows for learning effects, and that it was applied to various 
situations, showing good predictive power. The way the experience-
weighted attraction learning model works is the following: i) the past 
success of a strategy will make it more likely for the strategy to be chosen 
again; ii) “unchosen strategies, which might have yielded high payoffs, are 
more likely to be chosen in the future”; iii) “with experience, players move 
to reduce discrepancies between actual and foregone payoffs”; iv) there is a 
forgetting parameter in the sense that previous decisions are discarded after 
some time (idem). After calibrating and applying Camerer and Ho’s 
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learning model to the individual decisions, Amaldoss and Jain found a very 
good model fit: indeed, subjects learn and adapt throughout the experiment.  
 
To sum up all results from Amaldoss and Jain’s paper, one finds that the 
research tested “the descriptive validity of some of the counterintuitive 
implications of using mixed strategy when players are asymmetric” (idem). 
The authors developed a patent race model, tested it experimentally and 
received good support for the theory on the aggregate level. The 
heterogeneity of decisions on the individual level could be well accounted 
for by employing an adaptive learning model. The model provides an 
interesting explanation of the reasons why a firm with a market advantage 
might fail to innovate: the advantage of one firm provokes strategic 
aggressive investments by its competitors and might impede the firm’s 
innovative ability. Amaldoss and Jain point out that this result is also 
consistent with some field observations: Lerner (1997) analyzed innovative 
behavior in the disk-drive market during the period between 1971-1995 and 
found out that market leaders innovated at a lower rate than their 
competitors, and they often lost their leading position to market challengers. 
All in all, the paper by Amaldoss and Jain (2002) has a very strong 
theoretical basis, a good experimental design as well as excellent results and 
implications, which are also supported by empirical observations.  
 
Nieken and Sliwka’s (2010) paper studies risk taking in a two-person 
tournament by creating a theoretical model and performing an experiment. 
Tournaments are a general case of patent races since contestants compete 
“for a limited set of prizes” and the best performant “receives the winner 
prize”, while “less successful competitors only receive lower loser prizes” 
(idem). Similarly to the experiment described in Chapter 6, in Nieken and 
Sliwka’s paper two agents simultaneously choose between a risky and a safe 
strategy. As the authors put it, this sort of situation has relevance in the real 
world, most notably for “mutual fund managers” who “have to decide 
between risky and safe portfolios”, firms which have to choose between the 
introduction of a new technology and staying with the status quo or also 
politicians who “gamble for resurrection” by choosing risky policy 
alternatives for fear that they might lose the election (idem). The main 
departure of Nieken and Sliwka from other models is that they allow 
contestants to imitate each other’s risky strategies: for example, if a 
competitor who has remained behind in a race follows a risky strategy, “the 
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front runner may well try to adopt a similar strategy” in order to protect her 
lead (idem). In other words, Nieken and Sliwka “allow for different degrees 
of correlation between the outcomes of the risky strategies of the 
contestants”, and their results strongly depend on the level of this 
correlation (idem). The two agents involved in the tournament have 
asymmetric positions (like in Chapter 6), so one of the contestants has a lead 
over the other. The winner of the tournament receives a prize with a 
normalized value of one, while the loser’s value is set to be zero. Similarly 
to the theoretical model I present in Chapter 6, Nieken and Sliwka’s model 
also computes three Nash equilibria: i) the leader chooses the safe strategy 
and the follower the risky strategy; ii) they both choose the risky strategy; 
iii) they both play a mixed-strategy equilibrium. The difference to this 
dissertation is that in Nieken and Sliwka, a stronger correlation between the 
risky strategies means that it becomes more attractive for the leader of the 
race to choose the risky strategy. In the following, I provide the 
mathematical description of Nieken and Sliwka’s theoretical model.  
 
The authors consider a tournament between two agents A and B who 
simultaneously decide among a risky and a safe strategy, and their decision 
is depicted as di ϵ {r, s} for i = A, B. Each agent’s decision influences the 
distribution of her performance, denoted as yi, as follows: 
 
  
  
 
It is furthermore assumed that “the performance indicators    are correlated 
with a correlation coefficient 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1” (idem). Such a coefficient does not 
exist in my experimental model from Chapter 6, because in my model the 
players’ strategies are completely unobserved and simultaneous. Turning 
back to Nieken and Sliwka’s model, Agent A has a lead over agent B, and 
this lead is denoted as ∆yA ≥ 0. The authors introduce ∆µ = µr - µs, and ∆µ 
“is positive if the risky strategy has a higher expected outcome than the safe 
one and negative in the opposite case” (idem). The authors then show that 
(risky, safe) and (safe, safe) can never be Nash equilibria and proceed with 
the mathematical characterization of the three existing equilibria through 
their Propositions 1-3. Proposition 1 states that “a pure strategy Nash 
(5.4) 
(5.5) 
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equilibrium exists in which the leading player A plays the safe strategy and 
player B plays the risky strategy if and only if”: 
 
  
 
According to Proposition 2, “a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists in 
which both players choose the risky strategy if and only if”: 
 
  
 
Finally, Proposition 3 states that “a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies 
exists if and only if”: 
 
  
 
Furthermore, Nieken and Sliwka point out in their Proposition 3 that “in any 
mixed strategy equilibrium, player A chooses the risky strategy with a 
higher probability than player B if the risky strategy leads to a higher 
expected outcome than the safe one. If ∆µ < 0 player B chooses the risky 
strategy with a higher probability than his opponent”. 
 
The experimental design of Nieken and Sliwka (2010) contained three 
different treatments in which the correlation coefficient ρ of the risky 
strategy was varied and assumed values of zero, one and 1/2. For each 
treatment one session with 24 participants was implemented. Each 
participant played five trial periods plus 23 payoff-relevant periods and was 
randomly matched with another partner in every period. In any period, every 
subject was endowed with a score that was “drawn from a normal 
distribution with a mean of 150 points and a standard deviation of 42 
points” (idem). This endowment generated a leader, a follower, and a gap 
between them. Any subject had to choose between a safe and a risky 
strategy. The safe strategy guaranteed the player 80 additional points, while 
the risky strategy generated additional points that were drawn “from a 
(5.6) 
(5.7) 
(5.8) 
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normal distribution with a mean of 100 points and a standard deviation of 20 
points” (idem). The final number of points determined the winner and the 
loser. Feedback was provided at the end of every period. After the 
experiment was completed, one of the 23 periods was randomly selected 
and entitled the winner with 25 Euros, while the loser earned only 5 Euros. 
An additional show-up fee of 2.50 Euros was paid to all subjects.  
 
Nieken and Sliwka’s (2010) results were pretty clearly cut: the possibility 
that contestants imitate the risky strategies of their opponents (and that the 
outcomes of the policy choices are thus correlated) strongly influenced the 
equilibrium of the game. The key predictions of the model were confirmed: 
if the outcomes are uncorrelated, leaders choose the safe strategy more often 
than the followers, but the opposite is valid if the outcomes are perfectly 
correlated. The authors point out that their results are relevant for “gambling 
in competitive situations. When the competitors have access to similar 
policies, the correlation between the outcomes of the risky strategies will be 
high” and therefore leaders will have higher incentives to choose the risky 
strategy (idem).   
 
The most important features of the experiments from the current subchapter 
are synthesized in Table 5.4.  
 
 
Table 5.4. Main design features of the experiments from Chapter 5.2.2. 
 
Isaac and Reynolds (1992) 
• tested their own developed model of Schumpeterian competition 
• in their experiment, sellers compete by making decisions on pricing, 
output and cost-reducing R&D 
• the authors ran 12 experiments: 2 experiments of four-seller markets 
without the possibility to innovate, 6 experiments of four-seller 
markets with the possibility of innovation, while 4 experiments were 
monopoly control experiments with the possibility to innovate 
• in the experiments, sellers played 15 periods, in which the first 5 
periods had no R&D reduction possibility, and starting with period 6 
sellers had an innovation stage and an output market stage 
• in the innovation stage, sellers could purchase draws that could lower 
their marginal costs; in the market stage, buyers’ decisions were 
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computer simulated 
• the results of the experiment confirmed Schumpeterian competition, 
in that welfare is higher and prices lower on competitive markets 
compared to monopoly markets 
Sbriglia and Hey (1994) 
• exploratory study in the field of R&D competition 
• the experimental design was of innovation races in which N subjects 
competed to discover an unknown combination of randomly chosen 
alphabet letters 
• a subject who made a discovery alone was awarded a prize V, or had 
to share the prize with other discoverers 
• 57 subjects participated in 15 total experiments which included 3 pilot 
studies, 7 experiments with deterministic information and 5 
experiments with stochastic information 
• results showed that winners applied successful search strategies, 
invested more than their participation fee and more than losers 
• generally, the experiment provided insights into search strategies for 
patentable innovations 
Amaldoss and Jain (2002) 
• experimentally tested an asymmetric setting of two firms which race 
to develop a product and obtain a patent 
• the authors tested a mixed-strategy equilibrium analysis in which the 
player with a lower patent valuation is expected to act more 
aggressively that the leading player of the race 
• participants were 36 students subjects, who played in two groups of 
18 subjects each, generating two replications of the same experiment 
• in each experiment, the 18 subjects were divided into 9 low-reward 
and 9 high-reward subjects who remained unchanged in their roles 
throughout the experiment 
• any player could invest increments of a financial constraint c, and the 
player investing more won the patent 
• each subject played 80 trials of the same game with random re-
matching in each trial and feedback on investment levels, winning 
player and payoffs after each trial 
• on the individual level, an experience-weighted attraction learning 
model could explain subjects’ decisions 
• on the aggregate level, both the low-reward and the high-reward 
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subjects conformed to the predictions of the theoretical model, which 
emphasized the power of the mixed-strategy equilibrium concept 
Nieken and Sliwka (2010) 
• in their experimental setting, two agents with asymmetric positions 
(in the sense that one agent has a lead over the other in a tournament) 
simultaneously decide between a risky and a safe strategy 
• the winner of the tournament received a prize with a normalized value 
of one, while the loser’s utility is set to zero 
• the experimental design contained three different treatments in which 
the correlation coefficient of the risky strategies took values of 0, 1 
and 1/2 
• for each treatment, one session of 24 participants was conducted, and 
each participant played 5 trial periods plus 23 payoff-relevant periods 
with random re-matching in each period 
• in each period, subjects were endowed with a value drawn from a 
normal distribution; the safe strategy guaranteed the player a certain 
number of points, while the risky strategy was drawn from a normal 
distribution; the final number of points determined the winner and the 
loser, and feedback was given at the end of each period 
• the experimental results confirmed the key predictions of the model: 
if outcomes are uncorrelated, leaders choose the safe strategy more 
often than followers, but the opposite is true if the outcomes are 
perfectly correlated 
 
   
A good theory shows its power when it is confronted with experimental 
testing and when, time and time again, the theory produces reliable and 
consistent predictions. As one can see throughout Chapter 5, the opposite is 
true about the patent race literature (and thus I would like to underline that it 
will probably always remain “the patent race literature” and not a patent 
race theory). There are wild contradictions and extreme complexity within 
the theoretical literature (Chapters 5.1.1 to 5.1.5). The contrast between 
theory and experiments (Chapter 5.2.1) proves to be even starker and wipes 
out the results of the literature. The further experiments on patent races 
(Chapter 5.2.2) only increase the complexity and do not lead to any 
resolutions. However, a few excellent experimental studies can be found in 
this last subchapter. 
 
5. Patent Races and Their Problems 
136 
 
In this context, I would like to build on the results by Breitmoser et al. 
(2010), who pointed out that models are highly sensitive to parameter 
changes, while people are less context-sensitive. I will design a simple and 
intuitive game-theoretical model which includes important features of the 
patent race literature, and which also allows for large ranges of parameters 
under which theoretical predictions should be stable. I will then perform an 
experimental test of the model and verify the consistency of real-player 
decisions with the theory. This endeavor is the topic of Chapter 6.   
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CHAPTER 6 
Patent Races in the Experimental 
Laboratory 
“One cannot, without empirical evidence, deduce 
what understandings can be perceived in a nonzero-
sum game of maneuver any more than one can 
prove, by purely formal deduction, that a particular 
joke is bound to be funny.” 
 Schelling (1960) 
 
“Experimental economics seeks to establish a 
general theory linking economic factors, such as 
incentives, rules, and norms, to behavior.” 
 Camerer (2011) 
 
“In entrepreneurship many objects and 
relationships to be researched are dynamic or are 
embedded in a dynamic environment. These 
dynamics potentially threaten the reliability of 
ostensibly identified relationships in field studies. 
Only with experimental control, the factors of 
interest may be discriminated from “noise” of other 
rapidly changing factors.” 
 Schade and Burmeister-Lamp (2009) 
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The previous chapter showed how a large body of literature on patent races 
has so far yielded conflicting and unpredictable results. Small changes in 
model assumptions led to chaotic outcomes, experiments showed no support 
for theoretical predictions and theoretical papers either contradicted each 
other or analyzed incompatible research questions. However, there were 
exceptions to this inconclusive literature, in the form of the experiments 
based on own theoretical models, which I have described in Chapter 5.2.2. 
Most notably, the papers by Amaldoss and Jain (2002) as well as Nieken 
and Sliwka (2010) asked essential questions about the nature of two-player 
patent races, designed models based on established theoretical constructs 
and answered their research questions with the help of experimental tests. 
My experimental study from this chapter is closest to the research these 
authors performed, and sheds new light on the delicate subject of patent 
races. 
 
Therefore, I take a novel research approach by designing and experimentally 
testing a more intuitive game-theoretical model of a patent race. The starting 
point for my endeavor is the prestigious publication by Nalebuff (1988), in 
which a patent race is modelled similarly to a sailing competition7. In 
Chapter 6.1, I show my contribution to the existing literature and I adapt the 
example of a sailing race to match the realities of a model of R&D 
competition. I use a numerical equilibrium analysis to arrive to an 
appropriate parameterization of a patent race. Chapter 6.2 starts by showing 
the importance of experiments for economic research, then formulates 
propositions and hypotheses and finally presents the experimental design 
and implementation. Chapters 6.3 and 6.4 provide the econometric analysis 
and the results of the experiment.  
 
6.1. From a Sailing Race Puzzle to a Game-Theoretic Patent 
Race Model 
6.1.1. Nalebuff's (1988) Sailing Race  
Nalebuff (1988) describes the paradox situation encountered during the 
1983 America's Cup finals in sailboat racing. The American skipper Dennis 
                                                 
7 I am thankful to Avichai Snir for his suggestion to use Nalebuff's (1988) model.  
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Conner on board the Liberty boat was facing the Australian skipper John 
Bertrand who was in the lead of Australia II. The clear favorite of the race 
was the American: after the first four races of the Cup, Dennis Conner's 
Liberty was leading “3-1 in a best out of seven series” (idem). On the 
morning of the fifth race, as reported by The New York Times (September 
22, 1983), “cases of champagne had been delivered to Liberty's dock. And 
on their spectator yacht, the wives of the crew were wearing red-white-and-
blue shorts, in anticipation of having their picture taken after their husbands 
had prolonged the United States' winning streak to 132 years.” 
 
But, as Nalebuff describes, “it was not to be”. Liberty started with a leader 
advantage of 37 seconds when Australia II “jumped the gun and had to 
recross the starting line” (idem). Being at disadvantage from the start, the 
Australian skipper decided to take a risky strategy: it sailed “far to the left of 
the course in the hope of catching a wind shift”, while the American boat 
kept to the safer route on the right hand side of the sailing course (idem). As 
Nalebuff puts it, the “gamble paid off. The wind shifted five degrees in 
Australia II's favor and they won the race by one minute and forty-seven 
seconds. Two races later, Australia II won the series”. 
 
Nalebuff (1988) then suggests the main guidelines according to which one 
could apply the same principles in designing a patent race model. Two firms 
could be entrenched in a competition for the development of an R&D 
project. Only the first firm to complete the project is awarded a patent 
(which should ensure rich profits by capturing the market). One firm is six 
months ahead of its competitor. There are two strategies any firm can 
pursue, RISKY or SAFE. The strategy SAFE takes two years but is 
guaranteed to bring the developer to a successful completion. The strategy 
RISKY takes only one year, but there is a 50% chance that it will work, and 
a 50% chance that the R&D project will fail. According to Nalebuff's 
design, a firm that fails with the RISKY strategy has to return to the SAFE 
strategy and take an additional two years to complete. Each firm has the 
same two strategies to choose from: RISKY or SAFE. Any player's chance 
of success is independent of whether the competitor's RISKY strategy works 
or fails.  
 
Nalebuff explicitly states that there is no time discounting in this model. I 
found this assumption critical and I will modify it in the adapted patent race 
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model. Nalebuff also underlines one significant departure from the sailboat 
race, in that the two sailboats can observe each other, whereas firms in a 
patent race cannot. Indeed, in an R&D race each firm's move is independent 
and unobservable. Another important assumption made by Nalebuff, which 
I found reasonable and adopted in my later model, is that due to limited 
resources a firm cannot pursue both strategies simultaneously.  
 
Nalebuff asks several research questions about this patent race. Which 
strategy maximizes a player’s chance of winning? What will be the 
counterpart’s behavior? How important is secrecy about a player’s own 
decision? In the following, I will answer these questions as well as add new 
questions such as: how large should the prize be, whether one should 
include cost considerations and time discounting factors, or what happens if 
one varies the probability of success for the RISKY strategy. 
 
Overall, I found Nalebuff’s puzzle to be very appropriate for the purpose of 
designing an intuitive game-theoretical model that I can then test 
experimentally. The puzzle contains many of the features that were quite 
intensely scrutinized in the “traditional” patent race literature: 
• it is a game-theoretical model, which was endorsed by Fudenberg et 
al. (1983) and by Reinganum’s (1984) article; 
• it is a “tough” patent race: there is a single prize, a “winner-take-all” 
setting with one winner and one loser, as in Reinganum (1982), in 
the model on ε-preemption by Fudenberg (1983), as well as in Harris 
and Vickers (1987), Grossman and Shapiro (1987) and Park (1987). 
The toughness of the model implies that it is particularly suited to 
bring forward the competitive behavior of individuals; 
• it is an asymmetric game, which was the concern of a large stream of 
the patent race literature. Reinganum (1989) identifies four streams 
of this literature, which are described in Chapter 5.1.3. Out of these 
four streams, asymmetric races stand out as especially relevant for 
markets with an incumbent monopolist and a challenger, but have 
further implications for our general understanding of competitive 
behavior. Furthermore, asymmetric races represent the only stream 
of literature (out of the four streams identified by Reinganum, 1989) 
which has been tested experimentally. Reinganum (1989) showed 
that, in a deterministic innovation setting, the leader invests more 
than the follower, because the first actor knows she can keep her 
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market position for a long time, or forever. Differently, if innovation 
is stochastic, the role of the leader circulates around the industry, and 
thus followers have an incentive to invest and challenge the position 
of the leader. My experiment, based on Nalebuff’s puzzle, includes 
both a deterministic and a stochastic innovation setting, and 
therefore aims at core questions of the asymmetric patent race 
literature; 
• Cockburn and Henderson (1994) found it “a daunting prospect” to 
match the results of the theoretical patent race literature with 
empirical evidence. Since empirical evidence is nearly impossible to 
find for the standard patent race models, the only way to test the 
features and assumptions of such models is through experiments. 
 
The relevance of Nalebuff’s puzzle becomes even more obvious after I 
finish building the theoretical model at the end of Chapter 6.1. Even though 
I could not anticipate it ex ante based on the original puzzle, the final model 
reflects important research questions that come up in prestigious papers. In 
the following, I show my contribution to the existing literature:  
• the issue of experimentally testing asymmetric mixed-strategy 
equilibria in the context of a patent race, which I am also doing in 
this chapter, was performed in the experiment by Amaldoss and Jain 
(2002), which I have described in Chapter 5.2.2. However, my main 
departure from these authors’ paper is that they only model a mixed-
strategy equilibrium, while I have two different settings: a mixed-
strategy equilibrium and a pure-strategy equilibrium. A further 
departure is that Amaldoss and Jain work with different roles 
assigned to different subjects in the experiment: once a subject was a 
low-reward or a high-reward subject, the role remained unchanged 
throughout the entire experiment; in my dissertation, each subject 
assumed different roles – each subject had equal numbers of 
treatments in which she was a leader and a follower; 
• Nieken and Sliwka (2010) also theoretically and experimentally test 
an asymmetric tournament in which two agents have to decide 
between a safe and a risky strategy. As I stated in the previous 
chapter, Nieken and Sliwka also found three Nash equilibria that are 
similar to those I found in my theoretical analysis of this chapter:     
i) the leader chooses the safe strategy and the follower the risky 
strategy; ii) they both choose the risky strategy; iii) they both play a 
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mixed-strategy equilibrium. Differently, in my model there are only 
two possible equilibria, corresponding to equilibria i) and iii) of 
Nieken and Sliwka. Another different assumption by Nieken and 
Sliwka was to vary the correlations between the risky strategies – 
these correlations assumed values of 0, 1 and 1/2, respectively. In 
Nieken and Sliwka’s initial model, the performance indicators for 
the risky strategies are correlated with a correlation coefficient 0 ≤ ρ 
≤ 1. Such a coefficient does not exist in my experimental model 
from the current chapter, because in my model the players’ strategies 
are completely unobserved and simultaneous. In Nalebuff’s initial 
sailing model, the correlation between strategies was 1 in the sense 
that once the leader left the finishing line the follower could imitate 
or adapt to the leader’s strategy. In my adapted model, the 
correlation between the risky strategies of the two players is 0, in the 
sense that no player can see and copy the other’s strategy. This zero 
correlation was in fact endorsed by Nalebuff himself, because sailing 
and R&D races are essentially different through the information 
structure: in sailing, one can see and copy the other’s strategy; this is 
not possible with R&D races, because strategies are simultaneous 
and invisible. In other words, with R&D races it is not necessary to 
correlate the risky outcomes, because the strategies cannot be 
known, due to secrecy about the R&D strategy (to reinforce this 
point, see Tables 1.1 and 1.2 in Chapter 1 of this dissertation). 
However, Nieken and Sliwka varied this correlation to test how their 
equilibria change according to the correlation coefficient, and this 
was one of the main contributions from their paper. Therefore, my 
own contribution to the literature is important because I assume zero 
correlation between the risky strategies and I let vary other 
parameters which were not present in Nieken and Sliwka’s paper, or 
in other papers: I let vary the probability of success for the risky 
strategy throughout the entire possible interval [0;1] and I also 
introduce a time framework through the accumulation of interest 
rates, parameters which I present in Chapter 6.1.2. One should notice 
that I only use one parameter, which I will denote as p, the 
probability of success for the risky project, and p is the same for 
both players. However, this does not mean that there is any 
correlation between the players’ strategies, it only means that the 
players embark on similar R&D projects (with similar rates of 
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success), and therefore one can assume, in order to avoid extreme 
mathematical and experimental complexity, that these risky R&D 
projects have the same chance to succeed (expressed through 
parameter p); 
• in Bronars’ (1986) tournament, the front runner prefers a low risk 
strategy to protect her position, while an opponent who is behind in 
the competition is motivated to choose a riskier strategy in order to 
catch up. Similarly, Knoeber and Thurman (1994) find that players 
with a higher ability in a tournament will choose less risky strategies 
than players with a disadvantage; I found similar results in my 
experimental study; 
• Breitmoser et al. (2010) point out, just as I do in this dissertation, 
that the predictions of theoretical models are highly sensitive to 
small changes in the model parameters (Breitmoser et al. are 
referring to the predictions of perpetual race models developed by 
Aoki, 1991 and Hörner, 2004). However, when faced with an 
experimental setting, subjects’ strategies are far less sensitive. With 
patent races, people are simpler and more stable than economic 
models. I do find similar results and draw conclusions on somewhat 
similar lines in my experimental study.  
 
For all these reasons, Nalebuff's "simple" game-theoretical model has an 
appreciable depth which makes it suitable for mathematical and 
experimental testing. It pays respect to many critical assumptions of the 
patent race literature. At the same time it simplifies these assumptions and 
grasps the essence of patent race models in a way that would not be 
confusing for participants in an experiment. I therefore adopt Nalebuff's 
puzzle and build a patent race model upon it in the next chapter. 
 
6.1.2. Building a Novel Patent Race Model 
As in Nalebuff (1988), I look at a model of two firms entrenched in R&D 
competition with the goal of achieving a patent for a technology they are 
both developing. Only the first firm to reach successful development is 
awarded the patent. Firm 1 is six months ahead of Firm 2. I rename 
Nalebuff's strategy RISKY to strategy FAST, and denote strategy SAFE as 
strategy SLOW. The reason for this is that Nalebuff's original denomination 
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might confuse participants in our later experiment. In fact, Nalebuff's 
strategy SAFE only ensures that the technology is completed; it does not 
imply that the completing firm actually receives the patent and thus it is not 
“safe”. We now have strategy SLOW taking two years but leading to 
successful completion of the technology with probability 100%, and 
strategy FAST taking one year but leading to completion with varying 
probability p (instead of Nalebuff's fixed initial value of 50%). The prize for 
receiving the patent and capturing the market is denoted as x. Nalebuff does 
not model costs in his puzzle. However, since R&D competitions always 
imply significant investments, and costs are modeled in virtually every 
paper from the patent race literature, I introduced a cost parameter c. For 
reasons of simplicity, any strategy (SLOW or FAST) has the same cost c. 
This may sound like an over-simplification; however, it is reasonable to 
assume that the costs of a slower but secure technology development and of 
a faster but less secure development are not drastically different. Besides, 
having varying costs for the two strategies would make both our 
mathematical model and the experimental implementation overly complex. 
Moreover, a very similar assumption was used by Park (1987), who 
assumed that development costs are equal for a slow and safe strategy, as 
well as for a “jump” strategy (a risky strategy) with a small success rate.  
 
A further parameter not included in Nalebuff's design which I nonetheless 
regard as highly relevant is time discounting. Time starts at t = 0 for both 
firms, where t = 0 is the moment in which Firm 1 decides on the strategy it 
wants to pursue. Measuring time in years, we have t = 0.5 as the moment 
when Firm 2 makes its own decision about the strategy it will follow. As we 
can see below in Figure 6.1, the latest moment in time in which any activity 
can still unfold is t = 3. I therefore apply an accumulation factor A reflecting 
the influence of the interest rate r as a function of time t. I denote A = 1 + r 
as the annual accumulation, and At = (1 + r)t as the accumulation at point t 
in time. The accumulation is applied on all incurred costs and on the prize; 
the liquidation date is t = 3. Time point t = 0 marks the beginning of the 
game, and we consider both firms to have opportunity costs starting from 
this initial moment t = 0. This is based on the quite realistic assumption that 
both firms have money in their bank accounts, and both want to invest in an 
R&D project. I will later define the mathematical conditions under which 
the incentive to participate in the race exists for both firms. This 
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participation constraint is essential for the existence and stability of a Nash 
equilibrium.  
 
Figure 6.1. depicts the generalized decision tree. It contains all the possible 
outcomes of this game, depending on the players’ decisions, on nature’s 
moves, and on time. As in Nalebuff (and in the real world), each firm's 
move is independent and unobservable; secrecy about the other's move is of 
outmost importance. The symbols            and                  are used to show 
the disruption of activities by Firm 1 and Firm 2, either because any of them 
won the patent, or because it lost the race. 
 
According to Nalebuff's racing puzzle, if a firm chooses strategy FAST, and 
fails, it is obliged to return to the beginning of the race, and choose strategy 
SLOW. However, in my model this can only be practically applied for Firm 
1. The reason for this is that Firm 2 knows it has failed entirely if it fails 
with strategy FAST: no matter what it does, it has no more time to catch up 
with Firm 1. Therefore, Firm 2 only pays the cost of its strategy (its R&D 
cost) once. However, if Firm 1 fails with its FAST strategy at t = 1, it has no 
information about Firm 2's activities at that point in time. Thus, it is obliged 
to return to the beginning, choose strategy SLOW, and pay again its 
development cost.  
 
I describe the game according to Rasmusen’s (2001) definitions. This game 
has imperfect information (not every information set is a singleton), it is a 
game of uncertainty (Nature moves after the players move), it is symmetric8 
(no player has information different from the other players when she moves, 
or at the end nodes) and complete9 (nature does not move first, or its initial 
move is observed by every player). 
                                                 
8 With simultaneous decisions, no player has any informational advantages (Rasmusen, 
2001). 
9 Two kinds of games have complete but imperfect information: games with simultaneous 
moves, and games where, late in the game, Nature makes moves not immediately revealed 
to all players (idem). 
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Figure 6.1. Generalized Decision Tree 
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In the following, I give the definition intervals for the parameters in the 
model, and provide reasoning for their choice.  
 
x  the prize for the winner of the race, defined in the interval (0; 1] 
c the cost of any strategy, restricted to the interval [0; αx), where α is 
between [0; 1]  
p the probability of success for the FAST strategy, between [0; 1]. The 
most reasonable values for p can be found away from the boundaries 
of the interval definition  
A the accumulation factor, equal to 1 + r. I let the interest rate per 
annum r vary between the extreme values of [0%; 100%]. Therefore, 
A will vary between [1; 2] 
 
In the choice of the definition intervals, I let the parameters assume very 
extreme values. This is in order for our equilibrium analysis to be complete 
and cover all possible ranges of parameter values. The cost c is originally 
restricted only to being lower than the prize x. The probability of success for 
the FAST strategy, p, takes all possible values between zero and one; 
however, the extreme case p = 0 makes strategy FAST ineligible (leading to 
an equilibrium (SLOW, SLOW), in which Firm 1 always wins due to its 
time advantage of six months), while the extreme case p = 1 eliminates the 
stochastic element of the model (leading to an equilibrium (FAST, FAST) in 
which strategy SLOW is always dominated by strategy FAST). I therefore 
do not expect relevant equilibria (especially under a participation constraint) 
to be found anywhere near the interval boundaries [0; 1]. The choice of the 
accumulation factor A directly depends on the way I defined r, the annual 
interest rate. In investment and financing theory (Schmidt and Terberger, 
1997, p. 199-206), r expresses the same concept under different 
formulations: a) r it is the rate of return which stockholders claim as yield 
on their capital investment because they could achieve it as alternative 
return in a different application of funds; here, r is the alternative rate of 
return of the best achievable and comparable alternative; b) r is the minimal 
rate of return of a self-financed investment which protects the best interest 
of the stockholder; c) r is the discounting interest rate of the stock market; it 
is the interest rate at which actual and potential stock holders discount the 
advantages that are derived from the ownership of a share; d) r is the growth 
factor of a dividend Dt at time t, where Dt = D0 (1 + r)t. The main difference 
between the last two interpretations is that c) is viewed from time t = 0 
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looking into the future, while d) is viewed from time t looking into the past. 
For the experimental purposes of this chapter I will use interpretation d), 
because participating subjects will be paid in time t = 3. As stated before, I 
let r vary between 0% (reflecting a financial market with infinitely patient 
investors) and 100% (a market with very impatient investors).  
 
I denoted 21
,ss
iπ as the payoff of Firm i for a strategy set (s1, s2), where 
(s1, s2) ϵ {(SLOW, SLOW); (SLOW, FAST); (FAST, SLOW); (FAST, 
FAST)}. 
 
By following each ramification of the generalized decision tree in Figure 
6.1, one can compute the expected payoff for each player i and each 
decision set (s1, s2).  
 
 
For the strategy set (SLOW, SLOW), the expected payoffs are: 
cAAxSS 3,1 −=π   
cASS 5.2,2 −=π   
 
For the strategy set (SLOW, FAST), the expected payoffs are: 
))(1( 33,1 cAAxpcpA
FS −−+−=π  
cApcAxApFS 5.25.25.1,2 )1()( −−−=π  
 
For the strategy set (FAST, SLOW), the expected payoffs are: 
cAApcAxApSF ))(1()( 3232,1 +−−−=π  
))(1( 5.25.05.2,2 cAxApcpA
SF −−+−=π  
(6.1) 
(6.2) 
(6.3) 
(6.4) 
(6.5) 
(6.6) 
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For the strategy set (FAST, FAST), the expected payoffs are: 
++−−−= cAAppcAxApFF )()1()( 3232,1π  
))()(1)(1( 32 cAAxpp +−−−+  
−−−+−= )()1( 5.25.15.2,2 cAxAppcpA
FFπ  
cApp 5.2)1)(1( −−−  
 
After rearranging the equation terms according to the prize x and the cost c, 
I obtained the payoff matrix of the game, which is depicted in Table 6.1.  
 
 
Table 6.1. Payoff matrix of the game 
 
 Firm 2 
SLOW FAST 
Firm 
1 
SLOW 
cAAx 3−  cAxpA 3)1( −−  
cA 5.2−  cApxA 5.25.1 −  
FAST 
cApA
pxA
)1(2
2
−−
+
 
cApA
xppA
)1(
])1([
2
22
−−
+−+
 
cA
xpA
5.2
5.0 )1(
−
−
 
cA
xppA
5.2
5.1 )1(
−
−
 
 
 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
(6.7) 
(6.8) 
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6.1.3. Equilibrium Analysis 
Since each player has two strategies (SLOW or FAST) in her strategy set, 
there are only four strategy combinations that can be tested in the search for 
a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. First of all, I show why (SLOW, 
SLOW) and (FAST, SLOW) can never be Nash equilibria.  
 
(SLOW, SLOW) is a Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1951) in pure strategies if 
none of the players wants to deviate unilaterally from strategy set (SLOW, 
SLOW). In our game, this happens when the following conditions 
simultaneously hold: π1S,S > π1F,S and π2S,S > π2S,F. The conditions can be 
translated into the following system of equations: 
        



−>−
−−+>−
cApxAcA
cApAcAAx
5.25.15.2
223 )1(Apx
 
which easily simplifies to 
        



<
>−+−
0
0)1()1(
5.1 pxA
AcpxAp
 
From equation (6.12) it becomes clear that (SLOW, SLOW) can never be a 
Nash equilibrium, because A1.5px is never negative. In other words, Firm 2 
would always deviate from the (SLOW, SLOW) strategy combination and 
choose the FAST strategy.  
 
Analogously, we can test each other strategy combination for the existence 
of a Nash equilibrium. (FAST, SLOW) is a Nash equilibrium in pure 
strategies if π1
F,S > π1S,S and π2F,S > π2F,F simultaneously hold, which 
translates to: 
        



−−>−−
−>−−+
cAxppAcAxpA
cAAxcApApxA
5.25.15.25.0
322
)1()1(
)1(
 
and eventually simplifies as 
 (6.9) 
(6.10) 
(6.11) 
(6.12) 
(6.13) 
(6.14) 
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


<−
>−+−
01
0)1()1( 2
Ap
cpAxApA
 
Equations (6.15) and (6.16) can never hold at the same time. From (6.16) we 
have that Ap – 1 < 0, which implies that A (Ap – 1) x < 0 in equation (6.15). 
Furthermore, by definition p – 1 ≤ 0, and thus A2(p  – 1) c ≤ 0. Since the 
sum of a strictly negative number and a non-positive number cannot be a 
strictly positive number, equation (6.15) is contradicted by (6.16).  
 
Therefore, the strategy combination (FAST, SLOW) is never a Nash 
equilibrium.  
 
CASE 1   
(SLOW, FAST) as a Candidate For a Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium 
The problem of finding a set of parameters that will enforce (SLOW, FAST) 
as a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium must be broken down into two parts. 
First, we must prove the existence of an equilibrium from which no player 
wants to deviate unilaterally. Second, we must verify the participation 
constraints that will ensure that players actually have an incentive to enter 
the race (the existence of profit).  
 
(SLOW, FAST) will be an equilibrium if π1S,F > π1F,F and π2S,F > π2S,S, or: 
        



>
>−+−−
0
0)1()1(
5.1
2
pxA
cpApxpA
 
Furthermore, a player i will only enter the race if her payoff is larger than 
that of staying out (consistent with Rasmusen, 2001, p. 166). In this model, I 
normalized the outside option to zero. That is to say, if a player does not 
enter the race, she has nothing to lose, but also nothing to gain from the 
race, so her payoff for staying out is zero. The participation constraint for a 
player i is that πiS,F > 0, which leads to the following two equations for the 
two players: 
        



>−
>−−
0
0)1(
5.25.1
3
cApxA
cAxpA
 
(6.17) 
(6.18) 
(6.15) 
(6.16) 
(6.19) 
(6.20) 
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Since there is no closed-form solution to the system of equations (6.17)-
(6.20), I need to employ a graphical solution using the definition intervals 
for parameters x, c, A and p. I need to find out which sets of parameters x, c, 
A and p will simultaneously satisfy the four equations above and will 
therefore lead (SLOW, FAST) to become a Nash equilibrium in pure 
strategies. I will do so in the next section.  
 
CASE 2   
(FAST, FAST) as a Candidate For a Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium 
According to the same reasoning as in CASE 1, I first test for the existence 
of a Nash equilibrium. (FAST, FAST) will be an equilibrium if π1F,F > π1S,F 
and π2F,F > π2F,S. This is equivalent to: 
        




>
>−−++−
A
p
cpAxpAAp
1
0)1()1( 22
 
As in CASE 1, the participation constraint that makes sure that any player i 
enters the race is that πiF,F > 0, and so: 
        



>−−
>−−+−+
0)1(
0)1(])1([
5.25.1
222
cAxppA
cApAxppA
 
As before, I will search for parameters x, c, A and p that simultaneously 
satisfy equations (6.21)-(6.24) through the use of a graphical solution.  
 
CASE 3   
Nash Equilibrium in mixed strategies 
In a game lacking any pure-strategy equilibrium, there is always a mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1951). The concept of a mixed strategy 
has found good application in a variety of contexts such as price promotion 
models (Varian, 1980), R&D modeling (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985), 
bundled pricing (Lan and Kanafani, 1993), capacity choice (Deneckere and 
Peck, 1995), as well as product standardization (Farrell and Saloner, 1998). 
According to Harsanyi (1973), any mixed strategy mi of player i will be of 
(6.21) 
(6.22) 
(6.23) 
(6.24) 
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the form 
k
i
k
k
ii spm ∑= , where kip is the probability that the mixed 
strategy mi assigns to the pure strategy 
k
is .  
 
I denote in the game: 
 m1 the probability that player 1 plays strategy FAST 
 m2 the probability that player 2 plays strategy FAST 
 
In order to compute these probabilities, one first needs to find the condition 
under which player 1 is indifferent between strategies FAST and SLOW. 
That is, one needs to know when player 1's expected payoff EP1 is equal for 
any of the strategies. Sure enough, the condition will be a function of m2, the 
probability for selection of strategy FAST of the other player - player 2.  
This translates into: 
 EP1 = (1- m2) π1S,S + m2 π1S,F   = (1- m2) π1F,S + m2 π1F,F   
from which we can derive the probability that player 2 chooses FAST: 
 FSFFSFSS
SFSS
m ,
1
,
1
,
1
,
1
,
1
,
1
2 ππππ
ππ
−+−
−
=  
 xApp
cpAxApAm
])1[(
)1()1(
2
2
2 +−
−+−
=    
 
Analogously, player 2 is indifferent between FAST and SLOW if her 
expected payoff EP2 is the same for any strategy, or: 
 EP2 = (1-m1) π2S,S + m1 π2F,S   = (1-m1) π2S,F + m1 π2F,F   
which yields the probability that player 1 chooses FAST: 
 SFFFFSSS
FSSS
m ,
2
,
2
,
2
,
2
,
2
,
2
1 ππππ
ππ
−+−
−
=  
(6.25) 
(6.26) 
(6.27) 
(6.28) 
(6.29) 
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 21 1 App
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+−
=    
 
Interestingly, m2 varies with all parameters x, c, A and p, while m1 only 
varies with A and p. Differently, the probability with which player 1 chooses 
the FAST strategy is insensitive to variations of the prize x or the cost of any 
strategy c. The intuition behind this fact is that player 1’s strategy will be 
more stable than player 2’s strategy, as the former depends on fewer 
parameters. Indeed, the experimental findings will confirm this intuition.  
 
Just as it is the case with the pure-strategy equilibria, we will need 
participation constraints to ensure that both players have an incentive to 
enter the race. This happens if their expected payoffs EP1 and EP2 are both 
positive. Using (6.25), (6.27), (6.28) and (6.30) I derive the following set of 
equations that need to be satisfied simultaneously in order for the mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium to be stable against the outside option:  
[ ]
[ ]
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6.1.4. A Multi-Dimensional Graphical Solution  
In this chapter I will plot the pure and mixed-strategy equilibria under 
varying parameter configurations x, c, A and p. Based on graphical 
depictions of the equilibria, this chapter will show how robust the equilibria 
will be to changes in the parameters. In the next chapter I will then select 
plausible sets of parameters that can later be used in a laboratory 
experiment.  
(6.30) 
(6.31) 
(6.32) 
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The intuition behind this is the following belief, which I have expressed 
before: traditional theoretical patent race models, such as the ones described 
in Chapter 5.1, have failed to be confirmed experimentally because of their 
stiff parameters and narrow equilibria. These models are too complicated 
and inflexible for the human mind to grasp, or the human intuition to feel. I 
draw once more on Breitmoser et al. (2010), who said that traditional patent 
race models are too sensitive to parameter changes, while subjects’ 
decisions are less sensitive. Other experimental studies which developed 
their own intuitive theoretical models (those described in Chapter 5.2.2) 
obtained excellent results which reunited theory and experiment.  
 
In the model presented in this dissertation, I will seek to find the boundaries 
of each equilibrium depending on varying parameter sets, and to pick 
parameters that would be easy to process for human participants in an 
experiment. Furthermore, the parameters I pick will have to be as far away 
as possible from the equilibrium boundaries, and as deep as possible inside 
the equilibrium chart. The reason for this is that behavior should become 
unstable around the equilibrium boundaries, and more stable away from 
them. Say I selected two sets of parameters that are both close to the 
equilibrium boundaries, where there is a clash of the equilibria (and 
therefore a clash of the best strategies). In such points, only a machine can 
compute the right equilibrium and the right strategy. But with widely 
defined equilibrium paths, and parameter sets that are representative and 
help distinguish between the equilibria, one might expect humans to do a 
good job as well in choosing the payoff-maximizing strategy.  
 
So I solved this five-dimensional model by constructing three parameter sets 
with a varying relationship between x and c. First of all, I normalized the 
prize to x = 1. In the experiment, this could be 1,000,000 Taler, which 
carries an emotional value for human participants of the type “Who wants to 
be a millionaire?”. I let c vary from very small to unacceptably large. In the 
following, c will assume three values: 0.05, 0.25 and 0.45. In the 
experiment, the cost c of any strategy would then be: 50,000 Taler, 250,000 
Taler and 450,000 Taler. 
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PARAMETER SET 1   
Low Cost (x = 1, c = 0.05) 
The following graphical representations have been programmed using the 
software Wolfram Mathematica 9.0.  
 
Figures 6.2. and 6.3. show graphically the equilibrium charts for the Nash 
equilibria in pure strategies (SLOW, FAST) and (FAST, FAST) depending 
on p and A. Figure 6.4. shows the equilibrium chart for the Nash equilibrium 
in mixed strategies (m1, m2).  
 
 
Figure 6.2. (SLOW, FAST) is a pure-strategy equilibrium only for the areas 
where all three graphs are visible simultaneously. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Condition (6.17)                 π1S,F > 0                          π2S,F > 0             
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Figure 6.3. (FAST, FAST) is a pure-strategy equilibrium only for the areas 
where all three graphs are visible simultaneously. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Conditions (6.21), (6.22)                     π1F,F > 0         π2F,F > 0 
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Figure 6.4. (m1, m2) is a mixed-strategy equilibrium only for the areas 
where all four graphs are visible simultaneously. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   m1                   m2              EP1             EP2 
 
 
By rotating the three graphical representations from Figures 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 in 
Wolfram Mathematica, I could obtain a very precise graphical depiction for 
the boundaries of each of the three equilibria. That is, one can know under 
which parameter configurations p and A each equilibrium will begin and 
cease to exist. This is done in Figure 6.5, which combines and flattens all 
the three  3-dimensional graphs cases seen above on to a 2-dimensional plot 
varying only on p and A. In other words, one can see the projection of the  
3-dimensional equilibria on the horizontal plane defined by p and A. 
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Figure 6.5. The three equilibria: (SLOW, FAST); (FAST, FAST) and     
(m1, m2) as bi-dimensional areas depending on p and A.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The boundary condition which separates equilibrium (FAST, FAST) from 
(m1, m2) is:  
 
A
p 1=  
The boundary condition which separates equilibrium (m1, m2) from (SLOW, 
FAST) is: 
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PARAMETER SET 2   
Medium Cost (x = 1, c = 0.25) 
Similarly to Parameter Set 2, Figures 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8 show the equilibrium 
charts for the Nash equilibria in pure and mixed strategies (SLOW, FAST), 
(FAST, FAST) and (m1, m2) as functions of p and A.  
 
Notice from Figure 6.7 that now the pure-strategy equilibrium (FAST, 
FAST) no longer exists, because there are only two graphs left: the red one 
representing the combined conditions (6.21) and (6.22), and the blue one 
showing that Firm 1 still finds it profitable to enter the race. However, the 
green graph has disappeared, showing that the participation constraint           
π2
F,F > 0 is no longer satisfied, so there is no incentive left for Firm 2 to 
enter the race. The increase in the cost of R&D from 0.05 to 0.25 has made 
this equilibrium too unstable.  
 
Figure 6.6. (SLOW, FAST) is a pure-strategy equilibrium only for the areas 
where all three graphs are visible simultaneously. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Condition (6.17)                 π1S,F > 0                          π2S,F > 0 
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Figure 6.7. (FAST, FAST) is a pure-strategy equilibrium only for the areas 
where all three graphs are visible simultaneously. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Conditions (6.21), (6.22)     π1F,F > 0                          π2F,F > 0 
 
Figure 6.8. (m1, m2) is a mixed-strategy equilibrium only for the areas 
where all four graphs are visible simultaneously. 
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Figure 6.9. The two remaining equilibria: (SLOW, FAST) and (m1, m2) as 
bi-dimensional areas depending on p and A.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The boundary condition which separates equilibrium (m1, m2) from (SLOW, 
FAST) is: 
 0)1(25.0)1( 2 =−+−− pAppA  
 
PARAMETER SET 3   
High Cost (x = 1, c = 0.45) 
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Figure 6.10. (SLOW, FAST) is a pure-strategy equilibrium only for the 
areas where all three graphs are visible simultaneously. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Condition (6.17)                 π1S,F > 0                          π2S,F > 0 
Figure 6.11. (m1, m2) is a mixed-strategy equilibrium only for the areas 
where all four graphs are visible simultaneously. No such area exists. 
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Figure 6.12. The only remaining equilibrium: (SLOW, FAST) as bi-
dimensional area depending on p and A.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1.5. Parameter Selection 
I believe that the selection of parameters for a successful experimental 
implementation must take into account the following considerations: 
• the accumulation factor A should not be too large. Values between 
[1; 1.25] are recommended, corresponding to an interest rate r of up 
to 25% per annum. I took this high rate not because it could ever be 
a reasonable central bank interest rate in any stable economy. But I 
    A 
0.5 1.0 0.0 p 
1.0 
    1.5 
  2.0  
Pure-strategy  
equilibrium 
(SLOW, FAST) 
6. Patent Races in the Experimental Laboratory 
165 
 
consider it the opportunity cost of other profitable and patentable 
foregone R&D projects (on the lines of Schmidt and Terberger,  
1997, which I have discussed in Chapter 6.1.2). For example, Firm 
2, which finds itself at disadvantage in the patent race, may choose 
to produce something altogether different, and thus the high interest 
rate represents the opportunity cost of the outside option;  
• the recommended values for A between [1; 1.25] imply that we can, 
for the sake of choosing realistic parameters, rule out the (FAST, 
FAST) equilibrium altogether. This equilibrium needs to have the 
fulfilled condition 
A
p 1>  (equation 6.22), and that would need        
p > 0.8, a probability too high to keep enabled the stochastic 
component of the game. Furthermore, I have an additional reason to 
eliminate the (FAST, FAST) equilibrium. One can see that it only 
exists for a very low cost of c = 0.05 in Parameter Set 1, and it fails 
to exist for a medium cost of c = 0.25 in Parameter Set 2. I consider 
that in Parameter Set 1, the cost-prize ratio is too low to express 
R&D investments. Usually, in patent races the R&D costs are also 
quite significant relative to the size of the prize. For example, I 
calculated the average ratio of cost to the prize in the experiment by 
Zizzo (2002) based on his experimental results: average investment 
per subject and round was 4.06 units; with a quadratic cost function 
and 16.1 rounds played by an average subject I obtained a total mean 
cost of 4.062 x 16.1 = 265.38 units, with a prize of 1000 units. This 
results in a cost-prize ratio of about 0.26, which is strikingly close to 
the cost-prize ratio generated by my medium cost parameter c = 0.25 
(provided that only one strategy is played, and not both);  
• one can see in Figure 6.12 that the introduction of a high cost            
c = 0.45 from Parameter Set 3 almost completely destroys all 
equilibria (by violating the participation constraint). The remaining 
trace of the pure-strategy equilibrium (SLOW, FAST) is so dismal 
and unstable that it would make little sense to formulate normative 
predictions based on it and test them experimentally. 
 
Due to the above-mentioned reasons, I chose Parameter Set 2 with a 
medium-sized cost of c = 0.25 and a prize of x = 1. The next required step  
was to decide on the size of p and A. I looked at Figure 6.9 and took into 
account the considerations mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 6.1.4: that 
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participants in an experiment should be faced with simple parameters and 
that those parameters should be situated well inside the equilibrium chart 
(not close to the equilibrium boundaries). From the myriad of options for p, 
two values stood out: a value of p = 1/2 would generate a mixed-strategy 
equilibrium, a value of p = 1/3 would generate a pure-strategy equilibrium 
(SLOW, FAST); both values are very easy to understand by participants and 
they are quite well in the middle of the equilibrium chart, or away from the 
boundaries. I employed the same criteria for the selection of values for the 
accumulation factor A = 1 + r. Participants would surely cope well with an 
interest rate of r = 0% and to one of r = 10% (meaning A = 1 or A = 1.1). 
Again, these values are stable inside the equilibrium chart.  
 
My final selection of parameters is visible in Figure 6.13: I will test a 
mixed-strategy equilibrium versus a pure-strategy equilibrium and vary the 
accumulation factor. These four data points constitute the basis of the 
experimental design, which I describe in Chapter 6.2.2. 
 
 
Figure 6.13. Parameter selection for p and A, given c = 0.25 and x = 1  
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6.2. Building the Patent Race Experiment 
6.2.1. Experiments as Research Method  
Laboratory experimental economics have been an important part of 
economic research for more than half a century. Laboratory experiments 
have been used, among others, to “investigate resource allocation issues in 
oligopolistic markets, public goods provision, and various auction market 
institutions” (Isaac and Reynolds, 1992). In laboratory experiments, real 
people make economic decisions for money and the quality of their 
decisions influence people’s payoffs. “Behavioral rules for decision-making 
are not imposed ex ante, but are whatever flesh and blood human beings 
choose to do” (Isaac and Reynolds, 1992).  
 
One of the building blocks of experimental economics is the induced value 
theory introduced by Smith (1976). He writes that “since economic theories 
always deal with certain alleged behavioral tendencies in isolation, the 
experimental laboratory is uniquely well suited for testing the validity of 
such theories” (idem). Smith also points out that all “characteristics of real 
world behavior” (e.g. “self-interest”, “interdependent tastes, risk aversion”) 
“arise naturally, indeed inevitably, in experimental settings” (idem). 
According to his induced value theory, control can be obtained in 
experimental studies by “using a reward structure to induce prescribed 
monetary value on actions” (idem), which was later called “incentive 
compatibility”. Smith (1976) developed three principles that ensure 
experimental control: i) monotonicity (a higher payoff is preferred to a 
lower one); ii) salience (subjects’ awareness that the quality of their 
decisions will influence payoffs); iii) dominance (nothing is more important 
for the respondent’s utility than the experimental payoffs).  
 
Schade (2005) compares field studies with economic experiments and points 
out that “dynamics are threatening the reliability of the different kinds of 
field studies; at the same time only performance dependent payments used 
in economic experiments may lead respondents to react sensitively to 
tradeoffs and incentives”. A similar idea is expressed by Ariely (2008, p. 
xxi): “Why experiments? Life is complex, with multiple forces 
simultaneously exerting their influences on us, and this complexity makes it 
difficult to figure out exactly how each of these forces shapes our behavior. 
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For social scientists, experiments are like microscopes or strobe lights. They 
help us slow human behavior to a frame-by-frame narration of events, 
isolate individual forces, and examine those forces carefully and in more 
detail. They let us test directly and unambiguously what makes us tick”. 
 
In other words, field research in dynamic environments encounters the 
drawback that most relationships between analyzed variables change very 
rapidly. Therefore, field research “faces the challenge to discriminate 
relatively stable factors from the ‘noise’ of the couple of dozens of other 
rapidly changing factors”, while economic experiments “are one potential 
means to overcome this ‘dynamism obstacle’” (Schade, 2005). In such 
experiments, ‘noise’ and changing influences are reduced, the dynamic 
reality is not directly dealt with, the researcher obtains “control over the 
experimental situation” and “results may become replicable and 
generalizable to some extent” (idem). For these reasons, “economic 
experiments may also be used to compare competing theories” and they 
“help to modify existing and to build new theory” (idem).  
 
Schade (2005) also compares the use of professionals versus students as 
subjects in experimental studies and notes that “experimental economists 
often judge it advantageous to experiment with students”. He points out to 
studies in which professionals were not able to adapt to the experimental 
situation: they did not react to the opportunities and incentives in the 
experiment, but instead applied previous knowledge about the decision 
situation. Differently, students who were mostly inexperienced novices 
adapted better to the experimental incentives. Lévesque and Schade (2005) 
underline that experts, as opposed to novices, are more exposed to certain 
decision biases (e.g. overconfidence). 
 
In the laboratory controlled, incentive-compatible experiment, the three 
principles of monotonicity, salience and dominance are fulfilled. My subject 
pool consists mostly of students, following Schade’s (2005) 
recommendation that “the incentives and tradeoffs faced in the decision 
when to exploit a business opportunity may well be studied in an incentive-
compatible experiment with students”. Since my theoretical model is 
especially designed to analyze competitive behavior in a patent race model, 
I expect such behavior to shine out through the experiment with students.  
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6.2.2. Experimental Design and Implementation 
At the end of Chapter 6.1.5, I selected two sets of parameters for p and A 
(generating four parameter combinations) and gave plausible reasons for 
this choice. I let the prize x = 1 and the cost of any strategy c = 0.25 stay 
constant during the experiment, and I transform them into Taler values with 
a psychological importance for participants: the prize x becomes 1,000,000 
Talers and the cost c is equal to 250,000 Talers. The probability of success 
with strategy FAST, p, is varied between the two values 1/3 (reflecting the 
pure-strategy equilibrium SLOW, FAST) and 1/2 (leading to the mixed-
strategy equilibrium m1, m2). The accumulation factor is varied between     
A = 1 (r = 0%, no accumulation) and A = 1.1 (r = 10%, accumulation). 
Furthermore, I want any subject who participates in the experiment to be 
confronted with all four parameter combinations, and to be confronted with 
the two possible roles: that of Leader and that of Follower in the race. The 
variation of the three variables (p, A and role) generated 23 = 8 settings, 
which are depicted in Table 6.2.  
 
 
Table 6.2. Eight experimental settings S1-S8 
 Setting  Role  
Equili-
brium  
Probability of 
success for 
strategy FAST  Accumulation  
Setting 1  Leader  Pure  p = 1/3  No Accumulation  
Setting 2  Leader  Mixed  p = 1/2  No Accumulation  
Setting 3  Leader  Pure  p = 1/3  Accumulation (r=10%)  
Setting 4  Leader  Mixed  p = 1/2  Accumulation (r=10%) 
Setting 5  Follower  Pure  p = 1/3  No Accumulation  
Setting 6  Follower  Mixed  p = 1/2  No Accumulation  
Setting 7  Follower  Pure  p = 1/3  Accumulation (r=10%) 
Setting 8  Follower  Mixed  p = 1/2  Accumulation (r=10%) 
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In order to test if subjects follow the pure-strategy and especially the mixed-
strategy equilibrium, I need each setting to be played over several rounds.    
I decided that a number of seven rounds for each of the eight settings S1-S8, 
totaling 56 rounds per subject, would be appropriate because it allows for 
the computation of both mixed-strategy and pure-strategy equilibria without 
making the experiment too long for participants. For example, if a subject 
decides to choose strategy FAST in four out of the seven rounds of Setting 
2, one can state that the subject played a mixed-strategy equilibrium with a 
probability of choosing strategy FAST equal to 4 / 7 = 57.14 %. Similarly, if 
a subject chooses strategy FAST in none of the seven rounds of Setting 1, 
one can say that the subject played the pure-strategy equilibrium (SLOW, 
FAST).  
 
The patent race experiment was programmed using the software z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007) and was carried out in July 2012 in the experimental 
laboratory of the School of Business and Economics of the Humboldt-
Universität zu Berlin. Subjects were mostly students (87,5%) from 23 
different fields of study (n = 48 subjects, with 36 female and 12 male 
participants). I ran four sessions, each with twelve subjects matched into six 
pairs. Subjects were told that they were going to play a competition game 
against a fixed opponent. Learning was not possible since there was no 
feedback about the outcomes of previous rounds throughout the experiment. 
Each subject played 56 rounds and the order of the eight settings was 
randomly varied from one round to the next. Respondents were informed 
that 14 rounds (seven rounds as Leaders and seven rounds as Followers) 
would be randomly selected by the computer at the end of the experiment. 
The detailed written experimental instructions describing the decision 
situation and the parameters of the game were handed out to the participants 
in German. An English translation of the instructions is available in 
Appendix 6A of this dissertation. The instructions were read out by the 
experimenter and then presented again on the computer screen. Subjects had 
to correctly answer eight comprehension questions before they could make 
their 56 decisions. Afterwards, I measured subjects' risk attitudes using the 
procedure by Holt and Laury (2002) and I gathered their demographic 
information. The average duration for a session was of approximately 80 
minutes. On average, 45 minutes were spent on making the actual 56 
decisions. Subjects earned € 14.54 on average, with a minimum of € 11.40 
and a maximum of € 20.20. 
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6.2.3. Propositions and Hypotheses 
In this chapter I first use the normative game-theoretic model which was 
completed at the end of Chapter 6.1 in order to derive benchmark 
propositions about how subjects should play. These propositions show us 
what strategies a perfectly rational economic agent would choose, under the 
given parameters. This approach is based on assumption that individuals are 
able to formally optimize on economic variables.  
 
Second, I formulate behavioral hypotheses, based on the framework of 
bounded rationality developed by Simon (1957). Bounded rationality is the 
idea that decision makers seek a satisfactory solution rather than the 
mathematically optimal solution, because their rationality is limited by the 
information they have, by cognitive gaps and by the finite amount of time 
available to them for making a decision. Simon coined this phenomenon 
“satisficing”. Gigerenzer and Selten (2002, p.14) point out that there is more 
to Simon’s approach than just “satisficing”, and that aspiration levels (e.g. 
the aspiration of a decision maker to achieve a certain profit on a certain 
market) are an essential feature of bounded rationality. Decision makers 
have certain aspirations which are dynamically adjusted to the situation: 
aspirations are raised if it is easy to accomplish them, and lowered if 
satisfactory outcomes are hard to acquire. Todd and Gigerenzer (2003) find 
three interpretations for the concept of bounded rationality: i) “optimization 
under constraints”; ii) “erroneous deviations from a rational standard”;            
iii) “a fit between the structures of the mind and the environment” in the 
form of “simple, bounded, heuristics that fill up the mind’s adaptive 
toolbox” (idem). Lévesque and Schade (2005) experimentally study 
intuitive optimization and point out the last two approaches ii) and iii) best 
account for the bounded rationality phenomenon. They suggest that humans 
make errors in some situations, but perform better than expected in others.    
 
Based on the first approach, the homo economicus approach, which assumes 
perfect rationality, I formulated two benchmark propositions which were 
derived from the equilibrium predictions elicited in Chapter 6.1. Proposition 
1 expresses the pure-strategy equilibrium SLOW, FAST. Proposition 2 
implements the selected parameters to compute a mixed-strategy 
equilibrium. I used equations (6.27) and (6.30) from Chapter 6.1.3 to 
calculate the probabilities of play for strategy FAST, denoted as m1 and m2.  
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Proposition 1 
“Given a low probability of success for strategy FAST p = 1/3 
the Leader will play FAST with probability 0% 
and the Follower will play FAST with probability 100%.” 
 
Proposition 2 
“Given a medium probability of success for strategy FAST p = 1/2 
without accumulation (r = 0%) 
the Leader will play FAST with probability 66% 
and the Follower will play FAST with probability 83% 
with accumulation (r = 10%) 
the Leader will play FAST with probability 71% 
and the Follower will play FAST with probability 81%.” 
 
Based on the second approach, the approach of bounded rationality, I 
assumed that individuals would employ heuristics and simple dynamics in 
their decisions. I was able to hypothesize the application of two heuristics in 
my patent race experiment. The first of these heuristics, and the theoretical 
basis for Hypothesis 1, is the extremeness aversion by Tversky and 
Simonson (1992), according to which individuals have a tendency to stay 
away from alternatives that are described by extreme combinations of 
characteristics. A second possible behavioral pattern, the basis for 
Hypothesis 2, is represented by anchoring-and-adjustment heuristics (Slovic 
and Lichtenstein, 1971). Individuals select a certain initial value, called the 
anchor, and later adjust in the direction suggested by the decision situation. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) say that "different starting points yield 
different estimates, which are biased toward the initial values’’ (p. 1128). 
 
Hypothesis 1 
(Extremeness aversion) 
“If given the opportunity, individuals will mix between 
strategies, even if the rational choice is to play a pure strategy.”  
 
Hypothesis 2 
(Anchoring-and-adjustment heuristics) 
“Individuals' first decision situation will influence their 
subsequent decisions.”  
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6.3. Econometric Analysis 
In this chapter I compare the normative predictions derived from the 
equilibrium analysis with the actual decisions made by subjects in the 
experiment, and I employ statistical methods to test whether those 
predictions had a significant effect on subjects’ choices. Furthermore, I 
analyze the distributions of subjects’ deviations from equilibrium play and I 
provide explanations for these deviations. Finally, I verify whether subjects 
employed anchoring-and-adjustment heuristics and I describe why they did 
or did not. By running the econometric analysis, I also test the validity of 
the benchmark propositions and the hypotheses formulated in the previous 
chapter.  
6.3.1. Normative Predictions and Subjects’ Decisions 
In the first part of the analysis I present descriptive statistics about subjects’ 
predicted percentages of play for strategy FAST, their actual mean choices, 
their deviations from normative predictions and the significance levels of 
those deviations. This is done in Table 6.3. 
 
 
Table 6.3. Comparing benchmark propositions with actual play 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Significance levels: *** p < 0.1%; ** p < 1%; * p < 5% 
 
One can conclude from Table 6.3 that people behave surprisingly close to 
the equilibrium predictions. All deviations from optimal play, except one, 
6. Patent Races in the Experimental Laboratory 
174 
 
are small (not larger than 16% in absolute values) and most of them are 
significant or highly significant. There is only one large and significant 
deviation, for the settings in which the Followers should have played a pure-
strategy equilibrium but clearly played mixed strategies (the deviation being 
-50% from optimality).  
 
In the next part of my analysis I run regressions in order to explain what 
factors influence the dependent variable Setting Decision. This variable 
expresses the percentage of FAST choices made by each subject in any of 
the settings S1-S8. It means that the variable includes 48 subjects x 8 
settings = 384 data points. Also, the data points are correlated for each of 
the 48 subjects, and thus I need to employ a panel econometric model to 
estimate the influence of independent variables on the Setting Decision.       
I build hierarchical regressions, starting with one predictor and 
incorporating several others step by step. The essential predictor to start 
with is the normative prediction, which I called Setting Prediction.  
 
When working with panel data, one has to find out whether a fixed-effects 
or a random-effects regression model is appropriate to estimate the data. 
Whenever time-invariant variables (e.g. age, gender, risk attitude) are 
included in the regression, the decision is quite easy: in fixed-effects models 
all time-invariant variables are omitted, and therefore a random-effects 
model should be employed. Even though in all my later regressions I will 
use time-invariant predictors, in the first regression I am using only Setting 
Decision as dependent variable and Setting Prediction as predictor. Since 
none of them is time-invariant (but instead they vary with time), the best 
way to decide between a fixed-effects and a random-effects model is to 
estimate both and to run a Hausman test which gives guidance on the better 
model.  
 
I used the software Stata/IC 12 to produce all regressions provided in this 
chapter and in Appendices 6B-6C. Tables 6.4 and 6.5 show the estimators 
for the fixed-effects and the random-effects models, respectively. Table 6.6 
contains the results of the Hausman test. One can see that the estimates of 
the coefficients and the standard errors of both models are almost equal. The 
Hausman test suggests that there are no systematic differences between the 
two models’ coefficients. In order to keep the consistency with my later 
regressions, I select the random-effects model as the relevant one.  
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Table 6.4. Fixed-effects regression. Dependent variable: Setting Decision. 
Independent variable: Setting Prediction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Significance level: *** p < 0.1% 
 
 
Table 6.5. Random-effects regression. Dependent variable: Setting 
Decision. Independent variable: Setting Prediction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Significance level: *** p < 0.1% 
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Table 6.6. Hausman test comparing the fixed-effects and the random-effects 
model 
 
 
 
 
The main result of the selected random-effects model depicted in Table 6.5 
is that the normative predictions did have a positive and highly significant 
effect on subjects’ actual decisions in each setting. This result is also in line 
with that from Table 6.3, where we saw that the deviations from optimality 
are significant but mostly rather small. This means that people managed to 
intuitively behave in the direction of the equilibrium predictions, even 
though it was impossible for them to compute the optimal solution 
mathematically (as this would have implied them to do the full analysis of 
Chapter 6.1 in a matter of seconds). One can see in Table 6.5 that the factor 
Setting Prediction explained about 25% of the variation in Setting Choice 
(expressed through the overall R-squared).  
 
For the sake of completion, I would like to explain what the values of the F 
test in the fixed-effects model, the Wald chi in the random-effects model, 
sigma_u, sigma_e and rho represent. The F test and the Wald chi are values 
which are compared to certain thresholds and determine the significance 
level of the regression. In order to understand the other concepts one has to 
know what a panel econometric model does. It equates the values of the 
dependent variable with the sum of the following parts: i) a constant term;   
ii) observed time-variant factors (here, the normative predictions);              
iii) observed time-invariant factors (here, age, gender, risk attitude); iv) an 
unobserved individual specific effect (e.g. preparation, intelligence, ability); 
v) an unobserved random error term (a residual). The sigma_u and sigma_e 
are estimates of the standard deviation of the individual specific effect and 
of the error term, respectively. Rho is the share of the estimated variance of 
the overall error accounted for by the individual specific effect.  
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I also wanted to test for the influence of other variables such as gender, age, 
the interaction between gender and role (Leader or Follower) as well as risk 
attitude on the dependent variable Setting Choice. In Appendix 6B, I built 
the corresponding hierarchical regressions and incorporated the variables 
step by step. None of these variables had any significant effect on the 
dependent variable. For the variable “risk attitude”, I had to eliminate about 
25% of all data, because subjects violated the utility axioms from Holt and 
Laury (2002) and therefore their risk attitudes were inconsistent. I chose the 
most relevant regression, which is depicted in Table 6.7.   
 
 
Table 6.7. Random-effects regression. Dependent variable: Setting 
Decision. Independent variables: Setting Prediction, Female, Age, Female * 
Role (the interaction of Female and Role)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Significance level: *** p < 0.1%. Data coding: Female = (1 if female, 0 if 
male); Role = (1 if Leader, 0 if Follower). 
 
The main result from Table 6.7 reinforces the previous result from Table 
6.5: the only significant factors influencing subjects’ decisions were the 
normative predictions, while all other variables had no significant effect. 
The percentage of variance explained remained almost the same around 
25%. People’s behavior was therefore guided by equilibrium play.  
Setting Decision 
Setting Prediction 
Female 
*** 
Constant 
Age 
Female * Role 
6. Patent Races in the Experimental Laboratory 
178 
 
6.3.2. Subjects’ Deviations From Equilibrium Strategies 
In this chapter I focus on finding explanations for subjects’ deviations from 
equilibrium play. I do this by running new hierarchical regressions on the 
dependent variable “absolute deviation from equilibrium” and by analyzing 
the distribution of deviations in the experiment. First I must explain why I 
chose the absolute deviation and not the actual deviation. The Deviation is 
defined as the Setting Decision minus the Setting Prediction. The Absolute 
Deviation is the absolute value of Deviation. In half of the experiment (in all 
settings with p = 1/3, or pure-strategy equilibria SLOW, FAST), the Leader 
is constrained to having only positive deviations (because her equilibrium 
prediction is 0%), while the Follower is constrained to having only negative 
deviations (her equilibrium prediction is 100%). These constraints make the 
variable Deviation less appropriate to study in the regression. In order to 
have a clean account of which subjects deviated at all from the equilibrium 
(no matter in which direction), I used the dependent variable Absolute 
Deviation.  
 
I ran a first regression with only one predictor, the variable Role (Leader or 
Follower). I made again the choice between a fixed-effects and a random-
effects model by using the Hausman test, which suggested no systematic 
difference between coefficients. Like in the previous chapter, I therefore 
selected the random-effects model, which is depicted in Table 6.8. The 
fixed-effects model and the Hausman test can be found at the beginning of 
Appendix 6C. The predictor Role had a highly significant negative effect on 
the dependent variable Absolute Deviation (p < 0.1%). This means that 
Followers deviated significantly more, and Leaders less from the 
equilibrium predictions. The amount of variance explained (the overall R-
squared) was of 6.75%. 
 
I then ran hierarchical regressions, incorporating step by step the following 
variables as predictors: the success probability of strategy FAST, the 
accumulation, gender, the interaction between gender and role, age and risk 
attitude. All these hierarchical regressions can be found in Appendix 6C.      
I selected the most relevant regression and represented it in Table 6.9. None 
of the newly incorporated predictors had any significant effect on the 
Absolute Deviation. The only significant predictor remained the variable 
Role;  however,  it appears that the inclusion of many new variables affected  
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Table 6.8. Random-effects regression. Dependent variable: Absolute 
Deviation. Independent variable: Role  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Significance level: *** p < 0.1%. Data coding: Role = (1 if Leader, 0 if 
Follower). 
 
Table 6.9. Random-effects regression. Dependent variable: Absolute 
Deviation. Independent variables: Role, Success Probability of FAST, 
Accumulation, Female, Female * Role, Age  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Significance level: * p < 5%. Data coding: Role = (1 if Leader, 0 if 
Follower); Female = (1 if female, 0 if male). 
* 
*** 
*** 
Absolute Deviation 
Role 
Constant 
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the significance level of variable Role, which deteriorated from the 0.1% 
level in the first regression to the 5% level in the regression from Table 6.9. 
The R-squared only increased marginally from 6.75% to 7.37%. 
 
The main conclusion from the analysis of the Absolute Deviation remains 
that Followers deviated more, and Leaders less, from normative predictions. 
To explain why, I look at the overall distribution of deviations for all 
subjects and all settings, and then separately for Leaders and Followers.  
 
 
Figure 6.14. Distribution of deviations from normative predictions for all 
subjects and all settings 
 
 
No. of observations 384 
Mean -0.154 
Median 0 
Mode 0 
Standard deviation 0.383 
Skewness -0.581 
Kurtosis -0.041 
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Figure 6.14. shows the histogram of deviations from equilibrium predictions 
for all 48 subjects and all 8 settings, amounting to a total of 384 
observations. Figures 6.15. and 6.16. show the distributions of deviations for 
Leaders and Followers, respectively. At first glance, it appears as if the 
deviations for all settings and for Leaders have a shape somewhat 
resembling the normal distribution. Not so for the deviations of Follower 
settings  only, which more resemble the uniform distribution. The 
unimportant 
 
Figure 6.15. Distribution of deviations from normative predictions for all 
subjects as Leaders only 
 
 
 
No. of observations 192 
Mean -0.013 
Median 0 
Mode 0 
Standard deviation 0.317 
Skewness -0.322 
Kurtosis 0.777 
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analysis  of  mean, median and mode all show that the smallest deviations 
from equilibrium predictions are achieved by Leaders (-0.013; 0 and 0, 
respectively) and large deviations are observed for Followers (-0.296;          
-0.142 and multiple modes of -1 and 0.14). Especially important here is the 
mode of zero for Leaders, with 31.77 % of all Leaders' decisions (427 out of 
1,344 individual decisions, in 61 of 192 settings) made exactly according to 
the equilibrium prediction (SLOW, FAST).  
 
 
Figure 6.16. Distribution of deviations from normative predictions for all 
subjects as Followers only 
 
 
 
No. of observations 192 
Mean -0.296 
Median -0.142 
Multiple modes -1; 0.14  
Standard deviation 0.393 
Skewness -0.537 
Kurtosis -1.050 
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The standard deviation of the distribution is lower for Leaders (0.317) than 
for Followers (0.393). The lower negative levels of kurtosis and skewness 
show a flatter distribution with larger tails for Followers10. I also ran Q-Q 
plots and computed Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests of 
normality in SPSS, which generated no relevant additional information. 
 
All indicators support the initial characterization of followers' distribution as 
resembling the uniform distribution. To sum up: 
• Followers' deviations from equilibrium predictions took values 
which were more spread out and uniform, showing some uncertainty 
about what strategy to play; 
• Leaders played much closer to equilibrium predictions and their 
deviations were exactly zero in about one third of all settings 
decisions.  
 
Figures 6.17 and 6.18 may provide explanations about the differentiated 
deviation phenomenon. Figures 6.17 and 6.18 are simple re-runs of Figures 
6.6 and 6.8 (from Chapter 6.1.4), but they also include the positions of the 
selected parameters (from Chapter 6.1.5) in the three-dimensional space 
generated by p, A and equilibrium-relevant variables defined in p and A. 
One can see in both figures that the equilibrium definition is more stable for 
Leaders and more fragile for Followers. In Figure 6.17, the two selected 
parameters (marked with red) are very close to the equilibrium boundary of 
the Follower, the line where the green graph (representing the Follower’s 
payoff or π2S,F) meets the zero plane. On the other hand, the Leader’s payoff  
or π1S,F, depicted by the blue graph, is visibly higher from the zero plane. I 
have also computed the actual levels for both payoffs by inserting the 
concrete values of parameters x, c, A and p into equations (6.3) and (6.4) 
from Chapter 6.1.2. We have the values x = 1 and c = 0.25 (Parameter Set 2 
from Chapter 6.1.4), which remain unchanged for both Figures 6.17 and 
6.18. In Figure 6.17, for the red point defined by parameters A = 1 and p = 
0.3333 we find that π1S,F = 0.4167 and π2S,F = 0.0833 and therefore the 
Leader’s payoff is much higher above zero than the Follower’s payoff. For 
the other red point defined by parameters A = 1.1 and p = 0.3333 we find 
that π1S,F = 0.4834 and π2S,F = 0.0672, which confirms the result obtained 
with the previous parameters. In Figure 6.18 we find a similar situation in 
                                                 
10 The interpretation of kurtosis and skewness is based on Field (2009, p. 138). 
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Figure 6.17. Selected parameters inside the (SLOW, FAST) pure-strategy 
equilibrium chart 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Condition (6.17)                 π1S,F > 0                          π2S,F > 0 
 
 
Figure 6.18. Selected parameters inside the (m1, m2) mixed-strategy 
equilibrium chart 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   m1                   m2              EP1             EP2 
 
Selected parameters 
Selected parameters 
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that the green graph, the expected payoff of the Follower (EP2) is visibly 
lower than the blue graph, the expected payoff of the Leader (EP1), and EP2 
is much closer to the zero plane. To confirm this with precision, I have 
computed EP1 and EP2 with the given parameters x, c, A and p. EP1 and EP2 
were computed in equations (6.31) and (6.32) in Chapter 6.1.3. For the red 
point defined in the zero plane by A = 1 and p = 0.5 one finds that EP1 = 
0.3333 and EP2 = 0.0833. Similarly, for the red point defined by A = 1.1 and 
p = 0.5 the expected payoffs are EP1 = 0.2474 and EP2 = 0.0548. Thus, for 
all selected parameters in both Figures 6.17 and 6.18 the generated 
equilibria are less stable for the Follower than for the Leader. 
 
To sum up the above findings: due to the asymmetric positions for Leaders 
and for Followers, which generate different expected payoffs – that is, lower 
payoffs for Followers which sometimes are just above zero levels – I find 
that equilibrium predictions are more unstable for Followers than for 
Leaders. I believe this explains the Followers’ larger and more spread out 
deviations from equilibrium play that I have encountered in this chapter. 
 
6.3.3. Testing Anchoring and Adjustment, Propositions and 
Hypotheses 
In this chapter I test whether subjects employed anchoring-and-adjustment 
heuristics in their decisions, and I also provide the general results on the 
propositions and heuristics I formulated in Chapter 6.2.3. 
 
In order to check whether individuals’ first decision situation (or first few 
situations) influenced their later decisions, I ran in Stata/IC 12 ordinary least 
squares regressions on the dependent variable “average decision” of 
subjects, having as independent variables the decisions made by subjects in 
the first five rounds and then in later rounds. I denoted the independent 
variables as “global decisions”. Each variable contained a number of 48 
observations from all subjects. Table 6.10 presents the coefficients, standard 
errors, significance values and amount of variance explained, while Figure 
6.19 shows only the evolution of coefficients throughout the 56 rounds. 
 
 
6. Patent Races in the Experimental Laboratory 
186 
 
Table 6.10. Ordinary least squares regressions. Dependent variable: average 
decision. Independent variables: global decisions 
 
Predictors Coefficient 
Standard 
Error p-value 
Adjusted 
R-squared 
GlobalDecision1 0.0524 0.0483 0.284 0.0037 
GlobalDecision2 *0.0937 0.0454 0.045 0.0649 
GlobalDecision3 0.0537 0.0471 0.260 0.0063 
GlobalDecision4 0.0694 0.0464 0.142 0.0256 
GlobalDecision5 *0.1014 0.0451 0.030 0.0793 
GlobalDecision10 *0.1161 0.0442 0.012 0.1115 
GlobalDecision15 0.0673 0.0467 0.157 0.0223 
GlobalDecision20 *0.1071 0.0447 0.021 0.0915 
GlobalDecision25 *0.1086 0.0446 0.019 0.0950 
GlobalDecision30 **0.1294 0.0436 0.005 0.1427 
GlobalDecision35 *0.1011 0.0450 0.030 0.0792 
GlobalDecision40 **0.1291 0.0441 0.005 0.1385 
GlobalDecision45 *0.1146 0.0443 0.013 0.1081 
GlobalDecision50 0.0640 0.0464 0.175 0.0188 
GlobalDecision55 *0.0971 0.0452 0.037 0.0715 
n = 48 observations. Significance levels: * p < 5%; ** p < 1% 
 
 
Figure 6.19. Regression coefficients. Dependent variable: average decision. 
Independent variables: global decisions 
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The coefficients from Table 6.10 tend to become largest, with the highest 
levels of significance and largest percentage of variance explained, during 
rounds 20-45. This shows that there is an individual tendency within each 
subject to play strategy FAST (as evidenced by the average decision), but 
subjects learn about their own tendency during play. In the early rounds      
(0-20) participants’ decisions are still far away from their average decisions, 
but they converge to the average decisions later in the experiment (rounds 
20-45). Finally, during the last rounds (45-56) decisions diverge again from 
the average decision, probably due to boredom effects.  
 
In any event, these results show that there is no evidence for the application 
of the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic, because subjects’ first decision 
situations did not significantly influence subsequent decisions. Thus, there is 
no support for Hypothesis 2. It appears that individuals’ self-consistency is 
stronger than the anchoring phenomenon. Finally, Table 6.3 from Chapter 
6.3.1 shows that the benchmark propositions 1 and 2 cannot be confirmed, 
because the homo economicus approach is a too hard assumption. However, 
it is true that individuals mixed between strategies even when the rational 
choice was to play a pure strategy (see Table 6.3) and therefore Hypothesis 
1, based on the extremeness-aversion heuristic, is confirmed. Recall from 
Chapter 6.2.3 that the extremeness-aversion heuristic (Tversky and 
Simonson, 1992) was stating that individuals have a tendency to stay away 
from alternatives described by extreme characteristics. In my experiment, 
this means that subjects had a tendency to stay away from playing only the 
SLOW strategy or only the FAST strategy (which were the extreme choices 
of the subjects), even though the normative equilibrium predictions (in the 
form of the pure-strategy equilibrium) were showing that this was the purely 
rational choice that subjects should have followed. The results for the two 
propositions and the two hypotheses are summarized in Table 6.11.  
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Table 6.11. Results of the two propositions and the two hypotheses 
 
Propositions 
and hypotheses 
Theoretical basis Results 
Proposition 1 Homo oeconomicus 
approach 
Not confirmed 
Proposition 2 Homo oeconomicus 
approach 
Not confirmed 
Hypothesis 1 Extremeness-aversion 
heuristic 
Confirmed 
Hypothesis 2 Anchoring-and-adjustment 
heuristic 
Not confirmed 
 
6.4. And the Winner Is…? …The Human Being 
Throughout this chapter, I developed a game-theoretic patent race model, 
tested it experimentally and analyzed it econometrically. In Chapter 6.1       
I started with Nalebuff’s (1988) sailing race model, transformed it into a 
game-theoretic model and added parameters such as cost and time 
discounting to adapt it to a patent race context. I then performed an 
equilibrium analysis and selected parameters that were easy to understand 
by participants and stable inside the equilibrium chart. The analysis 
predicted a pure-strategy and a mixed-strategy equilibrium. In Chapter 6.2    
I shed light on the importance of experiments for research and I built an 
experimental design with eight settings by varying three parameters: i) the 
type of equilibrium; ii) the existence of accumulation through an interest 
rate; iii) whether a subject was at an advantage in the race (Leader) or at a 
disadvantage (Follower). I also formulated benchmark propositions based 
on the assumption of full rationality and hypotheses based on the concept of 
bounded rationality.  
 
In Chapter 6.3 I presented descriptive statistics and performed regression 
analyses, which provided the experimental results. First of all, in Chapter 
6.3.1 I found that experimental participants behaved suprisingly close to the 
equilibrium predictions, as their deviations from optimal play were mostly 
small. The results of a random-effects regression showed that the 
equilibrium predictions had a highly significant effect on subjects’ actual 
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choices. My conclusion from the regression was that individuals intuitively 
behave in the direction of optimal play, even though the experimental 
settings change randomly from round to round, and it is impossible for 
participants to compute the equilibrium mathematically. This brings support 
to the concept of intuitive optimizing by individuals (Lévesque and Schade,  
2005). Indeed, in this experiment subjects made errors in some situations, 
but performed especially well in others.  
 
Second, I wanted to find out why subjects deviated from equilibrium play in 
some situations, but decided very close to optimality in other situations. 
Chapter 6.3.2 contained random-effects regressions on the absolute 
deviation from equilibrium and found out that the only significant factor 
influencing deviations was a subject’s role: when a subject was a Leader, 
she deviated significantly less from normative predictions than when a 
subject was a Follower. I analyzed the distribution of deviations for Leaders 
versus Followers and concluded that, indeed, Leaders’ deviations were 
smaller and resembled more the normal distribution, while Followers 
deviated more and their decisions seemed to come from something similar 
to the uniform distribution. This implies that Followers encounter some 
uncertainty about what strategy to play (and therefore randomize between 
strategies).  Overall, my experimental results seem to confirm the strength 
of game-theoretical modelling. The larger deviations from optimal play for 
Followers are likely to be the result of the asymmetric positions between the 
two roles and the less stable definition of the equilibrium for Followers. 
Whenever the Leader’s payoff was rather high, the Follower’s payoff was 
visibly lower and closer to the zero threshold under which the equilibrium 
predictions would have broken (see the end of Chapter 6.3.2 for details). 
Thus, the less stable equilibrium predictions for Followers seem to be 
reflected in less stable strategies and larger deviations from optimal play, 
which can be seen as a scientific result of game theory. Variables such as 
gender, age, accumulation and risk attitude had no significant effect on 
subjects’ decisions or on their deviations.  
 
Third, I ran ordinary regressions in Chapter 6.3.3 to test for anchoring and 
adjustment. I found that subjects had individual tendencies to play the 
strategy FAST rather than strategy SLOW, that they learned about their 
individual tendencies throughout the experiment, and that they did not 
employ anchoring-and-adjustment heuristics (showing that self-consistency 
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was stronger than the anchoring phenomenon). The benchmark propositions 
derived from the perfect rationality approach were, as expected, not 
confirmed. However, I could find support for the extremeness-aversion 
heuristic, as subjects mixed between their strategies even when it was 
optimal for them to play pure strategies. Moreover, the extremeness 
aversion was more pronounced for Followers than for Leaders, because the 
equilibrium predictions from the game-theoretical model were less stable for 
Followers. In other words, Followers were less sure than Leaders that they 
should play pure strategies when the optimal play recommended them to do 
so, and therefore Followers avoided extreme combinations (such as the pure 
FAST strategy) and played more mixed strategies, showing some 
uncertainty about how they should act.  
 
I consider the experimental study described in this dissertation to be an 
important contribution to the patent race literature in particular and to the 
study of competitive behavior in general. Experimental studies such as 
Zizzo (2002), Silipo (2005) and Breitmoser et al. (2010), which tested 
models from the theoretical patent race literature, found no support for this 
literature (see Chapter 5.2.1). As stated before, the reason for this was the 
fragility of such models, in which predictions change dramatically as a 
consequence of small changes in parameters or assumptions. Such models 
have the drawback that they were not based on proven and established 
concepts from economic theory, but instead on many parameters and 
assumptions. The situation was different for studies that constructed their 
own patent race models based on strong theoretical foundations and then 
tested them experimentally: Isaac and Reynolds (1992) proved 
Schumpeterian competition in an R&D race, Amaldoss and Jain (2002) 
showed the power of the concept of a mixed-strategy equilibrium in an 
asymmetric patent race, while Nieken and Sliwka (2010) also tested pure-
strategy versus mixed-strategy equilibria in a patent race setting with a 
leader and a follower (see Chapter 5.2.2). These studies showed consistency 
between theory and experiment and they have important implications for 
competitive behavior; their consistency may reside in the fact that they 
based their experiments on proven concepts such as Schumpeterian 
competition or results from game theory, such as mixed-strategy and pure-
strategy equilibria.  
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I believe that the experimental study from this dissertation brings an 
important contribution to the last three studies I have mentioned. It is also 
based on a strong game-theoretic foundation but delivered to experimental 
participants in a very intuitive way, which led to consistency between theory 
and experiment. Similarly to Amaldoss and Jain (2002) as well as Nieken 
and Sliwka (2010), the present study is of high relevance for competitive 
behavior on asymmetric markets with a market leader and a challenger. My 
contribution goes beyond Nieken and Sliwka, as I introduce a time 
framework with interest rates as well as a variation of the probability of 
success for the risky strategy. My experiment also sheds additional light on 
patent races compared to Amaldoss and Jain: these authors modeled a 
mixed-strategy equilibrium, while I compared a mixed-strategy and a pure-
strategy equilibrium setting. Moreover, I found similar results to other 
studies of patent races with asymmetric players: the asymmetric position 
often triggers more aggressive behavior from the side of the disadvantaged 
market player, while the leader tends to play safe and just protect its current 
position. In important cases, this can shift the balance of power from the 
market leader to the challenger, the way Apple destroyed IBM’s hegemony 
by using an aggressive marketing campaign for the introduction of the 
Macintosh computer in 1984.  
 
Finally, I would like to state that, in my view, the most surprising aspect of 
this study is subjects’ behavior during the experiment. How could they 
manage to intuitively optimize their decisions in a few minutes, when the 
mathematical computation of optimal strategies would have taken hours or 
even days of work? Therefore, my recommendation for future research is to 
perform more experiments that can analyze human intuition in (economic) 
decision situations – to the best of my knowledge, important examples of 
such studies are the publications by Lévesque and Schade (2005), 
Burmeister-Lamp et al. (2012) or Gigerenzer and Selten (2002). So it was 
not the Leader, nor the Follower who won or lost the race; on the contrary, 
Leaders and Followers intuitively harmonized their actions onto optimal 
play. The real winner of this patent race experiment is the human being.   
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CHAPTER 7 
Conclusions 
 
“Economic theory also pleads for a mechanism 
design approach: an optimal patent system could be 
based on a menu of different degrees of patent 
protection where stronger protection would involve 
higher fees, allowing self-selection by inventors.” 
 Encaoua et al. (2006) 
 
“Policymakers could increase the inventive step (the 
standard of nonobviousness in US law) required to 
obtain a patent so the most trivial advances over 
the prior art do not qualify for patent protection.” 
 Hunt (1999) 
 
 “Empirical studies of innovation have found that 
end users frequently develop important product 
and process innovations. Defying conventional 
wisdom on the negative effects of uncompensated 
spillovers, innovative users also often openly reveal 
their innovations to competing users and to 
manufacturers.” 
 Harhoff et al. (2003) 
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This dissertation analyzed a plethora of aspects related to patents and patent 
races. The literature review on patents and their effects on economics, 
business and society pointed out to a hot debate for the case of patent 
protection. I wrap up the main conclusions about patents in Chapter 7.1. 
What is more, a review of the patent race literature showed that most of this 
research branch contains many contradictions and is rather inconclusive. My 
experimental study on patent races brings an important contribution to the 
literature by showing that people are able to coordinate their strategies 
during a patent race, due to two factors: through a wide definition of the 
equilibrium intervals in the experimental design and because people 
intuitively play in the direction of equilibrium predictions. This finding is 
important because it implies that real-world competitors in R&D and 
innovative activities might also optimize their decisions and avoid socially 
wasteful behavior. Some empirical evidence seems to confirm this finding. I 
summarize my analysis of patent races in Chapter 7.2. The last subchapter 
proposes some solutions to the patent puzzle and discusses potential future 
developments.  
 
7.1. Conclusions For Patents  
In the introductory chapter, the reader was confronted with some of the 
absurdities of the patent system. The smartphone patent wars brought to 
light some of the darkest features of patents: false news, continual patent 
fights, patent thickets, patent trolls, wasteful legal suits, trivial patents 
impeding innovation, bans of sales for innovative products which restricted 
consumer choice, as well as unpredictable consequences on firm reputation. 
The traditional argument for patent protection, still respected today, is that 
patents are necessary because otherwise innovators who poured great effort 
into their ideas might be copied by imitators at zero cost. Further arguments 
in favor of patent protection include patents’ important role in fostering 
information disclosure (as opposed to secrecy) and thus in the diffusion of 
knowledge. Patents are also essential for the delegation of R&D decisions 
into the hands of private investors who have the best information on the 
costs and benefits of R&D (as opposed to a world where the government 
makes R&D investments and these are funded by taxpayers). While the 
traditional argument in itself is so strong that it cannot be rejected, I find 
some situations in which the conventional view is reversed, and I underline 
many unintended distortions induced by the patent system. In Chapter 1.1.2 
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I identified some of these drawbacks, most notably the deadweight loss 
brought by monopoly pricing, the decoupling of patenting and R&D 
activities, the tendency to generate substitute rather than complementary 
goods and the significant amount of financial resources that are diverted 
from innovative activities into patenting or, even worse, into patent 
litigation trials. Chapter 1.1.3 presented empirical evidence on patents’ 
effectiveness as protection mechanism for firms’ returns from innovative 
activities. In two studies, firms consistently evaluated patents as having a 
limited role in the protection of innovation, while the primary role is played 
by such mechanisms as first mover advantage, complexity and secrecy. 
These findings are corroborated by Encaoua et al. (2006), who point out that 
“competitive rents, in the absence of patent protection, might be sufficient to 
compensate innovators in certain circumstances”. These authors show that 
when secrecy works as effective protection mechanism, when first-mover 
advantages are important or when the cost of imitation is high, there seems 
to be little need for patents. Another setting under which patents might not 
be needed is that of sequential and complementary innovation, dealt with in 
Chapter 1.1.4. Here, Bessen and Maskin (2009) assert that if innovations 
build upon the preceding ones and are the result of complementary research 
approaches, imitation may promote innovation, while strong patents may 
inhibit it. The authors relate to empirical evidence of industries – software, 
computers and semiconductors – which have been particularly innovative 
under weak patent protection. In fact, a strengthening of patents in the 
software industry led to less R&D on the side of patent holders, which is 
aligned with Bessen and Maskin’s hypothesis. Chapter 1.2 was mainly 
concerned with the increase in patenting activities, the simultaneous decline 
in patent quality and the emergence of “patent thickets”. These phenomena 
were the result of a shift in firm strategy, from a “single patent” to a “patent 
portfolio” view, and of a shift to a “more is better” patenting mentality. A 
solution to these rather negative developments might be to raise 
patentability standards, and I discuss it in Chapter 7.3. Chapter 1.3 
mentioned some of the critical societal and ethical issues raised by patents, 
especially the patenting of genes or life-forms, patents on lifesaving 
medicine, corporate attempts to block the distribution of generic medicine, 
trivial patents blocking innovation, as well as legal asymmetries between 
small and large firms, with smaller firms unable to fight in case of patent 
infrigement.  
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Chapter 2 described the instruments that might be used by policymakers to 
regulate patent protection – patent breadth, height and length – and then 
showed the shortcomings of trying to design an optimal regulative structure. 
The notion of patent breadth was found to embody many heterogeneous 
concepts. I found Klemperer’s (1990) definition to be the most useful: 
“breadth measures how different competitors’ products must be in order not 
to infringe the patent”. Patent height, defined by Scotchmer and Green 
(1990) as the level of novelty requirements for patenting, might in fact be 
part of the solution to the explosion of patent applications and their 
diminishing quality. As I mentioned before, I discuss this in the last 
subchapter. Patent length, the statutory life of a patent, is the regulatory 
instrument preferred by patent offices for practical reasons: easiness to 
define and modify it. Nordhaus (1972) developed a model recommending 
the shortening or elimination of patents for trivial innovations, but slightly 
longer patents in the case of radical innovations. But even Nordhaus’s 
conclusion about stronger patents might be reversed under a setting of 
sequential innovations. In Chapter 2.2 I showed why an optimal patent or 
patent race regulation cannot be achieved. The literature on this topic is very 
heterogeneous, it consists of different models that follow a variety of goals 
and are based on miscellaneous assumptions. However, Chapter 2.2.2 
revealed an important conclusion: the strengthening of patent protection did 
not seem to increase R&D spending or innovative output in the U.S. or in 
Japan. One study by Hunt (2006) even predicts that stronger patents would 
have negative effects on innovation. 
 
Chapter 3 dealt with the explosion of patents in Europe and around the 
world. Not only the number of applications increased dramatically in recent 
decades, but also the average size of a patent, expressed in the number of its 
claims and pages. Besides, an extreme phenomenon entitled “mega-
applications” was identified; such applications have reached up to 100,000 
pages or 20,000 claims, but even larger one have been submitted. At the 
same time, the increase in patenting was not accompanied by a growth in 
R&D activity, raising further concerns about patent quality. In Chapter 3.2 
five determinants of patent voluminosity were analyzed. First, the fee 
structure seemed to affect firms’ patenting strategies. When faced with 
additional fees on extra claims, firms tried to limit their number of claims, 
probably compressing more information in fewer claim categories. 
Therefore, the fee structure may work as a solution to stop the patent flood, 
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and I discuss it in Chapter 7.3. A second reason for the patent boom is 
represented by internationalization through the Patent Cooperation Treaty. 
This procedure provides applicants with 18 additional months before 
incurring the cost of patenting and applicants do not have to pay fees for 
excess claims, making the PCT a more attractive way to file for a patent. 
Third, national practices affected patent voluminosity: countries under 
common law (such as the Anglo-Saxon countries) register larger patent 
documents than countries under civil law (such as Continental Europe). 
Besides, the US patent drafting style by itself was shown to be a significant 
and large determinant of voluminosity. Fourth, the increased technological 
complexity that society experienced in recent years required more 
explanations and more detailed descriptions, leading to larger patent texts. 
Fifth, the emergence of young, highly competitive industries such as 
biotechnology, organic chemistry or computers was found to contribute to 
the patent boom. Chapter 3.3 discussed the effects of the unprecedented 
surge in patenting. Enormous pressure was placed on patent offices, which 
have huge backlogs of unexamined applications and must allocate 
increasingly more resources to search and examine the filings, resulting in 
questionable patent quality standards. The flood of applications also means 
more search costs for inventors, patent examiners and the general public;          
it generates uncertainty and compromises the reliability of the entire patent 
system. Potential solutions, related to the fee structure, are given in the last 
subchapter.  
 
In Chapter 4, I examined the role patents play in the pharmaceutical 
industry. The phenomenon observed by Bessen and Maskin (2009) in the 
software and computer industries, where patent protection negatively 
impacted innovation, seems to be even more pronounced in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Here, I found it questionable whether patents fulfill 
their expected role of stimulating innovation, as patents seem to produce 
some anomalies that benefit the industry but harm society. The pharma 
industry was the most profitable of all US industries during the second half 
of the 20th Century. At the same time, the pharma industry’s innovativeness 
appears to have slightly declined due to a focus on incremental innovation 
(also labeled as “me too” drugs), instead of developing radical innovations 
(new molecular entities with the highest therapeutic value). Similar to the 
results from Chapter 1.1.3, even for pharmaceuticals (where patents’ 
importance is rated as especially high) there is empirical evidence showing 
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that R&D managers rated different protection instruments for their 
innovations: secrecy or first-mover advantage were more important than 
patents. An attempt to encourage generic competition through the 1984 
Hatch-Waxman Act remained largely unsuccessful and, paradoxically, 
might have led to an explosion of industry profits. Pharmaceutical 
companies make significant marketing and PR efforts to build brand loyalty 
and strong bonds with medical professionals who prescribe the drugs. This 
way, they are able to control the market and even increase their prices for 
brand name drugs, while market penetration for generics remains low. Some 
recommendations for pharmaceuticals can be found in the last subchapter.  
 
7.2. Conclusions For Patent Races  
Chapter 5 gave an extensive overview of the patent race literature. This 
literature proved to be extremely complex and yet inconclusive. It is enough 
to take a look at only two initial papers, those by Barzel (1968) and by 
Kamien and Schwartz (1972), to understand the main problem of the 
literature: each subsequent study makes departures from previous research, 
in that the research questions as well as the working assumptions of every 
model are modified. Even though researchers intended to improve upon the 
existing knowledge, their attempts led to increasing complexity and 
decreasing compatibility of their results. The theoretical patent race 
literature is filled with contradictions. For instance, Lee and Wilde (1980) 
contradict Loury (1979), while Reinganum (1982) contradicts Kamien and 
Schwartz (1976). Cockburn and Henderson (1994) provide a good 
explanation for the instability of the literature: “Conclusions from these 
types of models are also rather fragile: small changes in the timing of 
moves, the information structure of the game or the treatment of spillovers 
can easily reverse or weaken any given theoretical result”. Experimental 
tests of theoretical two-player multistage patent race models were described 
in Chapter 5.2.1: Silipo (2005) tested Fudenberg et al. (1983), Zizzo (2002) 
tested Harris and Vickers (1987) and Breitmoser et al. (2010) tested Hörner 
(2004). Most of the theoretical predictions failed to withstand experimental 
tests, rendering little value to the standard patent race literature. On the lines 
of Breitmoser et al. (2010), I also believe that the predictions of theoretical 
models are highly sensitive to parameter changes, while real subjects in 
experiments follow behavioral patterns that are much more stable. The 
experiment in Chapter 6 corroborates this intuition. Chapter 5.2.2 gave 
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examples of prestigious experimental studies based on own theoretical 
models and not rooted in the theoretical patent race literature. Here, Isaac 
and Reynolds (1992) elegantly proved the existence of Schumpeterian 
competition in a carefully designed experimental setting of an R&D race. 
Amaldoss and Jain (2002) performed an experimental investigation of a 
mixed-strategy equilibrium in a patent race context and obtained excellent 
results. I therefore believe that well-designed experimental settings, based 
on strong theoretical foundations (rather than the shady predictions of the 
theoretical patent race literature) may prove to be a fruitful research 
endeavor, now and in the future.  
 
Following this belief, I set out an experimental study of a patent race as 
described in Chapter 6. Starting from Nalebuff’s (1998) intuitive model of a 
sailing race (which incorporated many important questions from the patent 
race literature), I developed a mathematical model of an asymmetric patent 
race. Here, two firms are entrenched in R&D competition with the goal of 
attaining a patent. Only the first firm which succesfully completes an 
innovative project is awarded the patent (the prize of the race). One firm, the 
Leader, has a time advantage of six months over the other firm, the 
Follower. Each firm has to choose between a SLOW and a FAST strategy. 
The SLOW strategy takes two years, but it is sure to lead to a completion of 
the project. The FAST strategy only takes one year, but it only offers a 
probability of success in the completion of the project. Each strategy has a 
cost, and time discounting is accounted for through an interest rate. Based 
on these parameters, I developed a game-theoretic model and performed an 
equilibrium analysis. In the absence of a closed-form equilibrium solution, I 
employed a multi-dimensional graphical solution to select the appropriate 
parameters for the patent race experiment. I chose the parameters based on 
two requirements: they had to be easy to process by human participants in 
an experiment and they had to be stable inside the equilibrium paths. 
Indeed, the experimental results show that the large breadth of the 
equilibrium intervals from which the parameters were selected played an 
essential role: subjects behaved in a manner consistent with predictions. 
Eventually, the experimental design consisted of eight settings generated by 
the variation of three parameters: i) whether a subject is a Leader or a 
Follower; ii) a mixed-strategy equilibrium versus a pure-strategy 
equilibrium; iii) a setting without interest rate and a setting with 10% 
interest rate per year. Following Schade’s (2005) recommendation that 
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“only students’ behavior may be influenced by performance-dependent 
payments given the average level of payments an experimenter can afford”, 
I ran a laboratory controlled incentive-compatible experiment with 48 
subjects, mostly students. Each subject had to play seven rounds of the eight 
settings, totaling 56 rounds per subject. The order of the eight settings was 
randomly varied from one round to the next. I formulated two benchmark 
propositions about how subjects should play, based on the assumption of 
perfect rationality. I also derived two behavioral hypotheses from the 
framework of bounded rationality. Hypothesis 1, related to extremeness 
aversion (Tversky and Simonson, 1992), was that individuals would mix 
between strategies even if the rational choice is to play a pure strategy. 
Hypothesis 2, based on anchoring-and-adjustment heuristics (Slovic and 
Lichtenstein, 1971), stated that individuals’ first decision situation would 
influence their subsequent decisions. In Chapter 6.3, I performed an 
econometric analysis, the results of which are summarized in the following. 
In the experiment, people behaved surprisingly close to the normative 
equilibrium predictions, and most of their deviations from optimal play were 
small and significant. Therefore, the benchmark propositions were rejected, 
while Hypothesis 1 was confirmed. The results of random-effects regression 
models showed that the normative predictions did have a positive and highly 
significant effect on subjects’ observed decisions, while factors such as 
gender or age were insignificant. Followers deviated more, and Leaders less, 
from normative predictions. A reasonable explanation for this can be found 
in the equilibrium predictions, which were more unstable for the Follower 
than for the Leader. There was no evidence for anchoring-and-adjustment 
heuristics and thus Hypothesis 2 was rejected. Instead, each subject 
followed an individual tendency to play the FAST or SLOW strategy and 
subjects discovered their tendencies during play. I believe that the high 
consistency between theory and experiment puts my study on a par with 
prestigious publications such as those by Isaac and Reynolds (1992) or 
Amaldoss and Jain (2002). Implications for patent races are discussed in the 
next chapter.  
 
7.3. Recommendations and Future Outlook  
In this chapter I provide potential solutions to the patent conundrum. I found 
two sets of solutions, related to patent fees and to the reinforcement of high 
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patentability standards. I also give recommendations for pharmaceuticals as 
well as patent races and briefly mention future developments.  
 
Encaoua et al. (2006) discuss restructuring the patent fee system as a 
feasible solution to the patent problem. They write that “economic theory 
also pleads for a mechanism design approach: an optimal patent system 
could be based on a menu of different degrees of patent protection where 
stronger protection would involve higher fees, allowing self-selection by 
inventors” (idem). The authors suggest that “patent fees should reflect the 
cost of patents to society, rather than patent offices’ examination costs” 
(idem). They make a series of further recommendations, which I find highly 
relevant: i) patent application and renewal fees might be useful as a self-
selection process “to encourage high valuable inventions to be patented and 
discourage the least valuable ones”; ii) the funding structure of patent 
offices should be reformed; iii) governments should regard patent offices 
“not as profit centres, but as agencies in charge of aspects of innovation 
policy” (idem).  
 
In the matter of fees, Encaoua et al.’s recommendations are aligned with 
those of other researchers who suggested that the fee structures enforced by 
patent offices significantly affect firms’ patenting behavior. In Chapter 3.3, 
Dack and Cohen (2001) proposed a number of useful measures: a more 
rigorous approach to evaluate the clarity of an application, the introduction 
of a claims-based fee for PCT applications, and a limitation on the number 
of claims. Since firms clearly react to additional fees for extra claims (as 
seen in Chapter 3.2.1), I am inclined to recommend a progressive fee on 
each additional claim. However, as van Zeebroeck et al. (2008) rightfully 
show, the delicate issue in setting claim-based fees is to “ensure that a point 
is not crossed when it becomes cheaper to divide an application than pay 
excess claim fees”. Therefore, any modification of the fee structure must be 
designed intelligently and take into account a series of arising trade-offs. 
Encaoua et al. (2006) also note that how an optimal fee structure “can be 
implemented remains to be carefully investigated”. 
 
Hunt (1999) adds to the discussion on fees by saying that “there may be 
instances where raising patent costs can actually induce more R&D”. Hunt  
transforms the discussion of fees into a discussion of patentability standards 
by suggesting the introduction of a patent tax, or, even better, by increasing 
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requirements to obtain a patent. In Hunt’s (1999) words, “policymakers 
could increase the inventive step (the standard of nonobviousness in US 
law) required to obtain a patent so the most trivial advances over the prior 
art do not qualify for patent protection”.  
 
The literature uniformly agrees that society should get rid of “trivial 
patents”. Patents with low social value, or illegitimate patents (not novel or 
not sufficiently inventive), can negatively impact innovation and 
competition. Thus, we need to reform the patent system such that 
patentability standards are “kept high” and are “strictly applied” (Encaoua et 
al., 2006). Chapter 2 showed one instrument that allows patent policy 
makers to raise patent quality standards: through patent height regulation. 
Encaoua et al. (2006) write that preserving a high patent quality is especially 
important in our newest and most sensitive industries, “notably software and 
biotechnology, where there is not yet an established examination tradition in 
patent offices, to allow monitoring of granting standards”. Bessen (2003) 
suggests that many distortions such as trivial patents or patent thickets are 
the result of low patent standards. Bessen (2003) writes: “When patent 
standards are high, portfolio building is costly, and firms are more likely to 
follow a strategy where they do not assert their patents”. At the opposite 
end, low patent standards result in aggressive portfolio building, “socially 
wasteful behavior” and reduced R&D incentives (idem). Therefore, it 
should be one of society’s main concerns to reestablish high standards for 
patents (in specialized terminology, to increase patent height).  
 
I also wrap up my recommendations for pharmaceuticals. I suggest that 
patent protection and its effects on innovativeness should be more carefully 
analyzed. The record profits achieved in the pharma industry should be 
more highly taxed. On the lines of Fershtman and Markovich (2010), small 
entrepreneurial firms should be encouraged, as they were found to be 
relatively more innovative than big established pharma companies. In the 
US, payers of insurances should incentivize medical professionals to 
prescribe more generic medicine, thus loosening the grip that expensive 
brand name drugs have on the market. Last but not least, the ethical aspects 
of pharmaceuticals should be emphasized – these are not regular products, 
but instead they save lives. Attempts such as those undertaken by Gilead 
Sciences (see Chapter 1.3) to prevent the distribution of generic lifesaving 
drugs should be stopped. One instrument that could be employed in such 
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situations is compulsory licensing, where the patent holder is forced to 
license its patent under fair and reasonable conditions.  
 
For patent races, I suggest the implementation of further experiments based 
on stable theoretical foundations and intuitive designs, with the goal of 
teasing out people’s behavioral patterns or their intuition in competitive 
settings. My experiment showed that subjects were able to coordinate their 
strategies onto optimal play. Very good results were also found in three 
experiments (Isaac and Reynolds, 1992, Amaldoss and Jain, 2002, Nieken 
and Sliwka, 2010). I believe that future research should take into account 
the elegant designs of these authors, as well as my experiment, and should 
build new experiments based on established and solid theoretical 
foundations. In the literature, I only found one empirical example of real 
racing behavior, namely in the pharmaceutical industry (on which Chapter 
4.4 provides a detailed investigation). Here, firms avoided cut-throat 
competition or wasteful duplication of costs and managed to share the 
market equitably. Therefore my experimental results on harmonized 
strategies that maximize profits for everyone might also reflect an industry 
reality. What is more, given that empirical evidence cannot be easily to the 
theoretical constructs of the standard patent race literature, tremendous 
importance can be assigned to experiments, as they remain the only way to 
verify the theoretical findings of patent race models.  
 
Society seems to be advancing towards a new paradigm for innovation, and 
criticism of intellectual property has lately intensified. The dramatic 
increase of communication and connectivity from recent years has paved the 
way for a new phenomenon: open innovation. In traditional, closed-
innovation settings, firms keep strict control of R&D, development and 
production, try to prevent knowledge spillovers to competitors, deliver 
products down the pipeline to passive consumers and spend a lot on 
patenting. In an open-innovation framework collaboration is increased, 
knowledge is shared, and consumers are actively involved in the design of 
new, better products. In such a setting, it becomes harder and harder to 
protect intellectual property.  
 
However, open innovation cannot function by itself without the incentives 
to innovate provided by intellectual property protection. The main argument 
in favor of patents has always been, and continues to be respected: without 
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protection from imitators, true innovators have no reason to bring 
innovations to the market, because they cannot hope for any appropriability 
of benefits from their efforts. Thus, phenomena such as open innovation 
should not and cannot go too far as to destroy incentives to innovate 
altogether. I trust that an equilibrium shall be found between a setting with 
too much and too little intellectual property protection.  
 
The smartphone patent wars were very different from previous patent fights 
(as emphasized by The Economist, 21.10.2010), because a new type of 
player arrived on the battlefield, embodied by firms with open-source 
platforms. Google, for instance, does not charge for its operating system for 
smartphones, Android, and lets others modify the software. This threatens 
vendors of closed-innovation proprietary platforms, such as Apple and 
Microsoft, but benefits society by encouraging innovation. Even though 
some of the established firms will fight to protect the status quo, in the 
coming decades I expect a shift towards open innovation, resulting in more 
collaboration, a changing role or new design for patents and ultimately a 
better society.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 6A: Experimental Instructions  
 
(These instructions have been translated from German into English.) 
 
  
Welcome and thank you for taking part in our experiment on strategic decision 
behavior.  
 
General Rules  
Switch off your cell phone and all other electronic devices.  
Please stay absolutely quiet during the entire experiment and do not speak with the 
other participants.  
Concentrate on the given tasks and place yourself in the described situation.  
If you have questions, please raise your hand. The experimenter will come to you 
and explain your question. Please ask your questions quietly, in order not to disturb 
the other participants.  
On some computer screens you will find a calculator. You may use it, but you are 
not required to.  
None of your decisions will be related with your name or personal information.  
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This experiment consists of two parts. You are now starting the first part of the 
experiment.  
 
You are the research and development (R&D) manager of a high-tech company 
and you are presently undertaking a new, costly R&D project.  
 
You have a competitor. Another company is pursuing an R&D project, with the 
same goal as you. The company which completes the technical solution FIRST (the 
winner) receives a patent from the patent office. This company is economically 
successful.  
 
The patent gives the winner the exclusive right to develop a product, based on the 
relevant results of the R&D project, to sell that product and obtain profits. The 
company which does not achieve patent protection (the loser) is not allowed to sell 
any products based on the relevant results of the R&D project, but it must pay its 
R&D costs. Therefore, this company makes a loss from the project.  
 
Thus, of essential importance is which of the two companies completes the 
technical solution FIRST. The faster company will become the winner, while the 
slower company will become the loser.  
 
You and your competitor start with the development of the technical solution in 
different time points. One of the companies may start immediately with the 
development of the technical solution. This company is the Leader of the 
competition. The Leader has an advantage over her competitor, who is named the 
Follower. The Follower can only start to develop the technical solution in 6 
months. Therefore, the Follower has a disadvantage in this time competition.  
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YOUR DECISION  
For the development of the technical solution you may, independent on whether 
you are the Leader or the Follower, choose one of two different plans: Plan SLOW 
or Plan FAST.  
 
The Plan SLOW takes 2 years, but it is certain to lead you to the completion of the 
technical solution. The question then remains whether you were the first or the 
second to complete this technical solution. If you were the first, you receive the 
patent and you are economically successful. If you were the second, you do not 
receive the patent and you are not economically successful.  
 
The Plan FAST only takes 1 year, but it is not certain that you can develop the 
technical solution.  
Sometimes, the Plan FAST offers a chance to complete the technical solution of        
1 out of 3 (probability one third).  
Sometimes, the Plan FAST offers a chance to complete the technical solution of        
1 out of 2 (probability one half).  
Thus it is possible that you do not complete the technical solution with Plan FAST. 
In this case, you have to switch to Plan SLOW, pay again the R&D costs, and take 
another 2 years to complete the technical solution, which however might be too late 
to receive the patent.  
 
The competition starts on the 1st of January, Year 1. In this time point you receive 
an initial endowment amounting to 600.000 Talers.  
The R&D costs for the Plans SLOW or FAST each amount to 250.000 Talers. 
These costs will be subtracted from your initial endowment.  
Receiving the patent brings you a revenue of 1.000.000 Talers.  
Case 1: Sometimes, your revenues and costs are not subject to an interest rate. This 
will be communicated to you at the beginning of the decision situation. In this case, 
the value of the individual revenues and costs, and their sum remain unchanged 
over three years; that is, until the 31st of December, Year 3.  
Case 2: Sometimes, your revenues and costs are subject to an interest rate of 10% 
per year. This will also be communicated to you at the beginning of the decision 
situation. In this case, the value of the individual revenues and costs will be 
compounded with the interest rate over the three years, until the 31st of December, 
Year 3.  
Thus, the 31st of December, Year 3 represents the liquidation time point for your 
revenues and costs.  
In the following you are shown the effects of the interest rate on your revenues and 
costs.  
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Let’s suppose you are the Leader. You receive your initial endowment of 600.000 
Talers on the 1st of January, Year 1. On the same day you have to make your 
decision between Plan SLOW and Plan FAST, and you also pay the R&D costs of 
250.000 Talers.  
Let’s assume you chose Plan SLOW. Let’s further assume the Follower has also 
chosen Plan SLOW, or she failed with Plan FAST. Then, you receive the patent on 
the 1st of January, Year 3, and the corresponding revenue of 1.000.000 Talers.  
Case 1: no interest rate (will be communicated to you before your decision)  
Your payoff on the 31st of December, Year 3 will be:  
600.000 - 250.000 + 1.000.000 = 1.350.000 Talers. 
Case 2: interest rate of 10% per year (will be communicated to you before your 
decision) 
Your payoff on the 31st of December, Year 3 will be:  
600.000 x 110% x 110% x 110% - 250.000 x 110% x 110% x 110% + 1.000.000 x 
110% = 1.565.850 Talers.  
(The initial endowment and the costs are subject to the interest rate for 3 years, 
because they are incurred 3 years before the liquidation date. The revenue from 
receiving the patent is subject to the interest rate for only 1 year, because it was 
obtained 1 year before the liquidation date.) 
 
Let’s assume you are the Follower. You receive your initial endowment of 600.000 
Talers on the 1st of January, Year 1. You have to make your decision 6 months 
later on whether you choose Plan SLOW or Plan FAST, and you pay the R&D 
costs of 250.000 Talers on the same day, the 1st of July, Year 1.  
Let’s assume you chose Plan SLOW. Let’s further assume the Leader has chosen 
Plan FAST, and failed. Then, you receive the patent on the 1st of July, Year 3, and 
the corresponding revenue of 1.000.000 Talers. 
Case 1: no interest rate (will be communicated to you before your decision)  
Your payoff on the 31st of December, Year 3 will be: 
600.000 - 250.000 + 1.000.000 = 1.350.000 Talers. 
Case 2: interest rate of 10% per year (will be communicated to you before your 
decision) 
Your payoff on the 31st of December, Year 3 will be: 
600.000 x 110% x 110% x 110% - 250.000 x 105% (rounded) x 110% x 110% + 
1.000.000 x 105% (rounded) = 1.530.144 Talers.  
(The initial endowment is subject to the interest rate for 3 years, because it is 
received 3 years before the liquidation date. The costs are subject to the interest 
rate for 2 years and 6 months, because they have to be paid 2 years and 6 months 
before liquidation. The revenue from receiving the patent is subject to the interest 
rate for only 6 months, because it was obtained 6 months before the liquidation 
date.) 
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The following tables summarize all parameters of this game.  
 
Leader begins on the 1st of January, Year 1 
Follower begins 6 months later on the 1st of July, Year 1 
 
Initial endowment 600.000 
 
 
Duration  
Probability of 
completing the 
technical solution  Costs 
Plan SLOW 2 years certain  250.000 
Plan FAST 1 year  1/3 or 1/2 250.000 
 
Interest rate, Case 1 none 
Interest rate, Case 2 10% 
 
Receiving the patent 1.000.000 
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You will play this competitive game 56 times against the same person. That is, 
your competitor remains unchanged over the entire duration of the experiment.  
In 28 games you will be the Leader, and in 28 games the Follower. At the 
beginning of every game you receive the initial endowment of 600.000 Talers. In 
every game, the following parameters might change (this is communicated to you 
at the beginning of each game): 
-whether you are the Leader or the Follower;  
-how high is the chance to complete the technical solution using Plan FAST;  
-whether an interest rate is applied or not. 
In each game, you have to decide whether you want to follow Plan SLOW or Plan 
FAST first.  
 
At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly choose 14 games (7 
games in which you were the Leader and 7 games in which you were the 
Follower).  
The sum of your earnings in these 14 randomly chosen games will be paid to you at 
the end of the experiment. Therefore, try to make the best decision in every game.  
Please be patient, the results are not shown to you after each game. At the end of 
the experiment you will receive a table summarizing all your results.  
Your competitor will always be the Leader when you are the Follower, and she will 
always be the Follower when you are the Leader.  
Otherwise, you are both subjected to the same conditions: if you have an interest 
rate, your competitor will also have it. You have the same initial endowments, the 
same revenue, the same costs to follow a Plan, and the same chance to complete 
the technical solution through Plan FAST.  
The conversion rate is: 1 € = 982.065 Talers. 
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Appendix 6B: Hierarchical Regressions on Setting Choice 
 
Table 6.B.1. Random-effects regression. Dependent variable: Setting 
Decision. Independent variables: Setting Prediction, Female 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Significance levels: *** p < 0.1%; * p < 5%. Data coding: Female = (1 if 
female, 0 if male). 
Setting Decision 
Setting Prediction 
Female 
*** 
* Constant 
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Table 6.B.2. Random-effects regression. Dependent variable: Setting 
Decision. Independent variables: Setting Prediction, Female, Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Significance level: *** p < 0.1%. Data coding: Female = (1 if female, 0 if 
male). 
Setting Decision 
Setting Prediction 
Female 
*** 
Constant 
Age 
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Table 6.B.3. Random-effects regression. Dependent variable: Setting 
Decision. Independent variables: Setting Prediction, Female, Age, Female * 
Role, Risk Attitude (only for consistent subject answers)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Significance level: *** p < 0.1%. Data coding: Female = (1 if female, 0 if 
male); Role = (1 if Leader, 0 if Follower); Risk Attitude = (1 for very risk 
loving, 9 for very risk averse). 
 
 
 
Setting Decision 
Setting Prediction 
Female 
*** 
Constant 
Age 
Female * Role 
Risk Attitude 
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Appendix 6C: Hierarchical Regressions on Absolute 
Deviations from Equilibrium 
 
 
Table 6.C.1. Fixed-effects regression. Dependent variable: Absolute 
Deviation. Independent variable: Role  
 
 
 
Significance level: *** p < 0.1%. Data coding: Role = (1 if Leader, 0 if 
Follower). 
 
 
*** 
*** 
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Table 6.C.2. Hausman test comparing the fixed-effects and the random-
effects model  
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Table 6.C.3. Random-effects regression. Dependent variable: Absolute 
Deviation. Independent variables: Role, Success Probability of FAST 
 
 
 
Significance level: *** p < 0.1%. 
*** 
*** 
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Table 6.C.4. Random-effects regression. Dependent variable: Absolute 
Deviation. Independent variables: Role, Success Probability of FAST, 
Accumulation  
 
 
 
Significance level: *** p < 0.1%.  
 
*** 
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Table 6.C.5. Random-effects regression. Dependent variable: Absolute 
Deviation. Independent variables: Role, Success Probability of FAST, 
Accumulation, Female  
 
 
 
Significance level: *** p < 0.1%. Data coding: Role = (1 if Leader, 0 if 
Follower); Female = (1 if female, 0 if male). 
*** 
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Table 6.C.6. Random-effects regression. Dependent variable: Absolute 
Deviation. Independent variables: Role, Success Probability of FAST, 
Accumulation, Female, Female * Role 
 
 
 
Significance level: * p < 5%. Data coding: Role = (1 if Leader, 0 if 
Follower); Female = (1 if female, 0 if male). 
* 
236 
 
Table 6.C.7. Random-effects regression. Dependent variable: Absolute 
Deviation. Independent variables: Role, Success Probability of FAST, 
Accumulation, Female, Female * Role, Age, Risk Attitude (only for 
consistent subject answers) 
 
 
 
Data coding: Role = (1 if Leader, 0 if Follower); Female = (1 if female, 0 if 
male); Risk Attitude = (1 for very risk loving, 9 for very risk averse). 
 
